Criswell Theological Review 1.2 (1987) 309-334
[Copyright © 1987 by
digitally prepared for use at
Gordon and
HERMENEUTICS, EXEGESIS,
AND PROCLAMATION
JERRY VINES
DAVID ALLEN
Hermeneutics,
exegesis, and proclamation form the crucial triad
with
which every pastor must reckon. A proper biblical hermeneutic
provides the
philosophical underpinnings which undergird the exe-
getical task. Likewise, a proper exegetical
methodology provides the
foundation for
the sermon. Then, of course, proper sermon delivery is
necessary to
carry home God's truth to the hearer. This article will
attempt a
discussion of these three aspects in both a descriptive and
evaluative
manner. Hermeneutics as a philosophical base for exegesis
will
comprise section one. Section two of the article will suggest a
methodology for
exegesis from the field of Text Linguistics as an
augment to
the traditional method of biblical exegesis. Finally, in
section
three, the matter of proclamation will be briefly discussed.
I.
Philosophical Basis of Exegesis
A discussion of the principles and
practice of biblical exegesis
would not
be complete without mention, however brief, of the philo-
sophical arena in which these issues stand today,
The field of her-
meneutics, the science of interpretation, has
undergone tremendous
upheaval in
recent years. A host of new questions about the nature of
meaning are
being asked. In the first section of this article, we offer
some
tentative answers to the following questions which must be
addressed by
the biblical exegete, since they will invariably affect his
exegetical
method.
310 CRISWELL THEOLOGICAL REVIEW
1) What is the difference between traditional hermeneutics and
modern
hermeneutics?
2) How does our understanding of the subject/object distinction
affect our
theory and practice of interpretation?
3) What is the difference between what a text meant historically
and what
it means today?
4) Is authorial intention a valid criterion for biblical interpre-
tation?
5) Is the distinction between "meaning" and
"significance" a valid
distinction for
the biblical exegete?
6) Does a text have one primary meaning
or are multiple mean-
ings of equal validity possible?
7) How do the horizons of the interpreter affect exegesis?
8) What presuppositions about language and its nature inform
one's
theory and practice of exegesis?
In an effort to offer some workable answers to these questions,
the
first part of the article will attempt to outline some of the changes
which have
taken place in hermeneutics since 1800. It is an apodictical
fact that
the field of biblical interpretation has radically changed,
especially from
the time of F. Schleiermacher onwards. Traditional
hermeneutics involved the formulation and implementation of proper
rules for
interpretation. Primary attention was paid to the linguistic
aspects of
textual interpretation, including grammar, syntax, vocabu-
lary, etc. Meaning was bound up in the text
and awaited the inter-
preter to dig it out via proper exegesis.
Traditional hermeneutics
assumed that
a text contained a determinate meaning which with the
proper
exegetical method could be discerned by an interpreter.
Modern hermeneutical theory is characterized by a twofold tran-
sition: the shift from a special/regional
hermeneutical approach to
that of
general hermeneutics, and the shift from a primarily epistemo-
logical
outlook to an ontological one. The former was inaugurated by
the
advent of Schleiermacher's hermeneutics while the
latter shift
occurred with
the advent of M. Heidegger's Being and Time.1 In
general, we
may say that traditional hermeneutics focused on the text,
while
sometimes neglecting the role of the interpreter, and modern
hermeneutics focuses on the reader/interpreter, while sometimes
neglecting the
role of the text. It is our contention that a balanced
theory of
interpretation must give advertence to both of these aspects
as in
play every time interpretation takes place. Such a position seems
to be
represented by men like P. Ricoeur in his Interpretation Theory:
1 M.
Heidegger, Being and Time (Blackwell: Oxford, 1962).
Vines/
Allen: HERMENEUTICS, EXEGESIS, AND PROCLAMATION 311
Discourse
and the Surplus of Meaning2 and E. D. Hirsch in his
Validity in
Interpretation.3
Hermeneutical
Theory Since 1800: an Historical Assessment
No discussion of hermeneutics would be complete without men-
tion of the father of modern hermeneutics, F. Schleiermacher. He
argued that
interpretation consisted of two categories: grammatical
and
technical or psychological.4 Grammatical interpretation focused
on the
text itself and dealt with such matters as grammar, syntax, etc.
while
technical interpretation focused on the mind of the author in an
attempt to
reconstruct his psyche in order to determine his mental
process that
led him to write what he did. Schleiermacher defines
authorial
intention in a way which most, if not all, would agree today
is
untenable for the simple reason that we cannot get into the author's
psyche.
This problem is particularly acute when considering ancient
texts. The
only hint at authorial intention we have is what the author
has
deposited in his text. We cannot get behind the text to the author's
thought
processes.
For our purposes, we note two important features of Schleier-
macher's hermeneutics. He emphasized that
interpretation involved
both
objective and subjective factors. Furthermore, he did not attempt
to
dissolve the subject/object distinction as many later theoreticians
have
attempted to do. Schleiermacher's recognition that
interpretation
involved both
objective and subjective factors should be a vital part
of a
balanced theory of interpretation. If we inject the notion of the
interpreter's own horizons playing an integral part in meaning deter-
mination coupled with a more workable definition
of authorial inten-
tion (see below), then Schleiermacher's
basic scheme proves to be a
valuable
hermeneutical method.
From Schleiermacher the history of modern
hermeneutical theory
followed the
trail of W. Dilthey to G. Frege
to E. Husserl to M.
Heidegger to H. Gadamer. Space does not permit an analysis of
the
contributions and insights of Dilthey, Frege, and Husserl. Yet
it is
important to note that Heidegger was a student of Husserl
and
could not agree with his mentor that objective knowledge was
possible.
This point is crucial for it was Heidegger who ushered in
2 P. Ricoeur, Interpretation Theory: Discourse and the
Surplus of Meaning (Fort
Worth:
3 E.
D. Hirsch, Validity in Interpretation (
1967).
4 F. Schleiermacher, Hermeneutics: The Handwritten
Manuscripts (ed. H. Kim-
merle; tr.
J. Duke and H. J. Forstman;
312 CRISWELL THEOLOGICAL REVIEW
the
ontological revolution in hermeneutics. With it came an increasing
skepticism
towards the possibility of achieving determinate meaning
in
textual interpretation. Hence, we may say that Schleiermacher,
Frege and Husserl are representative of the
school of thought that
determinate
meaning and objectivity are possible in interpretation
while
Heidegger and his student Gadamer are representative
of the
view that
there can be no determinate meaning and objectivity in
textual
interpretation.
Heidegger has had a profound influence on contemporary her-
meneutical theory in his two works Being and Time5
and On the Way
to
Language.6
It is to Heidegger that we owe the valuable insight of
hermeneutics as embracing the whole of man's existence. Heidegger
is an ontologist who posited "interpretation" as one of
the funda-
mental
modes of man's being. However, Heidegger's theory concern-
ing the historicity of all understanding forced
him and his followers to
exaggerate the
difference between past and present into a denial of
any
continuity of meaning at all. In Heidegger, the shift is made from
the
primacy of the text to the primacy of the interpreter. Indeed, for
Heidegger
the interpreter is himself the source of meaning. Reality
for the
interpreter is "disclosed" via his understanding. Heidegger
seems to
disallow the cognoscibility of any objectively valid and
determinate
meaning.
Our critique of Heidegger must be brief at this point. It is not
our
purpose to
critique captiously those with whom we disagree. Suffice it
to say
that from our perspective he has overemphasized the role of
the
interpreter in creating meaning by not allowing the text to com-
municate determinate meaning. His theory assumes
the collapse of
the
subject/object dichotomy and therefore the impossibility of objec-
tive textual meaning.
R. Bultmann may be the most influential
figure in NT studies in
this
century. While teaching at the
found the
philosophical framework for his approach to scripture
from his
colleague, Heidegger. It is primarily through Bultmann
that
Heidegger's
philosophical existentialism has found its way into biblical
studies.
Bultmann's excellent article, "Is Exegesis
without Presuppositions
Possible?"
should be read by all who practice exegesis. Bultmann
has
accurately
emphasized the fact that one cannot come to any text from
a
totally objective standpoint. The interpreter always brings his
own
conceptual grid
to the text. His first paragraph is worth quoting:
5
Heidegger, Being and Time.
6
Heidegger, On the Way to Language (New York: Harper & Row, 1971).
Vines/Allen:
HERMENEUTICS, EXEGESIS, AND PROCLAMATION
313
The question whether exegesis without
presuppositions is possible
must be answered affirmatively if "without presuppositions"
means
"without presupposing the results of
the exegesis." In this sense, exegesis
without presuppositions is not only possible but
demanded. In another
sense, however, no exegesis is without presuppositions, inasmuch as the
exegete is not a tabula
rasa, but on the contrary, approaches the text
with
specific questions or with a specific way of
raising questions and thus has
a certain idea of the subject matter with which the text is
concerned.7
Yet Bultmann, following Heidegger,
exaggerates this notion of
presuppositions and subjectivity by arguing that the text of the Bible
is not
intended to be interpreted objectively but rather is to be a
"Subject"
that determines the interpreter's existence. While we can
agree that
the Scriptures do "speak" to us in a sense as subject to
object, we
must reject the notion that with each approach to the text,
there is
no valid or permanent meaning to be identified. By de-
emphasizing the
cognitive aspects of textual meaning, and unduly
exalting the
ontological notion of interpretation as "encounter," Bult-
mann injects into the main arteries of
biblical exegesis an overdose of
Heideggerian ontology and
existentialism.
We can all agree that interpretation does not involve a totally
passive
subject who stands wholly apart from his text and interprets it
without any
input from his own subjectivity. Like E. Kant, we have
all been
awakened from our Cartesian dogmatic slumbers. Whatever
insights Heidegger,
Bultmann and the like may press upon us in this
vein, we
are the better for it. However, we must argue that meaning
is not
a construct of the interpreter's subjectivity alone. It must be
forcefully
stated in opposition to the correlation of interpretation with
ontology by
Heidegger and Bultmann that they are doing nothing
more in
the end than suggesting that the interpreter projects his own
subjectivity. Unless we maintain the otherness or objectivity of textual
meaning,
then we must face squarely the fact that we could not
interpret at
all. Heidegger's scheme ineluctably results in the complete
breakdown of
the subject/object dichotomy, and it is this fact which
causes his
"method," along with Bultmann's, to be
methodologically
inadequate in
biblical exegesis.s
7 R. Bultmann, "Is Exegesis without Presuppositions
Possible?" Existence and
Faith (ed. S. M. Ogden;
8 The
so-called "New Hermeneutic" school of interpretation is one example
of
exegesis
which has followed the lead of Heidegger and Bultmann.
For a critique of the
New
Hermeneutic, see A. Thiselton, The Two Horizons
(
1980)
352-56, and "The New Hermeneutic," New Testament Interpretation:
Essays on
Principles
and Methods (ed. I. H.
314 CRISWELL THEOLOGICAL REVIEW
Like Heidegger's Being and
Time, Gadamer's monumental work
Truth and Method9 must
be reckoned with by evangelical exegetes. It
contains some
crucial insights which should not be ignored by those
of us
interested in text interpretation. Particularly helpful is his
emphasis that
interpreters come to a given text with their own world-
view,
presuppositions, or "horizon" as Gadamer
uses the term, which
is
different from that of the text. What is necessary is a "fusion of
horizons"
for interpretation to take place.
However, Gadamer's system is not without
its philosophical and
methodological flaws. Gadamer continues the attack on
objective
textual
interpretation by emphasizing that meaning is not to be identi-
fied with authorial intention. Furthermore,
exegesis has no founda-
tional "methods" to be used in
eliciting meaning from a given text.
According to
Gadamer, our historicity eliminates the possibility
of
discovering any
determinate textual meaning and therefore objective
meaning is
not possible.
Yet Gadamer does not want to proffer
relativism in text interpre-
tation and hence he falls back on three concepts
in an attempt to
extricate
himself from ultimate hermeneutical nihilism. These are
1) tradition, 2) meaning repetition, and 3) fusion of horizons.
The role
of
tradition, as Gadamer sees it, is to enlarge the
horizons of the text
for each
passing generation such that tradition serves as a bridge
between the
past and the present. The problem here is of course how
to
mediate between two conflicting traditional interpretations. By
eliminating the
possibility of objective textual meaning, Gadamer
also
eliminates the
criterion needed to make a choice between conflicting
interpretations and he is again left with relativism.
Gadamer seems to argue that a text does represent
a repeatable
meaning and
yet in the same paragraph turns around and suggests
that this
is "not repetition of something past, but participation in a
present
meaning."10 This creates confusion in that Gadamer
seems to
be
saying first that meaning is repeatable and then that it isn't. Such
reasoning
leads Hirsch to point out: "This kind of reasoning stands as
eloquent
testimony to the difficulties and self-contradictions that con-
front Gadamer's theory as soon as one asks the simple question:
what
constitutes a
valid interpretation?"11 While we can profit greatly from
Gadamer's
statements about pre-understanding and "fusion of hori-
zons," we must reject his basic thesis
that a text contains no deter-
minate meaning.
9 H. G. Gadamer, Truth and Method
(London: Sheed & Ward, 1975).
10 Gadamer, Truth and Method, 370.
11
Hirsch, Validity in Interpretation, 252.
Vines/Allen:
HERMENEUTICS, EXEGESIS, AND PROCLAMATION
315
In Heidegger and Gadamer, the notion of
understanding is not
conceived as a
way of knowing but rather as a mode of being.
Somehow they
never quite get around to answering the epistemo-
logical
questions which were left in the wake of the ontological
revolution.
What we need is a hermeneutical system which strikes a
proper
balance between epistemology and ontology.
Hirsch of the
of
Heidegger and Gadamer by arguing for the stability of
textual
meaning in
two important works: Validity in Interpretation and The
Aims of
Interpretation.12
One of Hirsch's most important contribu-
tions is his emphasis on the distinction
between "meaning" and "sig-
nificance." Drawing on A. Boeckh's
division of his Encyclopaedie13
into the
two sections labeled "Interpretation" and "Criticism,"
Hirsch
points out
that "the object of interpretation is textual meaning in and
for
itself and may be called the 'meaning' of the text." Conversely, the
object of
criticism is textual meaning as it bears on something else.
This object
is what Hirsch refers to as the "significance" of the text.14
Roughly speaking, such a division corresponds to the exegesis of
a text
which seeks to determine the text's meaning and the application
of that
meaning (as, for example, in preaching) to point out its
significance/application for today. Both meaning and significance or
interpretation and application are two foci which the exegete must
constantly keep
in mind. Furthermore, because they tend to happen
concurrently, it is probably not wise to argue that in practice these
two foci
can remain completely separated, although for the sake of
discussion, we
may separate them for the purpose of investigation
and
analysis.
Hirsch's categories of "meaning" and "significance"
are important
and
helpful for us. When the biblical exegete comes to a text of
Scripture,
he can proceed on the premise that there is a determinate
meaning
there. His job is to discover this meaning through exegesis.
Having done
this, there remains the further task of applying this
meaning to
modern day man.
Hirsch has also made a solid contribution in that his writings
stand as
perhaps the best critique of Gadamerian hermeneutics.
His
most
telling criticism of the weaknesses of Gadamer's
theory can be
found in Appendix II of, his Validity in Interpretation.15