IS THERE AN ALTERNATIVE TO ORGANIC EVOLUTION?*

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I

For over one hundred years there has been a continuous controversy, between evolutionists and anti-evolutionists over the body of data and theory of the origin, antiquity, and development of life and of man. While the controversy has been continuous, it has by no means been uniform. For a long time each dogmatically defended positions of some truth mixed with considerable error, in violent and fruitless debate, whose brilliance was in many cases mostly oratorical or literary. As the factual and scientific aspects of the evolutionary position increased and became more widely accepted, however, the bases for the anti-evolutionary or creationist1 opposition remained comparatively constant, with the result that, while the anti-evolutionists continued to actively oppose the evolutionist position, their attacks were less and less frequently reciprocated. Finally the evolutionist's entanglements with anti-evolutionists dwindled to an occasional defense or debate, the last of which of any consequence in this country was the famous Scopes trial of 1925. Interaction still persists in the British Commonwealth, however, chiefly due to the seemingly tireless efforts of the Evolution Protest Movement with active branches in London, Australia, and New Zealand.

Quite another pattern also emerges from a general review of this question. It is quite evident that in the view each has taken, and still takes of the other, whether in opposition or reaction, there is a tremendous degree of ignorance as to progress made in the past hundred years. The creationist exhibits in almost all of his anti-evolutionary literature an antiquated, "moth-ball" variety of "ever onward, ever upward" conception of evolutionism reminiscent of the latter nineteenth century, while the evolutionist on his part tends to identify all creationists with an immutability of species - deluge geology -- Ussher chronology type of position, sometimes referred to as "hyperorthodox", or "hyper-traditionalist."2

* This article constitutes part of Mr. Buswell's chapter in the forthcoming book, One Hundred Years After Darwin, scheduled for publication by Eerdmans in the late spring.

1. For present purposes other "anti-" evolutionary views like neo-Darwinian, or neo-Lamarckian, or other variations within scientific circles are ignored.

2. The term "hyperorthodox" has been recently brought into prominence by Dr. Bernard Ramm (1954: 27-31 et passim). Because of its relationship to the terms "fundamentalist" and "orthodox" and because of rather consistent objection
The complicating factor in all this is that while the anti-evolutionist is wrong in his usual appraisal of evolution today, the creationist position is still widely represented by the hyper-traditionalist point of view, from which has split a Creationist group which seeks to keep itself up-to-date scientifically while adopting a non-evolutionary rather than to its use, it should be clearly defined and its usage clarified. The term "fundamentalist" is today the most widely known label for the Bible-believing creationist in scientific circles. It is important, however, to understand the crucial distinction between at least two meanings of this widely misused term:

Fundamentalism originally referred to the belief that there are certain great truths in Christianity, which, if changed, would dissolve Christianity. Each Christian is allowed personal conviction in respect to a great number of doctrines and interpretations but that personal liberty is hedged about by key infallible and eternal doctrines. This is the term in its historic and good sense. The movement included such stalwarts as James Orr, J. Gresham Machen, Benjamin Warfield, W. H. Green and the numerous contributors to the famous Fundamentals papers.

In more recent years another movement has given the word an odious connotation. Alen with much zeal, enthusiasm and conviction, yet lacking frequently in education or cultural breadth, and many times individualistic, took to the stump to defend the faith. Many times they were dogmatic beyond evidence, or were intractable of disposition, or were obnoxiously anti-cultural, anti-scientific and anti-educational. Hence the term came to mean one who was bigoted, an obscurantist, a fideist, a fighter and an anti-intellectual [Ramm 1955: 131.].

The creationist position which this paper attempts to advance is to be identified with the first, and not the second meaning of "fundamentalist" as defined above. It is fully recognized, however, that all creationists who do not agree with this position are not automatically considered in the second category.

It is abundantly clear from his discussion of the matter (1954) that Ramm is employing the term "hyperorthodox" to refer to this second brand of fundamentalist so as not to perpetuate the "odious connotation" with the term. Ramm's reason for this is that we can sin to the right as well as to the left. Patriotism can degenerate into jingoism and enthusiasm into fanaticism and virtue into prudishness. It is possible not only to have slack theological views, but have views far more rigid and dogmatic than Scripture itself. Hyperorthodoxy in trying to be loyal to the Bible has developed an exaggerated sense of what loyalty to the Bible means [1954: 291.

He evidently got the term from J. W. Dawson, who, he points out (1954: 28), referred to "pedantic hyperorthodoxy" in evangelical apologetics in 1877.

Certain objections to my use of the term have been raised, however, chiefly upon the basis of a possible mss-identification of this position with sound, theological orthodoxy. Thus the alternatives "distorted orthodoxy" and "blind orthodoxy" have been suggested. Even more significant, perhaps, is the objection to the form of the term itself. Thus the Rev. John Buswell, my brother, wrote me, "Can anyone be hyperorthodox? Is not orthodoxy an ultimate-in-one sphere anyway? In other words, many would regard 'hyper-orthodox' as they would 'hyper-straight' or 'hyper-sterilized.' "

Since these objections, and others, seem to have some value, I have chosen to use instead the term "hyper-traditionalist" suggested by my colleague, Professor Joseph Free. Although a bit more cumbersome, this term carries none of the theological associations invariably attached to "orthodoxy" and "fundamentalism", and seems in addition to refer a bit more precisely to those who being bound by tradition, prefer to retain the peripheral, relative, and changeable interpretations with the fundamental truths, without being able to distinguish the difference.
an anti-evolutionary position. It is this position which the modern evolutionist has tended to overlook, and which constitutes the alternative to organic evolution that I wish to set forth here.

The hyper-traditionalist position, however, is the most often heard, though seldom listened-to, expression of creationism. Thus it is not without reason that G. G. Simpson could dispense with a consideration of creationism in a public lecture in Philadelphia in 1950 with words to the effect that "creationists are found today only in non- or anti-scientific circles."

One of the chief drawbacks to the anti-evolutionists, from Darwin's early critics to the present day, familiar as some of their leaders are with the data, is that their activities and literature have been almost completely wrapped up in arguments over petty fragments of the record, assuming that to attack evolution as a total philosophy one must show the data upon which the assumptions are based to be untrue. Instead of offering a positive, non-evolutionary interpretation of the data themselves, they have been guilty of treating them with scorn and sarcasm for no other reason than that the evolutionist has done something with them first.

What results is that both parties claim to have truth on their side and at the same time charge the other with falsity and ignorance. The creationist attacks the evolutionist's total philosophy from the standpoint of revelation, while the evolutionist answers with scientific data. Since the evolutionist is seldom caught up in an argument over revelation, the creationist is inevitably drawn to argue on the evolutionist's own ground in terms of genetic processes or paleontological remains, where he is generally over his depth. This anti-evolutionary position has been characteristically negative and unscientific in spite of its strong adherence to the scriptural fundamentals of the historic Christian faith.

II

Now to a consideration of the non-evolutionary creationist position. There are three major areas to consider, each with its relevant body of evidences and various interpretations. They are:

a. The origin of life.
b. The origin and age of man.
c. The processes of development since their origin.

The consideration of these areas is not simply a question of whether evolution" or "creation" is the exclusive explanation. Organic evolution is so inclusive and so complex a system that it must be broken down into its constituent elements. This may be attempted on various levels of abstraction. One of the most obvious and important steps which can
be taken is a separation of the consideration of origins from the consideration of process. I have the impression that British evolutionists are perhaps oftener involved in considerations of origins than are American evolutionists. The American, at least in anthropological circles, tends to leave questions of the origin of the earth and of life to the astronomers, physicists, and biologists on the one hand, or to the philosophers on the other. William Howells has stated the position thus:

We are totally bewildered, of course, about the beginnings of life and the reasons for our existence, and these are questions which have been grist to the mills of philosophers and myth-makers alike. But we know, roughly, what happened along the way, and that is the story of human evolution [1944:3].

Considerations of process, then, make up the major concerns of the evolutionist. Therefore let us postpone the consideration of origins to another context.

I find Simpson's three "modes" or aspects of evolution extremely useful for purposes of analysis, and comparison with the Creationist position. The first of these is speciation or "splitting" which, as Simpson points out, "is almost the only mode accessible for experimental biology, neozoology, and genetics. It embraces almost all the dynamic evolutionary phenomena subject to direct experimental attack." The second mode Simpson calls "phyletic" evolution, which "involves the sustained, directional (but not necessarily rectilinear) shift of the average characters of populations. It is not primarily the splitting up of a population, but the change of the population as a whole." While speciation may be called an explanation for races, species, and sometimes genera, Simpson points out that the phyletic mode "is typically related to middle taxonomic levels, usually genera, subfamilies, and families." He also observes that "nine tenths of the pertinent data of paleontology fall into patterns of the phyletic mode" (1944: 202-203).

Thus, although evolution does not consist of wholly distinct processes, and a fossil series, for example, can exhibit speciation, or splitting, in a phyletic pattern through geological time, nevertheless the well documented data of natural selection on these levels—the genetic and geological processes—may be abstracted from the over-all theory of organic evolution. It is the position of the creationist, at this point, that he can accept all of the facts within these two areas of consideration. Thus the creationist need have no quarrel with the transmutation of species or other taxonomic categories, and may fully accept the genetic explanation for variation. Similarly he may accept the evidence of the "evolution" of the horse, and other such well documented paleontological series, upon the basis of the adaptive dynamic interaction of genetic and environmental change called natural selection.
Turning to more anthropological matters, the creationist accepts the evidence for the age of prehistoric man and his culture. He has no quarrel with an antiquity of hundreds of thousands of years; there is nothing in the Bible to indicate how long ago man was created. The date of 4004 B.C. which has been an item of ridicule by evolutionists and a rallying point for the hyper-traditionalist, now finds itself a cultural survival, firmly ensconced in the notes on page 1 of certain editions of the Bible, but without a valid function in either modern Christian theology or chronology.

Neither has the creationist any quarrel with morphological features of ancient man. The Bible, which is the creationist's basis of belief and life, simply says nothing about what Adam looked like. And, although the creationist, Protestant and Catholic alike, must of necessity hold to the belief (which will be further discussed below) that there was a "first man," it is of no consequence whether he looked like a pithecanthropoid or a Caucasoid. Furthermore, if anthropological opinion swings in favor of calling some prehistoric types by separate specific or generic names, and other types Homo Sapiens with modern man, this is of relatively little consequence. For the creationist recognizes the arbitrary and non-qualitative nature of taxonomic categories and is not bound to equate any one of them with the "kind" spoken of in Genesis 1.

Thus the creationist looks on with the same interest, or relief, as any anthropologist, when a classic Neanderthaloid posture is straightened up, or a Piltdown forgery exposed. Here, of course, is a characteristic difference from the hyper-traditionalist reaction. When the Piltdown news hit the press early in 1954 the anti-evolutionist and many religious journals were full of "I told you so's" and another major pillar of evolution had fallen! One creationist on the other hand simply expressed "relief that one of the more perplexing riddles of man's prehistory is finally solved." Presumably the same sort of reactions can be expected once Professor Strauss's re-analysis of the La Chapelle bones gains wider circulation.

III

So far we have discussed chiefly those areas of concurrence between the evolutionary and the creationist positions. With the consideration of Simpson's third mode, however, we introduce the area of disagreement between the two. Essentially it boils down to a matter of facts vs. theory, data vs. interpretation, or a matter of attitudes and pre-suppositions.

Despite the factual basis of speciation and phyletic evolution, there are what Simpson refers to as "major discontinuities of the record" existing in the paleontology of the larger taxonomic groups between which there

is no fossil evidence of relationship. The origins of these larger groups are attributed to "a particular set of evolutionary events" that are "changes of adaptive zones such that transitional forms between the old zone and the new cannot, or at any rate do not, persist" (1953: 389). After showing in some detail how this applies to the perissodactyls, or horse group, Simpson concluded in 1944 that this regular absence of transitional forms is not confined to mammals, but is an almost universal phenomenon, as has long been noted by paleontologists. It is true of almost all orders of all classes of animals, both vertebrate and invertebrate. A fortiori, it is also true of the classes, themselves, and of the major animal phyla, and it is apparently also true of analogous categories of plants (1944: 107).

Now Simpson's third mode called "quantum" evolution purports to be the explanation for the jumping of these gaps. In his words, quantum evolution is "applied to the relatively rapid shift of a biotic population in disequilibrium, to an equilibrium distinctly unlike an ancestral condition. ... It is . . . believed to be the dominant and most essential process in the origin of taxonomic units of relatively high rank, such as families, orders, and classes. It is believed to include circumstances that explain the mystery that hovers over the origins of such major groups" (1944: 206).

Simpson candidly admits this as a "controversial and hypothetical" attempt to establish the existence of an "inferred phenomena." He points out that "major incidents of quantum evolution have systematically poor records, for reasons discussed [above]. Nevertheless, we do have many partial records of quantum evolution, even at high levels (e.g., origin of classes), which can be completed by sound and unequivocal inference."4

Of course, Simpson doesn't necessarily represent all evolutionists, but his three-fold breakdown is, de facto, applicable to organic evolution in its present-day form. Thus we conclude that it is at this point--quantum evolution--that the creationist and the evolutionist must part company. Again the question, "What is the alternative?" needs explicit definition. In other words, how will "creation" as an alternative to the quantum interpretation still fit the facts? As mentioned above, it becomes a matter of pre-supposition: for the creationist, supernaturalism; for the evolutionist, naturalism. I propose then that since in a percentage of orders, major gaps appear between them, perhaps the order is as near to being what Genesis 1 means by the term "kind" as any single taxonomic category can

4. 1953: 389. It should be added that Dr. Simpson points out as "the most important point about this mode of evolution and one of the reasons for its separate designation and special study" that "quantum evolution may lead to a new group at any taxonomic level. It is probable that species, either genetic or phyletic, often arise in this way. Certainly genera and all higher categories may do so. The phenomenon naturally becomes clearer and more readily definable when the change in adaptation and structure is relatively large, and such changes commonly eventuate in the development of higher categories. There is no level at which clear-cut quantum evolution is the only mode of origin of new groups, but at high levels some element of quantum evolution is usually involved" (Ibid.).
be. This proposal implies simply that God created the orders, and natural, selection took it from there. Of course this cannot be maintained consistently as far as orders are concerned, since in some cases classes or even phyla could be applied, and obviously in the case of man, a much lower category, perhaps genus, would apply. In other words, "an honest creationist will ask the paleontologist what he knows of the time of origin of animals, and draw his conclusions from the data" (Mixter 1953: 18).

Thus, if a supernatural presupposition is allowed, the interpretation may still remain consistent with the facts. One of the basic postulates of evolution, for example, is that similarity implies genetic relationship. However, with a supernatural agency pre-supposed, it becomes exactly as reasonable to postulate that similarity implies a common creator.

The fact that the evolutionary hypothesis as a total explanation for all major transitions is so firmly established in our scientific and educational system is due to at least three important factors. 1. Based upon the experimental knowledge of genetics, the sequential data of paleontology, and the logical consistency of the processes of adaptation and natural selection as presently conceived, this major jumping of gaps, in Simpson's words, "has a probable mechanism and would be expected under given conditions" (1944: 207). 2. The only alternative, creation, or the allowance of a supernaturalistic presupposition in the tradition of science, has been considered as clearly "incredible." 3. The creationists, due to their own peculiar tradition of fending off the advances of science, have failed to formulate this alternative in a scientifically respectable manner.

The primary point of difference, then, between evolutionism and creationism is not a matter of accepting or rejecting facts. There are no data as such that conflict with the Genesis account of creation as interpreted in the context of the author's language and culture. The primary point of difference is on the level of mechanistic vs. supernatural presuppositions. Most evolutionists claim with G. S. Carter, that "man is an animal, and
however greatly his present state differs from that of the rest of the animal kingdom, we must accept that he arose from sub-human ancestors by a process of evolution" (1953: 327). And, despite their acknowledgment that man is a wholly unique, or culture-bearing animal, most would tend to agree with Simpson that "man is the result of a purposeless and materialistic process that did not have him in mind. He was not planned. He is a state of matter, a form of life, a sort of animal, and a species of the Order Primates, akin nearly or remotely to all of life and indeed to all that is material" (1949: 344-45). The creationist claims that man is more than a unique animal, and that he was both planned and created by God.

In summary on these three modes of evolutionary process, the creationist may well hold, with Professor Mixter (1953: 10-11, 23), the following conclusions:

1. Speciation. "Whenever geneticists can show common genes, they are entitled to infer common ancestry."
2. Phyletic evolution. "When animals are traceable to other animals by a closely graded series of transitional forms, [the paleontologist is entitled to infer that] the early forms have given rise to the later ones."
3. Quantum evolution. "When a group of animals is separated from another group by an unbridged gap, then until bridges are found, one may hold that the groups so separated have arisen from independently created kinds."

IV

The questions may well be asked, how does this creationist position differ essentially from the Roman Catholic position, and, does the Catholic position also constitute an alternative to organic evolution?

The crux of the whole matter lies in the question of origins. The creationist, while he fully accepts the facts of genetics and the fossil record, believes that God created life and man, and that man did not arise from a previously existing organism. This position is frequently, but erroneously, called "theistic evolution," because it allows for some process in God's creative activity instead of necessitating an instantaneous creation. But while genetics and paleontology have played a big part in the expression of organic evolution, they neither alone nor in combination constitute evolution. One might as logically call the creationist a "theistic speciationist" or a believer in "theistic Mendelism" or "theistic stratigraphy" because he grants that God has instituted the hereditary process of genetics and the geological dynamics of prehistory or one might call a Bible-believing weather forecaster a "theistic meteorologist" simply because he believes that the laws which God instituted at creation, are believed and relied upon by non-Christian observers as well!
The theistic evolutionist, however, while believing that God is operating the process, also accepts the possibility that man could have arisen for a non-human creature, and that God merely endowed him with a soul, which act constituted the "creation of man," culturally, mentally, and spiritually. This position of theistic evolution is typically, but not exclusively, that of the Roman Catholics, who only specify their opposition to "materialistic" evolution. Dr. J. F. Ewing, in a recent issue of the Catholic *Anthropological Quarterly*, summarizing "The Present Catholic Attitude Towards Evolution" admits that "God may indeed have used a body prepared for the soul as far as possible by evolution. . . ."; that "there is no defined doctrine which opposes a theory of the evolution of Man's body, ... " and that "the possibility that there were true men before Adam and Eve, men whose line became extinct (in other words, Pre-Adamites), is allowable."

This I find, at present, impossible to accept, on theological as well as on anthropological grounds. Theologically, the fundamental doctrines of the original perfection and subsequent fall of man and his consequent need of redemption; and the role of the Saviour, Jesus Christ, the Son of God in dying on the cross to pay the penalty for the fall, for all who will accept Him, are seriously jeopardized by a first man having descended organically from pre-human parents. Now theistic evolutionists likewise acknowledge the necessity of retaining this doctrine of original sin. It is inextricably tied up with the necessity of having all mankind arise from one man. The Catholic statement on this from the Encyclical "Humani Generis" quoted by Ewing, is as follows:

No Catholic can hold that after Adam there existed on this earth true men who did not take their origin through natural generation from him as from the first parent of all, or that Adam is merely a symbol for a number of first parents. For it is unintelligible how such an opinion can be squared with what the sources of revealed truth and the documents of the Magisterium of the Church teach on original sin, which proceeds from sin actually committed by an individual Adam, and which, passed on to all by way of generation, is in everyone as his own [Cotter 1951: 43].

Thus the theistic evolutionist, if he allows man to have arisen from a non-human form, is obliged to inject some creative action or other upon his physical body in addition to giving him a soul, in order to make that body perfect and not subject to death. To me this is simply an additional and unnecessary complication of hypotheses to which Occam's razor could well apply.7

Anthropologically, the theistic evolutionary explanation for the origin of man seems to run counter to what we have become accustomed to expect of the cultural assemblages in association with fossil man. The pre-adamic theory would seem to imply that there were beings morphologically

7. Essentia non sunt multiplicanda praeter necessitatem.
human, but without culture. The evidence of human paleontology seems to argue otherwise. Of course we are at once faced with the question, What is morphologically human? I believe that the question of "human or non-human?" cannot be answered categorically upon morphological grounds. The question must be answered on spiritual grounds, which I presume are only indicated by cultural remains.

The problem of the interpretation of the Australopithecines immediately arises. So far no definite indication of any cultural assemblage has been identified. I readily accept the facts of the unique Australopithecine morphology, the marked humanoid conformation of the dentition, the ilium, and other features indicative of an upright posture. Nevertheless, until such time as the chronological problem of Australopithecine's antiquity in relation to true hominids is resolved, and some identifiable cultural assemblage is discovered, I prefer to class them as "non-human" in every sense of the word. I consider Mayr's designation of Homo transvaalensis premature, and cannot yet see Robinson's inclusion of Meganthropus in the same genus as Paranthropus without more of the former to go on. But, as I have attempted to point out to my hyper-traditionalist friends, should such a cultural assemblage be identified for the Australopithecines, it will necessitate perhaps a drastic revision of what we are used to considering "human" but nothing more as far as the creationist position is concerned.

By way of summarizing similarities and differences between the Roman Catholic view of evolution and the creationist view: (a) The following points we hold in common (adapted from Ewing 1956: 124)

1. The body of data and the processes of speciation and the palaeontological record are accepted without reservation.
2. "We know of Adam and Eve only from revelation, and a belief in an original pair is not in conflict with any real scientific evidence."

8. During the discussion period at the graduate seminar of the Anthropology Department, University of Chicago, February 18, 1957, Dr. F. Clark Howell revealed that according to communications from C. K. Brain in South Africa there had been some 50 Quartzite pebble tools discovered within the past year in the Australopithecus-bearing deposits at Sterkfontein which Mr. Brain was currently investigating.

Dr. Braidwood then offered the thought-provoking suggestion that as far as he was concerned, the Australopithecines could be a perfectly good tool-making species, yet without necessarily possessing a "cultural assemblage" as normally considered with all of its ramifications. Perhaps the Australopithecines will precipitate a re-definition of "culture" as well as of "human".

9. One anti-evolutionary journal (The High Way, XXVI [Oct.-Dec., 1956], 20-39) devoted some twenty pages to criticising my inclusion of the Australopithecinae in an article on fossil man. According to the typical hyper-traditionalist views expressed in this as well as other like periodicals, my position is that of a "compromiser" who is "currying the favor of infidel scientists." I am an "intellectual snob" who is blind to the fact that evolutionists are engaged in a monstrous conspiracy to undermine and overthrow the teachings of the Bible!
3. "All men (and hence the first man) are endowed by God with spiritual souls."
4. The first man was constituted a human being "by the direct and immediate action of God, an action that affected both soul and body."

(b) The differences lie in the question of origins which may be summarized, as follows

1. The evolutionary origin of the major taxonomic groups, or of paleontological series between which there is only inferential evidence of connection, sometimes referred to as "quantum" or "macro-
   evolution, is accepted implicitly by the Catholic theologian, but is rejected by the creationist.

2. The evolutionary origin of man from some pre-human form is allowed by the Catholic theologian but is rejected by the creationist.

V

For a long time, evolution has been opposed by a hyper-traditionalist brand of creationism characterized by a negative, anti-evolutionary approach. Consequently evolutionists have erroneously considered creationists as inevitably of this brand, and have tended to overlook the position of a scientifically-minded creationism which has attempted to be non-evolutionary in its thinking rather than purely anti-evolutionary.\textsuperscript{10} This is not surprising however, since these creationists have tended to be less vocal and perhaps a bit more cautious in the expression of their views.

The Roman Catholic theologian has always represented a basically creationist position, but has, with many Protestant scholars, accepted more of evolutionary theory than the facts seem to demand. Thus, with theistic presuppositions demanded, this position is termed by many "theistic evolution."

Thus we are left with three major groups based upon supernaturalistic premises, the hyper-traditionalist, the scientific creationist, and the theistic evolutionist.

In restating our question, Is there an alternative to organic evolution? it would seem that the answer is "yes" regarding origins; "no" regarding processes; and, that in comparison with organic evolution, creationism is the alternative, theistic evolution merely a variant.

10. This does not mean that they are any the less aware of the dangerous implications of evolution which run counter to a biblical position. It does mean that they desire to concern themselves with more than mere denunciations of these. They attempt rather to formulate a positive, non-evolutionary interpretation of the facts which is consistent, both scientifically and theologically.

REFERENCES CITED

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