Bibliotheca Sacra 149 (Jan. 1992): 3-15
[Copyright © 1992 Dallas Theological
Seminary; cited with permission;
digitally prepared for use at
Deuteronomy 24:1-4
and the
Issue of Divorce
J.
Carl Laney
Professor of Biblical Literature
Western Conservative Baptist Seminary,
Divorce and remarriage have become
regarded by many evan-
gelicals as viable solutions to intolerable
marriages. Most of those
who
seek a biblical basis for this opinion interpret Deuteronomy
24:1-4
as providing grounds for divorce and the right of remarriage in
cases
of adultery or sexual sin.1 Is there adequate textual evidence
for
this interpretation? Did Moses affirm the right of divorce for
sexual
sin? Is the remarriage of a divorced person without moral con-
sequence?
What application may Christians make of the legal pre-
cepts found in Deuteronomy 24:1-4?
The Background and Context
Not long after the Fall, God's
standard of one man married to
one
woman was violated (Gen. 2:24;
vorce had become a custom even among Israelites
(Deut. 24:1-4). And
so
the issue was addressed by Moses. The importance of this
Deuteronomy
passage in Jewish thinking is seen in the fact that it
served
as the background for the Pharisees' comments on divorce
when
they questioned Jesus (Matt. 19:1-12; Mark 10:1-10).
The Book of Deuteronomy gives a
restatement of the Mosaic
Covenant
for the benefit of the second generation of Israelites in the
wilderness.
Deuteronomy 24:1-4 is part of a larger section that ex-
1 For examples note John
Williams, For Every Cause? (Exeter:
Paternoster, 1981),
18;
Stanley A. Ellisen, Divorce and Remarriage in the Church, 2d ed. (
Zondervan, 1980), 64; Spiros
Zodhiates, What
about Divorce? (
Publishers,
1984), 47.
3
4
Bibliotheca
Sacra / January-March 1992
pands and applies the basic stipulations of the
covenant (5:6-21). As
observed
by Kaufman,2 the Decalogue seems to provide the basis for
the
instruction given in Deuteronomy 12-26. Kaufman suggests the
following
structure and arrangement:
Commandment Deuteronomy
Description
1-2 12:1-31
Worship
3 13:1-14:27
Name of God
4
5
6 19:1-22:8
Homicide
7 22:9-23:19
Adultery
8
9 24:8-25:4
False
charges
10 25:5-16
Coveting
Highlighting the significance of
this structure, Kaiser comments
that
"the entire second discourse of Moses (Deut. 5-26) is a single lit-
erary unit that convincingly demonstrates that the
moral law in-
forms
the statutes, judgments. . . and commands of God."3 Following
this
analysis, the text at hand would serve to illuminate and expand
the
prohibition against theft, in this case, the wrongful and illegal
taking
of a spouse.4
The Structure
It is crucial to note that this
passage does not institute or allow
for
divorce with approval. Deuteronomy 24:1-4 merely treats di-
vorce as a practice already existing and known.5
Grammatically the
passage
is an example of biblical case law in which certain condi-
tions are stated for which a particular command
applies. The prota-
sis
in verses 1-3 specifies the conditions that must apply before the
command
in the apodosis in verse 4 is followed. In other words 24:1-4
describes
a simple "if. . . then" situation.
The legislation specified in 24:1-4
actually deals with a partic-
ular case of remarriage. Grammatically the intent of
this law is not
2 Stephen A. Kaufman,
"The Structure of the Deuteronomic Law," MAARA V 1
(1978-79):
105-58.
3 Walter C. Kaiser, Jr., Toward Old Testament Ethics (
1983),
129.
4 Kaufman demonstrates
how Deuteronomy 24:1-4 fits well with the laws prohibit-
ing the taking of one's fill from another's crop (
(24:5),
and taking in pledge the upper millstone (24:6), a prohibition latent with sex-
ual imagery ("The Structure of the Deuteronomic Law," 140).
5 Peter C. Craigie, The Book of
Deuteronomy (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1976), 305.
Deuteronomy 24:1-4 and
the Issue of Divorce 5
to
give legal sanction to divorce or to regulate the divorce procedure.
The
intent of the passage is to prohibit the remarriage of a man to
his
divorced wife in cases of an intervening marriage by the wife.
Unfortunately the structure of the
passage has not always been
reflected
in the English translations. The King James Version, for ex-
ample,
places the apodosis at the end of verse 1 ("then let him write
her
a bill of divorcement"). The implication of this translation is
that
the Law requires that a husband divorce his offending wife.
This
translation, also found in the American Standard Version (1901)
and
the English Revised Version, has contributed to the confusion
seen
in the divorce-remarriage controversy.6
The Circumstances of Divorce (24:1-3)
The first three verses of
Deuteronomy 24 describe the situation
of
a woman who is twice divorced by different men or once divorced
and
then widowed. It should be carefully noted that divorce is nei-
ther commanded nor commended. The circumstances
leading to di-
vorce are simply described as a part of the case
under consideration.
The
verses do not indicate that divorce is necessarily sanctioned un-
der such circumstances. As Hurley observes, “Verse
1 does not focus on
the
grounds for the divorce as such, but rather discusses the first di-
vorce only to set the stage for the following
discussion."7
In this particular case the wife
lost favor with her husband be-
cause
of "some indecency" in her (literally, "nakedness of a
thing" or
"a
naked matter"). The precise meaning of the phrase rbADA tvar;f, is
uncertain.
Consequently it became the subject of heated rabbinic de-
bates
on divorce. The Septuagint's translation, a@sxemon
pra?gma
("some
unbecoming thing"), is equally obscure.
The phrase may refer to some
physical deficiency--such as the
inability
to bear children. This may be suggested by a possible par-
allel between Deuteronomy 24:1-4 and an old Assyrian
marriage con-
tract.8
The expression appears only once elsewhere in the Hebrew
Scriptures,
where it serves as a euphemism for excrement (Deut.
24:1
may refer to some shameful or repulsive act. Isaksson
takes it to
refer
to the wife's indecent exposure.9 In the first century conserva-
6 The New King James
Version gives a proper rendering of the text
7 James B. Hurley, Man and Woman in Biblical Perspective (
van,
1981), 99.
8 James B. Pritchard,
ed., Ancient Near Eastern Texts, 3d
ed (
ton
University Press, 1969), 543.
9 Abel Isaksson, Marriage
and Ministry in the New
Gleerup, 1965), 26-27.
6
Bibliotheca Sacra /
January-March 1992
tive Rabbi Shammai
interpreted the phrase as referring to marital
unchastity, while Rabbi Hillel
interpreted it more broadly to refer
to
anything unpleasant (Gittin
It seems unlikely that rbADA tvar;f, could refer to
adultery, since this
was
punishable by death (Deut.
Deuteronomy
24:1 cannot refer to adultery.10 He concludes that it
must
refer to "some indecency or impropriety of behavior" short of
licit
sexual intercourse.11 Whatever the precise meaning of rbADA tvar;f,
the
grammar makes clear that Moses was describing a case, not pre-
scribing
a course of action for dealing with an offensive wife.
The passage describes the actions of
a husband in dealing with
his
offending wife. According to custom the husband wrote out a cer-
tificate of divorce and delivered it to the wife.
The essential words
of
this document became fixed in Jewish tradition and are recorded in
the
Mishnah, "Behold, you are free to marry any
man" (Gittin 9:3).
The
passage then states that the wife left her husband's home and
became
another man's wife. Sometime after the second marriage,
the
woman was again divorced or widowed (Deut. 24:2-3).
The Issue of Case Law
Many expositors have concluded that
since Deuteronomy 24:1-3
does
not prohibit divorce and remarriage, both are approved by God.
This
conclusion is inconsistent with the context of the passage (v. 4)
and
with the nature of biblical case law.
The covenant entered into by God and
Israel at Mount Sinai con-
tains the obligations imposed on and accepted by the
Israelite peo-
ple. These covenant stipulations take two basic forms:
apodictic and
casuistic.
Apodictic (derived from the Greek a]po<, "from," and dei<k-
numi, "to show")
laws are stated in imperative terms such as "you
shall
not. . . ." Casuistic (derived from the Latin casus,
"case") laws
are
stated in the form of cases. If certain circumstances occur, a cer-
tain law must then apply. The protasis-apodosis
sequence ("if. . . ,
then.
. .") is the most frequent indicator of biblical casuistic law.
Deuteronomy
24:1-4 is such an example.
Deuteronomy 12-26 contains the detailed
stipulations of the
covenant.
This section elaborates the basic demands of Deuteronomy
5-11
by providing examples and applications in the religious life
(12:1-16:17),
political life (16:18-20:20), and social life (chaps. 21-
26)
of the nation. Apart from the case under consideration, Deuteron-
10 John Murray, Divorce (Phillipsburg, NJ: Presbyterian
& Reformed, 1961), 10-12.
11 Ibid., p. 12.
Deuteronomy 24:1-4 and
the Issue of Divorce 7
omy 12-26 contains 31 examples of case law. In 19
of these examples
the
protasis contains a situation that is either immoral
or has some
negative
connotation.12 The other 12 present situations that appear
morally
neutral.13
Deuteronomy 25:11-12 is an example
of case law in which the
protasis contains a situation that is immoral or
has negative conno-
tations. A woman who seizes the genitals of a
male opponent to help
her
husband in a struggle shall have her hand cut off. No one would
dare
suggest that the case being described is presented with ap-
proval. Many other similar examples could be cited.
What is the implication for the
study of Deuteronomy 24:1-4?
Just
as legislation on harlotry (23:18) in no way authorizes harlotry,
so
a law on divorce and remarriage is not authorization for them.
The
presentation of the case does not constitute divine approval of
the
actions, described. The context (including the apodosis) must be
considered
in order to discern whether the situation is merely being
described
or whether the actions described have divine sanction.
Too often interpreters have
discussed 24:1-4 as if God sanctions
divorce
and remarriage. The characteristic grammar of biblical case
law
argues against this. In fact the text itself is far from approving
the
second marriage, as is evident from verse 4.
The
Prohibition against Remarriage (24:4)
The main point of this example of
biblical case law appears in
the
apodosis (the "then" clause) of verse 4. Here it is clear that the
law
relates not to the matter of divorce as such, but to a particular
case
of remarriage. Moses declared that a man may not remarry his
former
wife if she has in the meantime been married to another man.
Even
though her second husband should divorce her or die, she must
not
return to her first husband. The prohibition is supported by an
explanation,
a reason, and a command. As Kaiser correctly notes,
this
is "the only regulative statement in this passage."14
THE
EXPLANATION
The prohibition against remarriage
is elaborated and explained
by
"since she has been defiled." The word rw,xE is used as a
conjunction
12 See Deuteronomy
13:1-5; 13:6-11; 13:12-18; 15:12-15; 17:1-5; 19:11-13;
19:16-19;
21:1-7;
22:28-29;
24:7; 25:7-10; 25:11-12.
13 See Deuteronomy
14:24-25; 15:7-8; 15:16-18; 17:8-9; 18:6-8; 23:10-13;
23:21-23;
23:24-25; 24:5; 24:19-22; 25:1-3; 25:5-6.
14 Kaiser, Toward Old Testament Ethics, 200.
8
Bibliotheca Sacra /
January-March 1992
with
yreHExa and could be
translated, "after that." The obvious question
is,
"After what?" The answer must be found in verses 1-3, which de-
scribe
the divorce and remarriage of the woman. It is unlikely that
divorce
itself would be regarded as defiling, since it violates no
command
and involves no sexual act. Apparently the second mar-
riage--with its physical union--is viewed as bringing
defilement.
The word "defiled" (xmeFA) is a Hothpa' el, the
less common re-
flexive passive conjugation, and means "to
be made unclean." This
stem
generally communicates a passive idea ("was defiled"), but can
tend
toward a reflexive idea ("she defiled herself"), depending on
the
context. Since it is unclear here who bears the responsibility for
the
defilement, one could simply translate "she has been defiled."
The Hebrew word xmeFA is used of sexual uncleanness (moral viola-
tion), religious uncleanness (bloodshed or
idolatry), and ceremonial
uncleanness
(eating unclean foods, touching a dead body). In Leviti-
cus 18:20 and Numbers 5:13-14 it is used of the
defilement of adultery.
The
implication is that a woman's remarriage after divorce is simi-
lar to adultery in that she cohabits with another
man.15 Keil and
Delitzsch comment:
The second marriage of a woman who
had been divorced is designated
by Moses a defilement of the woman,
primarily no doubt with refer-
ence to
the fact that the emissio seminis in
sexual intercourse ren-
dered
unclean, though not merely in the sense of such a defilement as
was removed in the evening by simple
washing, but a moral defile-
ment,
i.e., blemishing, desecration of the sexual communion which was
sanctified by marriage.16
The
use of xmeFA in Deuteronomy 24:4
suggests that remarriage follow-
ing divorce is placed on a par with adultery. The
Mosaic perspective
is
consistent with Jesus' teaching in Mark 10:11-12, where divorce
and
remarriage by either husband or wife is regarded as adulterous.
THE
REASON
To remarry one's original husband
after an intervening marriage
is
declared "an abomination before Yahweh." The word "abomina-
tion" (hbAfeOT) is used of things
detestable in either the moral or gen-
eral sense. Youngblood states that the word includes
that which is
"aesthetically
and morally repulsive."17 The term is used to de-
scribe
false gods (Deut. 32:16), ritually unclean animals (Deut. 14:3),
homosexual
relations (Lev. 18:22), and occultic activities
(Deut. 18:9-
15 Craigie,
The Book of Deuteronomy, 305.
16 C. F. Keil and F. Delitzsch, Commentary on the Old Testament, 10
vols. (Grand
Rapids:
Eerdmans, 1981), vol. 1: The Pentateuch, 418.
17 Theological Wordbook of the Old Testament, S.v.
"hbAreOT," by Ronald F.
Young-
blood
(1980), 2:976-77.
Deuteronomy 24:1-4 and
the Issue of Divorce 9
14).
The term is used in Leviticus 18:26-30 with reference to numerous
previously
mentioned aberrations including incest, adultery, child
sacrifice,
homosexuality, and bestiality.
THE
COMMAND
The reason ("for that is an
abomination") is followed by the
command,
"You shall not bring sin on the land which Yahweh your
God
gives you as an inheritance." To commit the act prohibited in
this
example of case law amounts to bringing the guilt of sin on Is-
rael's land. These words bring to mind the warning God
gave the Is-
raelites in Leviticus 18:24-25 regarding the
wicked ways of Canaan:
"Do
not defile yourselves by any of these things; for by all these the
nations
which I am casting out before you have become defiled. For
the
land has become defiled, therefore I have visited its punishment
upon
it, so the land has spewed out its inhabitants."
As the land was "defiled"
by the sexual abominations of the
Canaanites,
so there was danger of similar defilement by the remar-
riage of a divorced woman to her husband in the case
of an interven-
ing marriage. The prohibition was designed to
prevent the defile-
ment of the land that God was giving His people as
an inheritance.
The
Purpose of the Legislation
What did God intend to accomplish by
this law? What was its
purpose
in Israelite society?
TO
ENSURE THE PROPER LEGAL PROCEDURE
Based on the faulty translation of
the King James Version, some
have
argued that the purpose of this legislation was to ensure that
proper
legal procedure was used in the termination of marriage.
Atkinson
comments, "This would make public the termination of the
first
marriage, and so promote a sense of social responsibility, and
also--and
perhaps more importantly--give the divorced woman
rights
in law, by protecting her against the capital charge of adul-
tery if she remarried."18 The major
oversight by those suggesting
this
interpretation is the failure to recognize that the procedure de-
scribed
in verses 1-3 is merely descriptive, not prescriptive.
TO
DISCOURAGE DIVORCE
Murray, among others, has argued
that the legislation was de-
signed
to discourage divorce.19 As Adams comments, "The whole
point
of the four verses in question is to forestall hasty action by
making
it impossible to rectify the situation when divorce and re-
18 Atkinson, To Have and to Hold, 104.
19 Murray, Divorce, 3-16.
10
Bibliotheca Sacra /
January-March 1992
marriage
to another takes place (cf. 1 Cor. 7:11)."20
Since there was a
good
possibility of not being able to remarry his former wife, the
husband
would be less likely to put his wife away hastily. But one
wonders
whether this legislation would deter an angry husband.
Craigie
follows this viewpoint, but with a slightly different
perspective.
He suggests that Deuteronomy 24:1-4 applied certain
restrictions
on divorce to prevent it from becoming "too easy." If
abused,
divorce and remarriage "would become a 'legal' form of com-
mitting adultery."21
While this view has merit, it has
been pointed out by Thompson
that
the major deterrent to divorce in the biblical period was finan-
cial. Usually the husband forfeited the dowry when
divorcing his
wife
and sometimes had to make divorce payments as well.22
TO
PROTECT THE SECOND MARRIAGE
In a lecture delivered at the
University of Oxford on remarriage
in
Jewish Law, Yaron suggested that Deuteronomy 24:1-4
was de-
signed
to protect the second marriage.23
When the divorcee has married
another man, we have before us the
possibility of tension within the
"triangle" which has come into being.
The first husband may wish to get
back his wife, having repented of
dismissing her, the wife may draw
comparisons between her two hus-
bands unfavourable
to the second one, and may indulge in overtures
disruptive of the second marriage.
Or, nothing of the kind may have
actually happened, but the second
husband may go through agonies of
jealousy and apprehension, making
life a hell for the wife also. All
these possibilities are avoided once
the reunion is prevented.24
The
explanation seems at first convincing. But the view fails to ex-
plain
why the rule would apply after the death of the second hus-
band
when the second marriage would no longer be in jeopardy.25
TO
PREVENT A TYPE OF INCEST
Wenham has noted that the reasons
the husband should not
take
back his former wife--defilement, abomination, and pollution
20 Jay E. Adams, Marriage, Divorce and Remarriage in the
Bible (Phillipsburg, NJ:
Presbyterian
& Reformed, 1980), 62; J. Carl Laney, The
Divorce Myth (Minneapolis:
Bethany
House, 1981),32.
21 Craigie,
The Book of Deuteronomy, 305.
22 J. A. Thompson, Deuteronomy (Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity, 1974),244.
23 R. Varon,
"The Restoration of Marriage," Journal
of Jewish Studies 17 (1966): 1-11.
24 Ibid., 8.
25 C. M. Carmichael, The Laws of Deuteronomy (Ithaca, NY:
Cornell University
Press,
1974), 205.
Deuteronomy 24:1-4 and the Issue of
Divorce 11
of
the land--occur repeatedly in connection with the sexual offenses
listed
in Leviticus 18 and 20.26
As background for his viewpoint,
Wenham argues that marriage
establishes
a close and lasting "one flesh" (Gen. 2:24) relationship
that
does not terminate with divorce. From a biblical perspective,
marital
intercourse makes a man and wife as closely related as par-
ents and children. If a man may not marry his
sister-in-law because
she
has in effect become his sister (Lev. 18:16; 20:21), may he re-
marry
his former wife?
According to Wenham, Deuteronomy
24:1-4 uses the logic of
incest
laws to prohibit the restoration of the first marriage. If a di-
vorced couple should come together again after an
intervening mar-
riage, it would be as bad as a man marrying his
sister. To reconstitute
the
first marriage would be a "type of incest," which is explicitly
prohibited
in Leviticus 18:6-18.27 Wenham's view has support from
the
greater context of levitical law and has been favorably
re-
viewed.28
This view is an intriguing explanation for the prohibition
against
remarriage to one's original partner following divorce.
The major difficulty with this view
is that it seems to reach be-
yond
what is clear to the reader. One wonders how many Israelites
would
have seen the connection between the "one flesh" of the mar-
riage union and the incest laws of Leviticus 18:6-18.
Wenham uses
the
phrase, "type of incest." Is remarriage to one's spouse after an in-
tervening marriage actually incest or not? Yet
while Wenham's
view
seems obscure to the 20th-century interpreter, it may not have
been
so to those of Moses' day, whose lives centered around the cere-
monial requirements of the Law.
TO
PROTECT A STIGMATIZED WOMAN
Luck suggests that the passage under
consideration "intends to
protect
a stigmatized woman from further abuse by her offending
first
husband."29 According to Luck, Deuteronomy 24:1-4 deals not
with
an offending wife but with a sinning husband.
The text is trying to convey that
the first husband is responsible to
come to his senses before the second
marriage occurs. That he does
not, underlines the offensiveness of
the first husband's character. The
man was so hard-hearted that he cast
the woman from himself. Then,
he was so unrepentant that he
allowed her to be sexually coupled to an-
other man. Thus, in a sense, the
second marriage did defile the
26 Gordon J. Wenham,
"The Restoration of Marriage Reconsidered," Journal of Jewish
Studies 30 (1979): 36-40.
27 Ibid., 40.
28 See Kaiser, Toward Old Testament Ethics, 202-3.
29 William F. Luck, Divorce and Remarriage: Recovering the
Biblical View (San
Francisco:
Harper & Row, 1987), 64.
12
Bibliotheca Sacra /
January-March 1992
woman, but the fact stands not
really against her character but against
the character of her treacherous
first husband.30
Luck
certainly offers a creative approach to an old problem. Yet his
view
introduces speculation and hypothesis. Though Luck regards
the
first husband as "hard-hearted" and "unrepentant," the
passage
does
not offer any comment as to the husband's character.
In this appeal to Jeremiah 3:1 to
support his view,31 Luck seems to
have
missed the point of the prophet. Jeremiah was simply saying
that
Judah wanted to have it both ways--clinging to harlot lovers
and
renewing her "marriage" with Yahweh. The question raised by
the
prophet is, "What right had Judah, frightened by the conse-
quences of her evil deeds, to take the
initiative in seeking to return to
Yahweh?"32
Jeremiah was making a limited application of Deut-
eronomy 24:1-4. Judah had not married a
particular lover, but, like
Gomer, had been unfaithful. Clearly God had not issued
a divorce
document
(cf. Isa. 50:1). Therefore the renewal of His
covenant (i.e.,
"marriage")
relationship with Judah would not actually constitute a
violation
of Deuteronomy 24:1-4.
TO
DETER GREEDY PROFIT BY THE FIRST HUSBAND
Westbrook suggests that the key to
understanding the purpose of
Deuteronomy
24:1-4 "lies in the property aspect of marriage--more
exactly,
in the financial consequences of its dissolution."33 West-
brook
points out that a legal distinction between two kinds of divorce
was
recognized in various ancient Near Eastern law codes.
In cases where the wife was guilty
of socially recognized mis-
conduct
the husband was justified in divorcing her without any fi-
nancial consequences to himself. This principle
applies to the first
husband's
divorce mentioned in Deuteronomy 24:1-4, which was for
"some
indecency." In all other cases of marital dissolution the wife
was
entitled to a financial settlement. At the very least, her dowry
would
be restored. According to Westbrook, this principle applies to
the
second husband's divorce mentioned in Deuteronomy 24:3. Here
no
guilt on the wife's part is stated or implied; yet the husband
"turns
against her" or literally "hates her."34
According to Westbrook, the first
husband in Deuteronomy 24:1-4
30 Ibid., 63.
31 Ibid.
32 J. A. Thompson, The Book of Jeremiah (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1980), 191.
33 Raymond Westbrook,
"The Prohibition on Restoration of Marriage in Deut. 24:1-
4,"
in Studies in the Bible: 1986, ed. S.
Japhet, Scripta Hierosolymitana 31 (Jeru-
salem: Magnes, 1986), 393.
34 Ibid., 401-2.
Deuteronomy 24:1-4 and
the Issue of Divorce 13
divorced
his wife on the grounds of her "indecency" and thus escaped
the
normal financial consequences. He paid her no divorce money
and
probably kept her dowry. Yet she was able to find another hus-
band
who provided for her an inheritance (by his death) or a divorce
settlement.
And now that she was a wealthy widow or divorcee,
Westbrook
suggests, the first husband would forget his original objec-
tions and seek to remarry her. The effect would be
that the first hus-
band
profited twice-first by rejecting his wife and then by remarry-
ing her. It is this unjust enrichment that the law
in Deuteronomy
24:1-4
seeks to prevent.35
Westbrook's solution fits nicely
with Kaufman's analysis of the
structure
of Deuteronomic law in that Deuteronomy 24:1-4 falls
within
the section (23:20-24:7) that expands the eighth command-
ment, "You shall not steal" (5:19). And
yet the view is based on con-
siderable hypothesis and speculation. His view
does not deal ade-
quately with the key terms
"abomination" and "sin on the land."
And
the view implies that the first divorce and remarriage is pre-
sented with approval. This is contrary to a proper
understanding of
the
clause, "since she has been defiled" (24:4).
A
SYNTHETIC APPROACH
In light of the many diverse
opinions as to the purpose of the
prohibition
of remarriage in Deuteronomy 24:1-4, it is wise to avoid
dogmatism
in reaching a conclusion. It may well be that the text was
intended
to accomplish at least two things. First, this restriction
seems
to guard against divorce becoming a legalized form of adul-
tery. Second, the prohibition against remarrying the
same woman
would
also serve as a moderating influence on divorce. Wenham's
analysis
contributes to this synthetic view by way of clarification.
The
laws against incest may serve to explain why the prohibition in
Deuteronomy
24:4 was necessary, that is, to avoid bringing the guilt
of
sin on the land.
Concluding Observations
Several concluding observations
based on this study may help in
considering
the issues in the divorce-remarriage controversy. First,
Deuteronomy
24:1-4 did not institute divorce. The passage simply
acknowledges
divorce as taking place, and not necessarily with di-
vine
approval. Second, though divorce is "permitted" in 24:1-4 in
the
sense that it is not specifically prohibited by law, divorce was
not
looked on with favor by the Hebrew Scriptures. The lot of a di-
35 Ibid., 404.
14
Bibliotheca Sacra /
January-March 1992
vorcee was not pleasant (Isa.
54:6). Though she was free to remarry
she
could not marry a priest (Lev. 21:7). This suggests that there was
"something
of a stigma (social or moral) attached to her as a divorced
woman.
Third, the clause, "since she has been defiled" (Deut. 24:4),
indicates
that some measure of moral defilement was associated
with
a divorced woman if she remarried. Fourth, 24:1-4 clearly
prohibited
the remarriage of a divorced woman to her first husband
if
since the divorce she had been married to another man.
Deuteronomy 24:1-4 was brought to
the attention of Jesus by some
religious
leaders who sought to "test" Him on the subject of divorce
and
remarriage (Matt. 19:1-12). Most of the first-century Jewish
teachers
believed that Deuteronomy 24:1-4 authorized divorce
They
differed only with regard to the legitimate grounds for divorce
(Gittin 9:10).
In talking with the Pharisees, Jesus
directed their attention to
God's
original design for marriage as set forth in Genesis 2:24. Jesus
affirmed
that man should not separate what God has joined (Matt.
19:6).
When Jesus' opponents cited Deuteronomy 24:1-4, which they
interpreted
as legal authorization for divorce, Jesus did not say
Moses
commanded divorce. Instead Jesus said Moses permitted it be-
cause
of the "hardness" of the Israelite hearts. Hurley remarks,
"Thus,
whereas the Pharisees had taken Moses' concession of divorce
as
God's design, Jesus took it as a regulatory measure to deal with the
result
of sin."36 Derrett further observes
that where Jewish interpre-
tation went wrong was in "the failure to perceive
that the one flesh
persists
after divorce."37 Therefore remarriage after divorce brings
moral
defilement not unlike that of adultery (Matt. 19:9).38
36 Hurley, Man and Woman in Biblical Perspective,
101.
37 J. D. M. Derrett, Law in the
New Testament (
1970),377.
38 The interpretation of
the exception clause in Matthew 5:32 and 19:9 is an issue of
great
debate among evangelicals and is outside the scope of this article. There are
four
major views as to the meaning of the exception. The patristic (early church fa-
thers) view interprets the exception to allow for
divorce for sexual sin, but that the
grammar
and syntax forbid remarriage. The Erasmian (Reformed
or traditional
Protestant)
view interprets the exception to allow for both divorce and remarriage in
cases
of adultery or sexual sin. The betrothal (engagement) view understands the ex-
ception to refer to a breach of the marriage
contract before the union is consummated,
and
that both divorce and remarriage are forbidden. The consanguinity (unlawful
marriage)
view interprets the exception to refer to the laws of Leviticus 18:6-18 pro-
hibiting incestuous marriage. According to this
view, divorce is allowed in cases of
incestuous
marriage, but remarriage is forbidden. Wenham's arguments on the purpose
of
Deuteronomy 24:1-4 seem to favor the fourth view.
For discussion of the meaning of the
Greek term pornei<a used in Matthew's excep-
tion clause, see Joseph A. Fitzmyer,
"The Matthean Divorce Texts and Some New
Palestinian
Evidence," Theological Studies
37 (1976): 197-226; Joseph Jensen, "Does
Porneia Mean Fornication?" Novum Testamentum
20 (1978): 161-84; Laney, The Di-
Deuteronomy 24:1-4 and
the Issue of Divorce 15
Some have questioned the present
application of this text to
Christians
who have been divorced and remarried. Are believers
prohibited
by Deuteronomy 24:1-4 from remarrying their original
spouse
in cases where there has been an intervening marriage? One
could
argue that the concern for "sin on the land" would limit the
application
of the text to the Jewish people in the
der the Old Covenant. Yet the issue of the wife
being "defiled" and
concern
to avoid "an abomination before the Lord" would argue
against
a temporal or limited application. Since there is nothing in
the
New Testament that modifies or abrogates this clear command,
there
seems to be no biblical basis for doing away with its present
application.
According to Deuteronomy 24:1-4, a man may not re-
marry
his divorced wife if she has in the meantime been married to
another
man.
vorce Myth, 66-78; Ben Witherington,
"Matthew
tional Situation?" New Testament Studies 31 (1985): 571-76; J. Carl Laney, “No Di-
vorce and No Remarriage," in Divorce and Remarriage, ed. H. Wayne
House (Downers
Grove,
IL: InterVarsity, 1990), 33-37.
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