CONDITIONAL
SENTENCES IN THE
NEW TESTAMENT
by
William
E. Elliott
Submitted in partial
fulfillment of requirements
for the degree of
Doctor of Theology in
Grace
Theological Seminary
May 1981
Digitized by Ted Hildebrandt, Gordon
College 2006
Title: CONDITIONAL SENTENCES IN THE GREEK NEW
TESTAMENT
Author: William E. Elliott
Degree: Doctor of Theology
Date: May
1981
Committee:
Dr. Charles R. Smith, Dr. John A. Sproule, Dr. Homer A. Kent, Jr.
Increasing interest in the grammar
of the Greek New Testament
has
focused attention upon aspects of the language that have, for the
most
part, been passed over by past grammarians. Among these topics
is
that of conditional sentences. A superficial survey of the lit-
erature
indicates that most writers seem to have the data confidently
in
tow, but closer inspection shows that this is not the case. Modern
grammarians
are, for the most part, content to follow the lead of A.T.
Robertson
and classify these clauses in terms of First, Second, Third,
and
Fourth Class conditions. Others, dissatisfied with Robertson's
system
and the extension of it by his followers, have returned to the
terminology,
if not the principles of Classical Greek. The situation
is
uncoordinated at best, for even in Classical Greek studies there
is
significant disagreement upon the classification of these sentences.
The historical background to the
study of conditional sentences
is
presented from both the Classical and the Koine Greek standpoints.
Suggested
systems of classification include Time, Fulfillment, Form
and
Determination. The latter, championed by B.L. Gildersleeve, is
the
preferred system. Determination is indicated by the mood of the
verbs
employed in the protasis. Gildersleeve's system entered Koine
studies
primarily through the work of A.T. Robertson. He employes
four
classes into which he places these conditional sentences.
The Simple Condition, using the
indicative mood, states the
condition
as an assumed reality. There is no necessary connection
between
actuality and the statement. This condition merely presents
the
conclusion as a necessary corollary of the condition.
The Contrary to Fact Condition also
uses the indicative mood
to
present the condition as one that is assumed not true, i.e., con-
trary
to fact. Again, there is no necessary connection between
actuality
and the conditional statement.
The Probable Condition presents the
condition as one assumed
probable,
i.e., one that could easily be fulfilled. The hypothetical
nature
of this condition requires the use of the subjunctive mood.
The Possible condition states the
condition as one that is
assumed
possible, i.e., little likelihood of fulfillment. This con-
dition
utilizes the optative mood, and there is no complete example
of
it in the New Testament.
Two basic concepts underlie all
conditional sentences. First,
the
determining factor is the mood of the verb, not the particle em-
ployed.
Second, all conditional sentences state their case as an
assumption,
never as a direct statement of reality.
Accepted by the Faculty of Grace
Theological Seminary
in partial fulfillment of
requirements for the degree
Doctor of Theology
Examining
Committee:
Charles R. Smith
Homer A. Kent Jr.
John A. Sproule
TABLE OF CONTENTS
INTRODUCTION 1
CHAPTER
I. A HISTORICAL SURVEY 4
Conditional Sentences in General 4
Conditional Sentences in Classical
Greek 8
The Importance of
Classical Greek 10
Suggested Classification
Systems 10
Classification
According to Time 11
Classification
According to Fulfillment 18
Classification
According to Form 20
Classification
According to Determination 23
Conditional Sentences in Koine Greek 33
Early Grammarians 34
George Benedict
Winer 34
Alexander
Buttmann 37
Samuel G.
Green 40
Ernest
DeWitt Burton 42
James Hope
Moulton 46
Modern Grammarians 49
Archibald
Thomas Robertson 49
William
Douglas Chamberlain 55
Charles
Francis Digby Moule 57
Friedrich
Blass - Albert Debrunner 60
Nigel Turner 62
H. E. Dana
and Julius R. Mantey 65
Robert W.
Funk 67
William
Sanford La Sor 65
Summary of Koine
Grammarians 71
II. THE SIMPLE CONDITION 73
Introduction 73
The Conditional Particle ei 75
The Significance of ei 75
The Significance of ei with other Particles 77
The Negative Particles in Simple
Conditions 81
Ean with the Indicative
Mood 84
Significance of Moods and Tenses 88
i
ii
Meaning of the Simple Condition 95
Particular and General
Conditions 95
Degree of Reality 98
Translation of the Simple Condition 105
III. THE CONTRARY TO FACT CONDITION 106
Introduction 106
Significance of Tense 110
Imperfect Tense 110
Aorist Tense 113
Pluperfect Tense 115
The Use of An in Contrary to Fact Conditions
116
The Meaning of the Contrary to Fact
Condition 121
The Translation of the Contrary to
Fact Condition 123
IV. THE PROBABLE CONDITION 129
Introduction 129
Analysis of the Probable Condition 131
The Protasis 131
The Apodosis 141
Meaning of the Probable Condition 148
Review of the
Grammarians 148
Evaluation of the
Grammarians 151
Relationship with the
Simple Condition 156
Summary 163
Translation of the Probable
Condition 165
V. THE POSSIBLE CONDITION 169
Introduction 169
The Optative Mood in General 170
The Optative Mood in Conditional
Sentences 174
The Construction 175
The Significance 178
The Grammarians 178
The Specific Examples 180
Those with
the Protasis Implied 180
Those with
the Protasis Stated 184
Translation of the Possible
Condition 191
VI. CONCLUSION
193
Simple
Conditions 194
Unreal
Conditions 195
Probable Conditions 195
Possible Conditions 196
Summary 196
iii
APPENDICES 198
Appendix I: Occurrences of the
Simple Condition 198
Appendix II: Occurrences of the
Unreal Condition 211
Appendix III: Occurrences of the
Probable Condition 215
BIBLIOGRAPHY
226
INTRODUCTION
God created man with the potential for abstract
reasoning, and
his many languages reflect this
through their use of the subjunctive
mood: the mood of contingency
or possibility. Posing questions,
exploring possibilities and
analyzing logical connections are part of
man's reasoning capabilities,
and his languages reflect these skills.
Among the syntactical tools
which accomplish these are conditional
sentences. These sentences,
usually consisting of two clauses,
state a hypothesis and give a
conclusion. In English this corres-
ponds to the "If . . .
then" formula.
This type of sentence, while prevalent in English, is
usually
listed as one of several
subordinate clause relationships.1
By
contrast, the Greek language
presents a more fully developed system
of conditional sentences by
means of which a remarkable degree of
precision may be obtained in expressing
conditional thought. The
Greek conditional sentence
presents both the condition and certain
specific implications about it
in one sentence whereas English needs
both the conditional statement
and qualifying sentences to communicate
the same concept. This
compactness lends itself to greater precision
1 Porter Perrin and
George H. Smith, Handbook of Current
English, third edition, edited
by Jim W. Corder (
Scott, Foresman and Company,
1968), 48-56, 120-121.
2
in the statement of conditional
concepts.
Since conditional sentences are basic to the material of
the
Greek New Testament, a detailed
understanding of conditional sentences
is vital for an accurate
interpretation of its contents. This, then,
is the goal of this study: to
explore conditional sentences so that the
message of the New Testament
may be better understood.
Though all students of Greek, both Classical and Koine,
agree
on the importance of
conditional sentences, few agree on the analysis
of them. A. T. Robertson aptly
describes the situation in Koine studies
when he writes, "In truth
the doctors have disagreed themselves and the
rest have not known how to
go."1 The Classical scene is likewise
muddled, as Blass-Debrunner
notes, "The classical grammars are also hope-
lessly at variance."2
Some of this confusion is due to the absence of a
standard by
which to classify conditional
sentences. Time, degree of reality and
construction have all been
suggested by various grammarians as possible
classification systems.
Further, each grammarian seems to have developed
his own terminology in
discussing the subject, and each argues that his
is best. Indeed, it is possible
to trace the influence of major
grammarians through succeeding
generations by noting who adopts their
terminology in dealing with
conditional sentences.
1 A. T. Robertson, A Grammar of the Greek New Testament in the
Light of Historical
Research
(
1934),
p. 1004.
2 Friedrich Blass and
Alvert Debrunner, A Greek Grammar of the
New Testament and Other
Early Christian Literature, translated and
revised
by Robert W. Funk (
1961), p. 189.
3
Another reason for the lack of standardization may be the
inherent flexibility of the
language itself. Though Classical and Koine
Greek may be considered
fossilized ancestors of Modern Greek, they were
living, functioning languages,
complete with the internal syntactical
elasticity found in living
languages today. Greek, like English, developed
through usage, and patterns so
developed may refuse to be forced into a
logically consistent mold. So,
whether through lack of a standard, or
lack of accepted terminology,
or through syntactical flexibility,
conditional sentences have
provided grammarians with a fruitful area of
contemplation, and students
with a frustrating area of concentration.
This study seeks to offer help to those involved in the
analysis of conditional
sentences by summarizing the work of previous
grammarians and giving a
detailed analysis of each type of conditional
sentence in the New Testament.
The work of past and contemporary
scholars will be surveyed to
give an overview of their studies, agree-
ments, and disagreements. Then
the conditional sentences in the Greek
New Testament will be identified
and analyzed with the help of principles
obtained from the grammatical
survey. Finally, observations will be
offered on the important
matters of translation and interpretation.
The result should be a small
but positive step in gaining further insight
into the meaning of conditional
sentences in the Greek New Testament.
CHAPTER I
A HISTORICAL SURVEY
Since any study necessarily builds upon the work of
others, a
survey of previous studies of
conditional sentences is basic to a
thorough understanding of the
topic. This study will include the work
of both Classical and Koine
scholars.
Conditional
Sentences in General
A brief survey of the technical details of conditional
sentences
will set the scene for the
succeeding discussion and evaluation.
The Definition of
Conditional Sentences
A conditional sentence is a two-clause sentence in which
the
first clause states a
supposition or hypothesis and the second clause
states the results if that
condition is met. The hypothetical clause
which states the condition
("If this . . .") is termed the protasis
and the conclusion clause is
called the apodosis (". . . then
this.").
Herbert Weir Smyth explains it
this way:
A condition is a supposition on
which a statement is based.
A
conditional sentence commonly consists of two clauses:
The protasis: the conditional, or
subordinate, clause,
expressing
a supposed or assumed case (if).
The apodosis: the conclusion, or
principal, clause, expressing
what
follows if the condition is realized. The truth or fulfillment
of
the conclusion depends on the truth or fulfillment of the
conditional clause.1
1 Herbert Weir Smyth, Greek Grammar for Colleges (
American Book Company, 1920),
p. 512.
5
The Construction of Conditional
Sentences
The Protasis
As Smyth stated, the protasis stands as the subordinate
or
dependent clause, setting forth
the condition. The term protasis comes
from prosta<sij, "lit. stretching forward, that which is put
forward
(in logic, a premise).1 While the formal sequence is the standard
"If . . . then,"
English, as well as Greek, varies the sequence in
usage: "You will receive
the reward if you do a good job."
The form of the protasis in Greek involves a conditional
particle (ei] or e]a<n) and a
verb. The various combinations of particles
and verbs will be discussed
later. Though the mood of the verb is the
key element in identifying the
type of condition, certain constructions
are fairly standard. Again,
these will be presented later. This
combination of particles and
moods enables Greek to express conditional
thought with a compact
precision lacking in English. The thought of
a few Greek words may take a
few English sentences to be communicated.
The Apodosis
The main or independent clause in a conditional sentence
is
termed the apodosis. This term
comes from "a]podo<sij, lit. giving back,
return;
i. e.
the resuming or answering clause."2 The apodosis may
employ verbs in any tense or
mood, and frequently, in the Koine at
1 Smyth, Grammar, p. 512.
2 Ibid.,
p. 512.
6
least, uses the particle a@n with moods other than the indicative.1
Taken
together, then, the protasis
and apodosis constitute a conditional
sentence.
The Conditional
Particles
The origin of the Greek conditional particles is as
obscure as
their usage is important.
Goodwin, one of the leading Classical Greek
grammarians, succinctly states:
It is impossible to discuss
intelligently the origin of the
conditional sentence until the etymology
and original meaning of
the particles ei],
a@n, and ke< are determined. On
these questions
we have as yet little or no real
knowledge.2
He then gives a brief summary
of what is known about these particles
and concludes:
But here we are on purely theoretical
ground; and we must content
ourselves practically with the fact, that
in the earliest Greek
known
to us ei
was fully established in its conditional sense,
like our if and Latin si.3
1 H. E. Dana and Julius
R. Mantey, A Manual Grammar of the
Greek New Testament (New York: The
MacMillan Company, 1966), p. 288.
2 William Watson Goodwin,
Syntax of the Mood and Tenses of the
Greek Verb (Boston: Ginn &
Company, 1893), p. 142.
3 Ibid.,
p. 143.
7
ei]
Liddell and Scott trace the origin of ei] back to its use in
Homer where it is sometimes
replaced by the Doric ai].1 It introduces
either conditional clauses or
questions and is regularly used with the
indicative mood.2 Its consistent translation in conditional
clauses is
"if." The
relationship of this particle, the indicative mood and the
assumed reality of the condition
will be discussed later.
e]a<n
Ean is a
combination of ei and an, according to Dana and
Mantey.3 Smyth remarks that "The etymology of e]a<n is uncertain:
either from h] + a@n or
from ei] + a@n.”4 This particle introduces
conditions in the subjunctive
mood, though it is not limited to this
mood:
The difference between ei] and e]a<n has been considerably
lessened
in Hellenistic as compared with earlier
Greek. We have seen that
e]a<n can even take the
indicative; while (as rarely in classical
Greek) ei] can be
found with the subjunctive.5
1 Henry George Liddell
and Robert Scott, A Greek-English Lexicon,
Vol.
I, edited by Henry Stuart Jones and Roderick McKenzie (
At
the Clarendon Press, 1951), p. 480. See also William Watson
Goodwin,
An Elementary Greek Grammar (Boston:
Ginn Brothers, 1872),
p.
263.
2 Dana and Mantey, Grammar, p. 246.
3 Ibid., p. 245.
4 Smyth, Grammar, p. 512.
5 J. H. Moulton, A Grammar of New Testament Greek, Volume
I:
Prolegomena, third edition
(Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1908), p. 187.
8
This caution should guard
against absolute rules, but the general
principle is that e]a<n utilizes the subjunctive mood while ei] employs
the indicative. Again, the
specific implications of this regarding the
assumed reality of the
condition will be discussed later.
These conditional particles are similar to particles of
interjection in Homeric Greek
and related languages. N. D. Coleman
suggests that the conditional
particles "appear to have been inter-
jections in the first
place."1 J. B. Greenough
tries to push the
origin of the conditional
sentence and its attendant particles back into
the frontiers of the
Indo-European linguistic heritage: "We are
naturally led to conclude that
this [conditional] construction was in
use more or less in
Indo-European times and was received by each of the
languages as a part of the
original inheritance."2 Whatever
the source
of these particles, conditional
sentences were a vital part of the
language of both Classical and
Koine Greek and play a vital role in the
Greek New Testament.
Conditional Sentences
in Classical Greek
Prior to the discovery of the papyri and the
comprehension of
their linguistic significance,
Biblical Greek was considered to be
1 N. D. Coleman,
"Some Noteworthy Uses of ei] in Hellenistic
Greek
with a Note on St. Mark viii 12," The
Journal of Theological
Studies, 27:1 (April, 1976), p.
159.
2 James B. Greenough,
"On Some Forms of Conditional Sentences
in
Latin, Greek and Sanskrit," Transactions
of the American Philo-
logical
Association, 2:2 (June, 1871), p. 164.
9
a unique species of that
language, sometimes referred to as "Holy Ghost
Greek."1 This was, of course, a false position, for the
Greek of the
New Testament was simply the
language of the common man as found in
"the street and market
place."2 This was
distinguished from Hellenistic
Greek, a direct descendant of
Attic or Classical Greek. While some
New Testament writings show
distinct Hellenistic influence, such as
Luke, Acts and Hebrews, others
are distinctly Koine. This is not
because the writers, according
to Moulton, used Greek "as foreigners,
Aramaic thought underlying
Greek expression."3 Rather
it is due to
the individual writers using
the language closest to them, each reflecting
their own blend of Hebrew and
Hellenistic cultures. As the result of
pioneering efforts by men like
Adolf Deismann in analyzing the papyri,
"Biblical" Greek
became identified as the language of the common man,
the Koine Greek. To be sure, it
still reflected the Hebrew idiom of
the authors, but it was Koine
none the less. A. T. Robertson sums up
the current understanding of
New Testament Greek:
The Greek of the New Testament that
was used with practical
uniformity over most of the Roman world
is called the Common Greek
or koinh<. Not that it was not
good Greek, but rather the Greek
in common use. There was indeed a
literary koinh< [Hellenistic
Greek] and a vernacular koinh<. Plutarch is a good specimen of the,
literary koinh< while the papyri are
chiefly in the vernacular koinh<
like most of the New Testament.4
1 Dana and Mantey, Grammar, pp. 9-15.
2 W. White, Jr.,
"Greek Language," The Zondervan
Pictorial
Encyclopedia of the
Bible,
5 vols., Merrill C. Tenney, editor (Grand
Rapids:
Zondervan Publishing House, 1977), II, pp. 827-828.
3 Moulton, Prolegomena, p. 3.
4 A. T. Robertson, A Short Grammar of the Greek New Testament
(New York: A. C. Armstrong E.
Son, 1908), p. 6.
10
The Importance of Classical
Greek
If the Koine of the New Testament is in the mainstream of
linguistic development and
expression, does it have any significant
connection with the literary
history of the language as a whole, and
with Classical Greek
specifically? Yes, answers Robertson:
This
koinh< was itself the heir of the past. The various Greek
dialects blended on an Attic base. The koinh< was thus richer in
expression as to words and forms than
any of the older dialects.
Compare the relation of modern English to
the various tongues that
have contributed to its power and
expansion. Ionic, Doric, Aeolic,
North West Greek and other dialects have made
some contribution to
the common result. The use of nominatives
in the midst of accusa-
tives in the Boeotian, for instance, is
strangely like the Book of
Revelation. So the absence of the future
participle is like the N.T.1
This heritage, then, is sufficient justification for
beginning
the study of conditional
sentences in Classical Greek, the language
of the period from Homer to the
Alexandrian conquests (c. 330 B.C.).2
This language constituted the
"chief basis of New Testament Greek,"3
thus its handling of
conditional sentences has important effects on
the Koine Greek.
Suggested Classification
Systems
How, then, did Classical Greek scholars classify
conditional
sentences? In general, they
seemed to follow one of three systems.
C. D. Chambers outlines them as
follows:
1 A. T. Robertson, A
Short Grammar, p. 6.
2 Dana and Mantey, Grammar,
p. 6.
3 Ibid., p. 6.
11
There are three possible ways of
classifying conditional
sentences, viz. (i) by time, (ii) by
fulfillment, (iii) by form.
The first is the system of Prof. Goodwin,
the second is proposed by
Mr. Donovan . . . and the third that of
Mr. Sonnenschein.l
Though the situation is not as
absolute as Chambers suggests, his
comments serve as a useful
guide to the discussion of conditional
sentences in Classical Greek.
Classification According to
Time
The classification most familiar to American students of
Classical Greek is that of
William Watson Goodwin. As Professor of
Greek Literature at
ficant influence on Greek
studies in the
book, Syntax of the Moods and Tenses of the Greek Verb, was published in
1860 when he was twenty-nine
years of age. Ten years later he published
An
Elementary Greek. Grammar.2 The importance of these works may be
judged by the fact that both
are still in print. His influence
extended into New Testament
studies through the work of Ernest DeWitt
The statement of the system.--Goodwin sets forth
his system in
terms of past, present and
future conditions:
1 C. D. Chambers,
"The Classification of Conditional Sentences,"
The Classical Review, 9:2 (May, 1895), pp.
293-294.
2 Chalmers G. Davidson,
"Goodwin, William Watson," Dictionary
American Biography, Vol. IV, edited by
Allen Johnson (
Scribner's Sons, 1957), pp.
411-413.
12
The most obvious natural distinction
is that of (a) present
and past conditions and (b) future conditions. Present and past
conditions (a) are divided into two
classes by distinguishing (1)
those which imply nothing as to the
fulfillment of the condition
from (2) those which imply that the
condition is not or was not
fulfilled. Future conditions (b) have two
classes (1, 2), distin-
guished by the manner in which the
supposition is stated. Class 1
of present and past conditions is further
distinguished on the
ground of the particular or general
character of the supposi-
tion . . . .1
Goodwin also includes the concepts of (a) fulfillment or
non-
fulfillment and (b) particular
and general characteristics as other
features by which conditional
sentences may be classified. The first
leads him to identify
conditional clauses as (1) those which imply
nothing as to the fulfillment
of the condition, (2) those which imply
fulfillment of the condition
and (3) those which imply the nonfulfillment
of the condition.
He explains the particular and general characteristics:
A particular supposition refers to a
definite act or to several
definite acts, supposed to occur at some
definite time (or
times) . . . .
A general supposition refers
indefinitely to any act or acts
of a given class which may be supposed to
occur or to have
occurred at any time . . . .2
The form of the conditional sentence may serve as a guide
to
its identification and
classification under these headings. A later
edition of his grammar
summarizes this:
I. Present and past suppositions implying nothing as to
ful-
fillment or
condition:
(a) Chiefly particular:
(protasis) ei] with
indicative
(apodosis) any form of the verb
1 Goodwin, Syntax of Moods, p. 139.
2 Ibid.,
p. 141.
13
(b) General:
1. (protasis)
e]a<n with subjunctive
(apodosis) present indicative
2. (protasis)
ei] with
the optative
(apodosis) imperfect indicative
II. Present and Past suppositions implying that
the condition is
not fulfilled:
(protasis)
ei]
with past tense of indicative
(apodosis) past
tense of indicative with a@n
III. Future suppositions in
more vivid form:
(protasis)
ei]
with subjunctive (sometimes ei] with future
indicative
(apodosis) any
future form
IV. Future suppositions in less vivid form:
(protasis)
ei]
with optative
(apodosis)
optative with a@n1
Smyth also adopts this system
of classification.2
The evaluation of the system.--The first point in
evaluating
Goodwin's system is that of
time. He seems to make time a basis of
classification when absolute
time is of secondary importance in the
Greek verb system. Goodwin
himself notes that relative time is far more
prominent in Greek verbs than
in English: "It is a special distinction
between the Greek and the
English idioms, that the Greek uses its verbal
1 William Watson Goodwin,
Greek Grammar, revised by Charles
2 Smyth, Grammar,
pp. 513-516.
14
forms much more freely to
denote merely relative time."1 A. T. Robertson,
noting that absolute time is
limited to the indicative mood, warns that
"even in the indicative
the time element is subordinate to the kind of
action expressed."2
While his reference to "kind"
of action may be
questioned, his observation on
time is helpful.
But is Goodwin basing his classification on time as
indicated
by the verb itself, or on
absolute time as indicated by the sentence as
a whole? The examples he offers
as illustrations seem to place the
emphasis upon the verb rather
than the syntax. Thus he presents: "Ei]
pra<ssei
tou?to, kalw?j e@xei, if he is
doing this, it is well; ei] pra<ssei
tou?to,
h[marthke<n, if he is doing this,
he has erred; ei] pra<ssei
tou?to,
kalw?j
e@cei, if he is doing this, it
will be well."3 One may well argue
that the syntax of a verb does
assign it absolute time in any given
context. But Goodwin does not
stress the role of syntax in establishing
the time of his verb. One must
therefore question any system of
classification which makes absolute
time as found in the verb itself a
foundation criterion.
Second, his distinction between particular and general
conditions
may be questioned as an
objective standard of classification. Goodwin
argues that
1 Goodwin, Syntax of Moods, p. 8.
2 A. T. Robertson, Grammar, p. 825.
3 Goodwin, Syntax
of Moods, p. 139.
15
When the apodosis has a verb of
present time expressing a
customary or repeated action, the
protasis may refer (in a general
way) to any act or acts of a given class
which may be supposed to
occur at any time within the period
represented in English as
present. Thus we may say:--
Ea@n ti<j
kle<pth, kola<zetai, if
(ever) any one steals, he is
(in
all such cases) punished . . . .1
Goodwin's concept of a present general condition seems to
fit
conditional sentences in the
New Testament, such as I John 1:7: e]a<n de>
e]n
t&? fwti> peripatw?men. . . , koinwni<an e@xomen - but
if (whenever) we
walk in the light . . . we have
(in such cases) fellowship. But what
about conditions such as Luke
5:12? Here the apodosis uses a present
tense, but the condition must
be considered a particular one, limited
to the historical situation: ku<rie, e]a<n
qe<lhj, du<nasai< me kaqari<sai -
Lord, if you are willing you
are able to cleanse me.
What is the difference between these two sentences?
Simply
that the apodosis of I John 1:7
contains a present tense verb which
expresses a "customary or
repeated action," while that of Luke 5:12
does not. There can be no
question that the condition in I John 1:7
states a general situation that
is presently true for all believers,
but such identification depends
upon the interpretation of the action
represented by the verb. Could
it be possible for interpreters to
disagree over the
interpretation of a given verb? Yes, it could.
Should the basis of
classification be a point that is interpretative
in nature? It seems reasonable
to answer in the negative. Since, then,
there is no objective way of
determining if a verb is referring to a
1 Goodwin, Syntax
Mood's, p. 141.
16
general or a particular act,
the final determination becomes one of
interpretation rather than
form. The concept of general versus particular
may serve as an interpretative
guideline, but it is not distinguished by
form. "That point [of
present or general conditions]," writes A. T.
Robertson ,"has no bearing
on the quality of the condition."1 Though
several modern New Testament
grammarians continue this terminology,
it must be questioned as a criterion
to the objective analysis of
conditional sentences.
Another point to consider in evaluating Goodwin's
classifica-
tion system is his concept of
fulfillment or non-fulfillment as found
in the condition. Robertson has
particular problems with Goodwin's
concept that conditions
employing the indicative mood in the protasis
imply nothing as to the
fulfillment of the condition. This, as
Robertson sees it, violates the
very nature of the indicative mood:
The words to which I object, besides
"particular," are "implying
nothing as to the fulfillment of the
condition." This condition
pointedly
implies the fulfillment of the condition. It is the
condition of actuality, reality, Wirklichkeit, and not mere
"possibility" as Farrar has it
. . . a la Goodwin.2
Robertson claims that Goodwin
"confuses the 'fact' with the 'statement'
of the fact."3
This seems a bit harsh, for Goodwin himself writes:
"The Greek has no form
implying that a condition is or was fulfilled,
and it is hardly conceivable
that any language should find such a form
1 Robertson, Grammar, p. 1006.
2 Ibid., p. 1006.
3 Ibid.,p.
1006.
17
necessary or useful."1
This would amount to a direct statement,
for
if the condition is fulfilled,
then the results are realized. Such a
statement would not be a
conditional statement at all, but a statement
of actuality. While the
specific topic of reality in conditional
sentences will be examined in
detail later, the important point is that
Robertson had serious doubts
about the validity of Goodwin's classifica-
tion scheme.
Another minor point of criticism leveled against Goodwin
is
that of terminology. J. W.
Roberts notes that "Others have attacked
Goodwin's terms 'more' and
'less vivid' as describing the significance
of his third and fourth class
conditional sentences," but gives no
supporting references.2
Robertson did not use this terminology,
and
those who followed have also
set it aside. Some contemporary grammarians,
though, are returning to it.
Both Robert W. Funk and William S.
La Sor speak of
"vivid" and "less vivid" concepts when discussing
conditional sentences in their
grammars. This point is not foundational
to the analysis of Goodwin's
system, and will be discussed later.
1 Goodwin, Syntax of Moods, p. 140.
2 J. W. Roberts,
"The Use of Conditional Sentences in the Greek
New
Testament as Compared with Homeric, Classical and Hellenistic
Uses,"
unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, the
1955,
p. 20.
3 Robert W. Funk, A Beginning-Intermediate Grammar of Hellenistic
Greek (Missoula, Montana:
The Society of Biblical Literature, 1973),
p.
684; and William Sanford La Sor, Handbook
of New Testament Greek,
vol.
II (Grand. Rapids: Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 1973),
pp. 221-225.
18
In summary, then, Goodwin is the main proponent of
Chamber's
first suggested criterion for
classifying conditional sentences: Time.
The main point of Goodwin's
system is the classification of these
sentences into past, present
and future conditions. Some of these
categories are further divided
into "particular" and "general" condi-
tions, and some of these are
subdivided by "vividness."
Criticism of his system has focused on (1) his use of
time as
a main dividing point, (2) the
characteristics of particular and
general, (3) the implication of
fulfillment and (4) his terminology.
The majority of Koine
grammarians today, operating under the influence
of A. T. Robertson, do not
follow Goodwin's system, though some show
signs of returning to it.
Classification According to
Fulfillment
The second criterion suggested by Chambers for
classifying
conditional sentences is that
of fulfillment, i.e. cataloging them
according to the fulfillment or
non-fulfillment of the condition.
The statement of the system.--Herbert Wier Smyth
follows this
system, noting that conditional
sentences may be classified according
to form and function. Among the
functions he lists is "fulfillment or
non-fulfillment."1
J. Donovan also champions this method of
classifica-
tion, and his argument is worth
pursuing. He uses a book review essay
as an opportunity to argue his
case in The Classical Review. The
grammar
1 Smyth, Grammar,
p. 514.
19
he is reviewing argues for the
position of classification by form, and
Donovan rejects this approach.
He argues that different meanings may
have the same form. He
concludes by writing: "What is wanted is not that
there should be a search for
'would be' or 'should be' or 'might be'
or other variations; but
recourse should at once be had to the universal
canon of fulfillment or
non-fulfillment."1
Further, recognizing that his position had already been
challenged, he adds a note of
defense:
After the campaign recently conducted in
the pages of this Review
against the very principle of fulfillment
as a basis of classifica-
tion, one point is now clear, if it was
not so already, namely,
that to be regarded as unfulfilled, a
condition need not necessarily
be so actually,
but that it is enough that it should be assumed
to be such.2
Thus Donovan elevates the
concept of fulfillment or non-fulfillment to
the status of a "universal
canon" for the classification of conditional
sentences.
The evaluation of the system.--Donovan's review
brought a rapid
response from Chambers who
defended the position in question. His
rebuttal begins with a summary
of Donovan's principle:
Therefore the universal canon resolves
itself into this: Conditions
are to be divided into (i) those which
imply or assume without
implying that the condition is not
fulfilled, and (ii) those which
do not assume or imply that the condition
is not fulfilled.3
1 J. Donovan,
"Sonnenschein's Greek Grammar," The
Classical
Review, 9:1 (January, 1895),
p. 64.
2 Ibid., p. 64.
3 Chambers, "Classification," pp.
293-294.
20
He then offers three serious
objections to Donovan's position. First,
Chambers observes that this
produces an imbalance in grammar. Condi-
tions implying non-fulfillment
are relatively rare in the language and
should not be the basis of
classification. Second, the terminology is
awkward at best and hardly fits
the need of the beginning composition.
Since Chambers is speaking of
English to Greek composition, his comment
has little reference to this
study. Third, and more to the point,
Donovan's scheme does not fit
all cases. The majority of grammarians
have not followed his
suggestions. The concept of fulfillment does, as
Goodwin notes, play a role in
our understanding of conditional sentences,
but it does not provide a
sufficiently applicable standard upon which to
classify them.1
Classification by Form
The third criterion Chambers suggests is classification
by the
form of the conditional
sentence. Among the classical grammarians who
have followed this approach is
E. A. Sonnenschein, professor of Greek
and Latin at
The statement of the system.--Sonnenschein writes:
To me the ordinary forms of
Conditional Sentences, whether in
Latin, Greek or a modern language,
present themselves in two great
1 Goodwin, Syntax of Moods, p. 139.
2 S. B. Sedwick,
"Sonnenschein, Edward Adolf," Dictionary
of
National Biography, 1922-1930, edited by J. R. H. Weaver (
21
classes, the distinction between which is
marked by certain well-
defined differences both of meaning and of
linguistic form.1
Form, for him, helps determine
the meaning, for in his classification
"there is a coincidence between distinctions of form
and distinctions of
meaning."2
Chambers supports this principle, noting that "It is
axiomatic that the division by
form, and not by sense, is the truly
scientific one, because like
forms must (originally at least) have like
meanings, but like meanings
need not have like forms."3
Smyth notes that several possibilities exist with regard
to
classification according to
form:
Classified according to form, all
conditional sentences may be
arranged with regard to the form of
the protasis or of the apodosis.
Protasis: ei] with the indicative.
e]a<n (rarely ei]) with the subjunctive.
ei] with the optative.
Apodosis: with a@n,
denoting
what would (should) be or have been.
without a@n, not denoting what would (should) be or
have
been.4
Which of these possibilities should be followed if
conditional
sentences are to be classified
by form? "Ought we to classify according
to the Protasis (Subordinate
Clause) or according to the Apodosis
1 E. A. Sonnenschein,
"Horton-Smith's Conditional
Sentences,"
The Classical. Review, 9:2 (April, 1895), p.
221.
2 Ibid., p. 221, italics added .
3 Chambers,
"Classification," p. 294.
4 Smyth, Grammar,
p. 513.
22
(Principal Clause), or
according to both at once?"1 Sonnenschein opts
for the Apodosis as the
standard. Roberts outlines his system so:
I.
Type One: Sentences without a@n in the apodosis: the
protasis
expressing no
implication of fulfillment.
ei] with a Past Indicative
expressing what was
ei] with a Present
Indicative expressing what is
e]a<n with a Subjunctive
expressing what is or what will be
Also e]a<n h] –
e@stai "If
A is B," followed by a command or wish.
II. Type Two: Sentences with ay in the apodosis:
the protasis
expressing some sort of implication
as to fact or fulfill-
ment.
ei] with the
Optative--Optative with a@n expressing what
would be
ei] with a Past
Indicative--Past Indicative with a@n expressing
what would be
III. Type Three: ei] ei@h . . .
e@stai (or e@sti) expressing in the
protasis some sort of mental reservation.2
Evaluation of the system.--Donovan, as indicated
above, claims
that this system leads to more
problems than solutions in application.
Even Chambers wonders
"whether this was the original principle of
division, or only its
accidental final result."3 The basic problem is
the occasional divergence
between form and meaning. Although the use of
form does offer an objective
standard of classification, is it reasonable
to pursue it when it does not
coincide with the real world? As will be shown
Sonnenschein is on the right
track, but the emphasis requires a slight
1 Sonnenschein,
"Horton-Smith," p. 220.
2 Roberts,
"Conditional Sentences," p. 12.
3 Charmers, "Classification," p.
294.
23
shift in order to be workable.
Classification by Determination
Chambers omitted a fourth basis of classification of
conditional
sentences, that of
determination. This approach, popularized by B. L.
Gildersleeve and followed by
many other grammarians, was first published
in 1876 and again in 1882.1
It seems strange that Chambers, writing
in
1895, was unaware of it.
The statement of the system.--Gildersleeve states
his case so:
In common with most grammarians, I
divide the conditional
sentences into four classes, for which I
have been in the habit of
using the designations
"Logical," "Anticipatory," "Ideal,"
"Unreal." If nothing more can be
said in behalf of this nomenclature
than that it saves time, something at
least has been said; and I am
glad to learn that a part of this
nomenclature, as applied to the
Latin language, has found favor among
teachers. Logical, Ideal, and
Unreal conditions occur in Latin also. The
Anticipatory is
peculiar to Greek.2
He describes the Logical Condition as one that
. . . states the elements in question. It
is used of that which
can be brought to the standard of fact; but
that standard may be
for or against the truth of the postulate.
All that the logical
condition asserts is the inexorable
connexion [sic] of the two
members of the sentence.3
1 B. L. Gildersleeve,
"On ei]
with the Future Indicative and ean
with
the Subjunctive in the Tragic Poets," Transactions
of the American
Philological Association, 7:1 (January, 1876),
pp. 2-23; and “Pindaric
Syntax,”
pp. 434-445.
2 Gildersleeve, "On ei]," pp. 5-6.
. 3 Gildersleeve, "Pindar," p. 435.
24
This type of condition
corresponds to Robertson's First Class condition.1
The Anticipatory Condition involves e]a<n in the protasis, and thus
corresponds to Robertson's
Third Class condition. Interestingly enough,
Gildersleeve agrees with
Goodwin in his concept of particular and
general ("generic"),
noting that "The anticipatory condition is
particular or generic according
to the character of the apodosis . . .,
just as any other conditional
sentence."2 The key
element is the
use of the present indicative
in the apodosis. Such a condition "is
regularly generic."3
Gildersleeve's Ideal Condition employs the optative mood
and
"seems to have been
developed out of the wish, just as the anticipatory
was developed out of
demand."4 This corresponds to Robertson's Fourth
Class condition. Since the New
Testament has no complete sentence of
this type, his comments on it
are beside the point of this study.
His fourth type of condition is termed the Unreal
Condition,
corresponding to Robertson's
Second Class condition. Rather than use
the term non-fulfillment as
does Goodwin, he speaks of it as
"futureless."
The Unreal. Condition, 'the hypothesis
contrary to fact,' seems
to be related to the hopeless wish, as
the ideal condition to the
wish pure and simple . . . . A wish may
be madly impossible, but
1 Robertson, Grammar, p. 1007.
2 Gildersleeve,
"Pindar," p. 436.
3 Ibid., p. 435.
4 Ibid.,
p. 436.
25
if it belongs to the domain of the future
it is optative. Now the
hopeless wish is hopeless because it is
futureless . . . .1
In simple language, this
condition states a condition as though there
is no hope whatsoever of its
being fulfilled. It implies its non-
fulfillment.
Thus Gildersleeve divides conditional sentences into two
broad
catagories: the first
containing those which imply something about the
determination of the condition,
and the second containing those which
imply nothing about its
determination. The first catagory is subdivided
into two classes: those which
imply positive fulfillment of the condi-
tion and those which imply
negative or non-fulfillment of the condition.
The second catagory also is
subdivided into two classes: those
conditions with a greater
degree of probability and those with a
lesser degree of probability.
Roberts summarizes this in outline
form:
I. Condition determined
A. As
fulfilled - the Simple or Logical Condition
past
Protasis: ei] with an indicative
present
future
Apodosis: Any form of verb
B. As
unfulfilled - the Unreal Condition
Protasis: ei] with a
past indicative
Apodosis: Past indicative with a@n
1 Gildersleeve, "Pindar," p. 437.
26
II. Condition undetermined
A. With greater prospect of
fulfillment - The Anticipatory
Condition
Protasis: e]a<n with
the subjunctive
Apodosis:
Usually future, except for the general, which has
the present indicative
B. With less prospect of fulfillment - The Ideal
Condition
Protasis: ei] with
the optative
Apodosis: Optative with a@n1
The comparison of the system.--A comparison of
this outline with
that of Goodwin's system on
pages 12-13 or with the chart in Smyth's
grammar will indicate
Gildersleeve's points of departure.2
These may
be listed as:
1. No attempt is made to utilize the time of the
condition as a
guide to the classification of
the sentence.
2. No attempt has been made to divide them into
particular
or general on the basis of the
protasis. Each of these may, in
Gildersleeve's opinion, be
particular or general, depending on the
apodosis, but that is not a basis
of classification.3
3. Mood, rather than tense is emphasized as one of the
important
features of the protasis.
1 Roberts,
"Conditional Sentences," p. 22.
2 Smyth, Gammar, p. 516.
3 He does approve of such
a distinction as a guide to interpre-
tation.
See "On ei]," p. 7.
27
4. No attempt is made to distinguish general and
particular
conditions by form, though he
does recognize that the Anticipatory
condition (e]a<n with the subjunctive in the protasis) is
more often than
not a general condition.
5. The Future Condition (called by Smyth the "Future
Emotional"1)
is identified as a simple or
logical condition on the basis of the
indicative mood.
This system has been followed by a significant number of
Koine
grammarians, including men such
as Winer,2 Buttman,3 Robertson,4 and
Blass-Debrunner.5
The evaluation of the system.--There are three
points which need
to be considered in evaluating
his system. First, the above-mentioned
1 Smyth, Grammar, p. 516.
2 G[eorge] Benedict] Winer,
A Grammar of the Idiom of the New
Testament, seventh edition,
revised by Gottlieb Lunemann, translated
and
edited by J. H. Thayer (
Publisher,
1893), p. 291.
3 Alexander Buttmann, A Grammar of the New Testament Greek,
translated
and edited by J. H. Thayer (
Publisher,
1873), p. 220.
4 Robertson, Grammar, p. 1004.
5 F[riedrich] Blass and
Albert] Debrunner, A Greek Grammar of
the New Testament and Other
Early Christian Literature, translated and
revised
by Robert W. Funk (
1961), pp. 188-189.
28
point regarding present and
general conditions needs to be summarized.
Gildersleeve maintains that any
conditional sentence may be particular
or general "according to
the character of the apodosis."1 The
particular character he looks
for is the use of the present tense. This
is true, according to him, of
all conditions, including the Logical and
Anticipatory conditions:
Hence when [the logical condition] has its
apodosis in the present,
it has a double meaning, which adapts it admirably
to personal
argument. So especially when the form ei]
tij is
used, which may
point either to a definite or to an
indefinite person, the Logical
condition is a two-edged sword, often
wielded in the keen encounter
of Attic wit. But as the e]a<n conditional with a
present indicative
apodosis is regularly generic, it is not
without reason that this
form should be preferred, when distinctly
generic action is to be
expressed.2
New Testament examples which illustrate his point include
Matthew 19:10 (ei] ou!twj e]sti<n h[ ai]ti<a tou? a]nqrw<pou
meta> th?j
gunaiko<j,
ou] sumfe<rei gamh?sai - if this is the case of the man with his wife,
it is better not to marry), a
logical condition which is obviously
a general one, and John 11:9 (e]a<n tij peripath? e]n t^? h[me<r%, ou]
prosko<ptei - if
anyone walks in the day he does not stumble), an
anticipatory condition which is
also general. Whether this holds as
a uniform rule (present tense
in apodosis = a general condition)
deserve detailed treatment and
will receive it at a later point in
this study. For now, it is
sufficient to note that Gildersleeve's
suggestion does fit some
passages in the Koine of the New Testament.
1 Gildersleeve,
"Pindar," p. 435.
2 Gildersleeve, "On ei," p. 6.
29
The second point of evaluation also relates to a
distinction
between Gildersleeve and
Goodwin. Gildersleeve's system relegates the
present general condition of
Goodwin to the anticipatory class because
of its subjunctive mood.
Conditions employing future indicative verbs
are classed as simple or
logical conditions. But what is the difference
between these two? Does not the
future indicative convey the same concept
as the present subjunctive, for
all practical purposes?
Gildersleeve answers that there is a distinction between
the
two, one which he feels has
been overlooked by many grammarians. First,
he notes, the normal pattern
for future conditions is e]a<n with
the
subjunctive: "The fact
then is patent enough to every one who will be
at pains to count, that for
model Greek prose e]a<n with
the subjunctive
is preferred to ei] with the future indicative."1
The reason for this,
he writes,
. . . seems to be to a considerable
extent the greater temporal
exactness, the same greater temporal
exactness which has wholly
displaced the future indicative with the
temporal particles, the same
greater temporal exactness which has given
so wide a sweep to the
optative with a@n as a sharper form of the future.2
If e]a<n with
the subjunctive is the normal form in Attic prose,
what is the role of ei] with the future indicative? It shows
. . . a certain coldness, a certain
indifference; and this added to
the general rigor of the logical
condition, which faces fact in all
its grimness, gives a stern, minatory,
prophetic tone to the future
1 Gildersleeve, "On ei]," p. 9.
2 Ibid.,
p. 9.
30
indicative, which commentators and
grammarians have noticed, but
noticed only in passing.1
Though Gildersleeve is speaking of conditions in Attic
Greek,
his observations give an added
dimension to the force of such conditions
in the New Testament, such as
Matthew 6:23 (e]a<n de> o[
o]fqalmo<j sou
ponhro>j
h#, o!lon to> sw?ma< sou skoteino>n e@stai - but
if your eye is evil,
your whole body will be
darkness) and Luke 13:3 (a]lla< e]a<n
mh> metanoh?te,
pa<ntej
o[moi<wj a]polei?sqe - but unless you repent, you will all likewise
be destroyed).
Thus Gildersleeve uses the mood of the verb as the
guiding
principle of his
classification. The present general conditions as
identified by Goodwin simply
follow the pattern of Attic prose and should
be considered as a type of
anticipatory or future conditions. Further,
the use of the future
indicative not only classes the condition as a
logical condition, but stresses
the inescapable nature of the apodosis.
A third point arises over the distinction between the
indicative
and subjunctive moods. Contrary
to Gildersleeve, Goodwin maintains that
there is no distinction between
these two moods in conditional sentences
except that of time. He devotes
an entire paper to the defense of his
position and offers the
following observation:
The idea of "possibility"
or something of the kind being attached
to the subjunctive, it was naturally
supposed that the simple
indicative in protasis must have a
corresponding idea at its
foundation, and that of
"certainty" or "reality" has generally been
assigned to it.2
1 Gildersleeve, "On ei]," p. 9.
2 "William Watson
Goodwin, "On the Classification of Conditional
Sentences
in Greek Syntax," Transactions of
the American Philological
Association, 6:1
(March, 1873), pp. 61-62.
31
He then gives several reasons for questioning that this
distinction holds up in
conditional sentences. In concluding his
argument he writes:
After the most careful study that I have
been able to give to the
subject, and especially after a comparison
of several thousand
classic examples, I am convinced that no
such principle [of
distinction] can be found. Every example
that I have met with has
only confirmed the opinion, which I can
now express with the
greatest confidence, that there is no
inherent distinction between
the present indicative and the present
subjunctive in protasis
(between ei]
boule<tai and e]a<n boulh?tai)
except that of time.1
Robertson, writing some years later, defends
Gildersleeve's
position against Goodwin by
pointedly hinging the meaning of the logical
condition (ei] with the indicative in the protasis) on the
significance
of the indicative mood.2 This mood, according to him, is characterized
as:
. . . the "modus rectus." It
does express "l'affirmation pure
et simple." The indicative does state a thing as true, but does not
guarantee the reality of the thing. In the nature of the case only
the statement
is under discussion. A clear grip on this point will
help one all along. The indicative has
nothing to do with reality
("on sich"). The speaker presents something as true. Actuality is
implied, to be sure, but nothing more.
Whether it is true or no is
another matter.2
Concerning the subjunctive mood, Robertson notes two
things.
First, it is probably
impossible to identify a single root-idea for
this mood. He accepts
Brugmann's identification of "three uses of the
subjunctive (the volitive, the deliberative, the futuristic."3
Thus
1 Goodwin,
"Classification," pp. 64-65.
2 Robertson, Grammar, p. 915.
3 Ibid.,
pp. 926-927.
32
the subjunctive does not
necessarily imply a specific time.
Second, there is a close connection between the aorist
sub-
juctive and the future
indicative:
These [the aorist subjunctive and the
future indicative] are closely
allied in form and sense. It is quite
probable that the future
indicative is just a variation of the
aorist subjunctive . . . .
The subjunctive is always future, in
subordinate clauses relatively
future. Hence the two forms continued
side by side in the language.
There is a possible distinction.
"The subjunctive differs from the
future
indicative in stating what is thought likely to occur, not
positively what will occur."
[quoting Thompson, A Syntax of Attic
Greek, p. 133].1
Thus Robertson offers support for Gildersleeve's position
by
holding, first, to a uniform
distinction between indicative and sub-
junctive moods, and, second, to
a non-chronological significance for
the subjunctive mood itself.
The particular case of the future
indicative and the aorist
subjunctive may show a blurring of this
otherwise sharp distinction,
but Robertson will not concede confusion
in the essential modal
significance, even in conditional sentences.
It would seem, then, that the major objections against
Gildersleeve's system raised by
Goodwin can be answered. Indeed, some
of the answers are directly
related to the objections raised against
Goodwin's own approach. Most
Koine grammarians have been convinced of
the superiority of
Gildersleeve's approach and have adopted it, via
Robertson, with some notable
exceptions.
1 Robertson, Grammar, pp. 924-925.
33
Summary of Classical Greek
Classification Systems
This somewhat detailed review of the work of Classical
gram-
marians has shown that there
is, in truth, significant disagreement
among them. Goodwin classifies
according to time, Donovan according to
fulfillment or,
non-fulfillment, Sonnenschein and Chambers according to
form, and Gildersleeve
according to determination. In terms of a
majority vote, classical
grammarians usually follow Goodwin and Koine
grammarians generally follow
Gildersleeve (or Robertson who follows
Gildersleeve).
Conditional
Sentences in Koine Greek
It is impossible to separate the advances in Koine
grammar
from those of Classical Greek,
for they have moved hand-in-hand. At
times, Koine grammarians took
the work of the Classical scholars and
brought it directly into New
Testament studies, as
Goodwin's classification of
conditional sentences. Robertson is
representative of those Koine
scholars who were conversant with Classical
studies, but saw fit to reject
some of them and sharpen the focus of
others, as he did with
Gildersleeve's work on these sentences.
Nigel Turner has done the historian of grammatical
studies a
great favor by publishing a
chronological bibliography of all major
Greek works, beginning with the
first New Testament grammar published
in 1655 and ending with the
latest edition of Bauer's Worterbuch
in
1958.1
1 Nigel Turner, A Grammar of New Testament Greek. Volume III:
Syntax
(Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1963), pp. vii-x.
34
This discussion will limit itself to the major Koine
grammarians
appearing on his list,
including those who have published since he
compiled his catalog. For
organizational purposes they will be divided
into "Early" and
"Late" grammarians, with A. T. Robertson being the
dividing point. Just as the
survey of Classical grammarians illustrated
the wide range of opinion on
conditional sentences in the classic
writings, so this survey will
demonstrate that Koine studies are in a
similar state of flux.
Early Grammarians
George Benedict Winer
George Benedict Winer is identified by Dana and Mantey as
the
first grammarian to operate
with the concept that the Greek of the New
Testament is the Greek of the
common people, not a special, Holy Ghost
language.1 In the preface to the Sixth Edition of his
grammar Winer
writes:
The fundamental error--the prw?ton
yeu?doj--of
the Biblical
philology and exegesis to which we refer,
consisted ultimately in
this, that neither the Hebrew nor the
language of the N.T. was
regarded as a living idiom . . . designed
to be used by men as the
medium of intercourse.2
From this basis he develops his
analysis of the Koine grammar, including
that of conditional sentences.
1 Dana and Mantey, Grammar, p. 9.
2 Winer, Grammar,
p. v.
35
Statement of His Position
Winer applies the results of the "enlightened
philology" of his
day to New Testament Greek and
offers this analysis of conditional or
hypothetical sentences:
In HYPOTHETICAL sentences four kinds
of construction occur:
a. Pure condition: If thy friend come, give him my regards
(the case is put as real). Here the
Indicative is used with
ei]. . . .
b. Condition with assumption of objective possibility (where
experience will decide whether or not it
is real): If thy friend
should come (I do not know whether he will come, but the
result
will show). Here e]a<n . . . with the
Subjunctive is used.
c. Condition with assumption of subjective possibility, the
condition existing merely in thought: If thy
friend come (the case
being conceivable and credible) I should
be pleased to present my
respects to him. Here ei] with the Optative is
used.
d. Condition believed to be contrary
to the fact: were there a
God, he would govern (but there is not). Had God existed from
eternity, he would have prevented evil (but he has not
existed).
Here ei] with the Indicative is
used,--the Imperf. in the first case,
the Aor. or (much more rarely) the Plup.
in the second . . .; in the
conclusion likewise one of these two
tenses.1
Summary of His Position
Winer's optimistic statement that "the diction of
the N.T. will
be found entirely in accordance
with the preceding rules" indicates his
confidence in these four basic
divisions.2 Though this has not been
fulfilled to the degree he
predicted, Winer has anticipated the major
system used by Koine
grammarians today. It is apparent that he is
following Gildersleeve's
system, though using slightly different termin-
ology. He makes no reference to
Gildersleeve, but it is possible that he
1 Winer, Grammar, p. 291.
2 Ibid.,
p. 292
36
was familiar with
Gildersleeve's work. Like him, Winer distinguishes
between ei] and the future indicative verb in the protasis
and e]]a<n with
the subjunctive, though he
acknowledges that "such construction with the
Fut. would approximate most
nearly to that with e]a<n . . .
."1 He
illustrates the difference
between the two in this way:
. . . but if all shall be offended in thee is a more decided
statement than if all should be offended. In the latter, it is
still altogether uncertain whether they
will be offended; in the
former, this is assumed as a future fact .
. . .2
Winer notes that "the exceptions to these rules in
the N.T.
text are but very few, and
occur for the most part only in particular
Codd."3 He discusses two types of exceptions: the use
of ei] with the
subjunctive and e]a<n with the indicative. He does not discuss
mixed
conditions,
concessive particles or elliptical conditions.
Evaluation of His Position
It is difficult at best to read many last-century
grammarians
with any degree of
comprehension. They wrote "for another eye, another
mind and another time." He
further complicates the issue by trying to
illustrate Greek concepts from
English. The difference between "If thy
friend come" and "If
thy friend should come" hardly conveys the
difference between the
indicative and subjunctive moods. His
explanatory comments are far
more helpful than his examples, which tend
to confuse the points he tries
to make.
1 Winer, Grammar, p. 293.
2 Ibid., p. 294.
37
Winer did, however, establish a significant precedent by
considering the Koine Greek to
be just that, the language of the common
man. By bringing the concept of
simple observation and induction to
bear upon the New Testament he
advanced the understanding of its
structure and pointed the way
for others to follow.
Alexander Buttmann
Alexander Buttmann followed the general rules of Winer in
his
treatment of conditional
sentences. Rather than expanding the rules at
length, Buttmann concentrated
on the deviations found in the New Testa-
ment. By this time it was
fairly evident that Winer's confident asser-
tion that all New Testament
forms were covered by his four rules was
overstated. Buttmann's work,
though, shows that Winer's four classifica-
tions are generally true and
accurately describe the majority of
conditional sentences in the
New Testament.
Statement of His Position
Buttmann observed that the first two forms of conditional
sentences (ei] with the indicative and e]a<n with the subjunctive) are by
far the most frequent forms in
the New Testament.1 He also
stressed the
importance of mood as the
determining factor in evaluating the kind of
condition:
The difference between them [the two
types of conditional
sentences] . . . is plainly to be
recognized in sentences where
both are used in close proximity; as Gal.
i. 8,9, where the
1 Buttmann, Grammar, p. 220.
38
hypothesis expressed in the 8th verse by e]a<n with the Subjunctive
is resumed or repeated in the 9th verse
with greater energy and
definiteness by ei] with the Indicative. So in Acts v. 38, 39.1
Comparison of His Position
Buttmann's analysis of the exceptions to Winer's rules
centers
on two areas: the use of ei] and e][a<n with
the indicative and subjunctive
moods respectively, and the use
of a@n in conditions contrary to
fact.
Particles and moods.--His analysis of the
particles and their
corresponding moods is one of
the first treatments of the topic that
discusses the problem of variant
readings.
Of the first case, the use of ei] with the Subjunctive,
we find, to
be sure, accidentally . . . no example
which is quite certain; for
in some of them the readings vary, some
are set aside by the MSS.
(as Rev. xi. 5 [but cod. Sin. qelh?sh the second time]), some
are
capable of a special interpretation.2
He also lists I Corinthians
9:11 and Luke 9:13 as possible examples of
this exception.
Regarding the use of e]a<n with the indicative he notes
that this
"is given so frequently,
that it is to be eliminated as little from the
writings of the N.T. as of the
Old."3 Buttmann does
concede that most of
these examples may be
questioned upon textual evidence, but argues
that the variants were
introduced when the copyists altered the original
and more difficult indicative.
1 Buttmann, Grammar, p. 220.
2 Ibid., p. 221.
3 Ibid.,
p. 222.
39
It is, indeed, not to be denied that
the instances in question
almost disappear amid the multitude of
those that are grammatically
regular, and suspicion may also be raised
by the circumstance that
hardly a single passage with the
Indicative is completely beyond
question critically. Yet when we consider
that in countless
passages with the Subjunctive not the
smallest variation is found
(which would not be the case if the
Indicative were chargeable solely
to the copyists), it is far more probable
that, where a diversity of
readings occurs in such a number of
instances, this fact results
from the circumstance that the copyists,
commentators, etc., early
altered the Indicative which gave them
offence.1
Specific examples will be
considered in a later section of this study,
but Buttmann's consideration of
variant readings marks a significant
advance in the detailed study
of conditional sentences.
Conditions contrary to fact.--The second area of
deviation
Buttmann examined was the use
of a@n in the fourth class of
conditions:
conditions contrary to fact. He
noted that the apodosis regularly
included a@n, but recognized that this was not an absolute
principle.
He listed four rules to explain
the disappearance of a@n from
these
apodoses:
a) When a@n has already been
expressed previously in the same
connection with another predicate. This
instance, which often occurs
in the classics and is found in the
nature of the case, is acci-
dentally not to be met with in the text
of the N. T. . . .
b) When the predicate (or the
copula) to which it belongs is
also dropped, as I Cor. xii. 19 . . . .
c) Where the apodosis contains such
a predicative term as e]dei>,
kalo<n h#n, h]du<nato, etc. This omission . . . is
so necessary
according to Greek habits of thought, that
it is only by way of
concession to our usage that we can speak
of supplying a@n.
d) Lastly, a@n is dropped for
rhetorical reasons: where,
though the fact itself is impossible or
improbable, the orator in
the vivacity of his thought desires to
represent it as actually
1 Buttmann, Grammar, p. 222.
40
having occurred, or at least as
almost taken place.1
Most modern grammarians dispense with these rules, simply
noting that a@n usage is at best unpredictable. Robertson, for
example,
simply states that "There
is no principle involved in a@n,
simply custom."2
Buttmann was willing to
recognize that the particle may be absent from a
condition without upsetting the
force of that sentence, and this is the
emphasis of modern grammars.
Evaluation of His Position
Buttmann gets credit for a more thorough study of the
conditional
sentence than that of Winer. He
accepted Winer's four categories, but
noted several major exceptions
to them, especially in the variant
readings. Buttmann and Winer
both placed emphasis upon mood as the
determining factor in
classifying conditional sentences rather than the
particles or tense. It remained
for other grammarians to state this
principle in more formal terms.
Samuel G. Green
Published around 1887, Samuel G. Green's Handbook of the Greek
Testament
presents an analysis of conditional sentences that follows the
patterns of Winer and Buttmann.3
1 Buttmann, Grammar, pp. 225-226.
2 Robertson, Grammar. p. 1007.
3 Samuel G. Green, Handbook to the Grammar of the Greek Testament
(
41
Statement of His Position
Briefly, Green identifies four kinds of conditions or
hypotheses:
a. The supposition of a
fact.
b. “
“
of a possibility.
g. “ “ of uncertainty.
d. “ “ of something unfulfilled.1
These four types of conditions
are indicated by four distinct
forms:
a. The conditional
particle ei],
if, with the Indicative in the
protasis, assumes the hypothesis as a
fact. The apodosis may have
the Indicative or Imperative.
b. Possibility or
uncertainty with the prospect of decision, is
expressed by e]a<n = ei]
a@n (very
rarely by ei]
alone [He lists I Cor. 14:5,
Phil. 3:12, and a few various readings,
such as in Rev. 11:5, as
examples.] with the Subjunctive in the
conditional clause, and the
Indicative or Imperative in the apodosis.
g. The Optative in a
conditional sentence expresses entire
uncertainty--a supposed case. Here the
particle ei]
is always used.
d. When the condition is
spoken of as unfulfilled, the
Indicative is used in both clauses, with
the particle ei] in the
protasis, and a@n in the apodosis.2
Evaluation of His Position
As is evident, Green's system of analysis is the same as
those
already discussed: four types
of condition, each identified by a
particular combination of
particles and moods, and each conveying a
different concept. Winer, Buttmann
and Green all seek to analyze
conditional sentences in terms
of form, especially that of mood. They
differ little from the popular
scheme of Robertson.
1 Green, Grammar, p. 317.
2 Ibid.,
pp. 317-319.
42
Ernest DeWitt Burton
Ernest DeWitt Burton was both a scholar and an
administrator,
having served as the chairman
of the Department of New Testament and
Early Christian Literature and
later as the president of the University
of Chicago.1 In his major Greek work, Moods and Tenses of New Testament
Greek, he
adopts Goodwin's analysis of conditional sentences and applies
it to the New Testament.2
Statement of His Position
His specific position, following Goodwin, is:
A. Simple Present or Past Particular
Supposition. The protasis
simply states a supposition which refers
to a particular case in
the present or past, implying nothing as
to its fulfillment. The
protasis is expressed by ei] with a present or past
tense of the
Indicative; any form of the finite verb
may stand in the apodosis.
John 15:20; ei] e]me>
e]di<wcan, kai> u[ma?j diw<cousin, if they
have persecuted
me, they,will also persecute you.
Gal. 5:18; ei] de>
pneu<mati a@gesqe, ou]k e]ste> u[po> no<mon, but if ye are
led by the Spirit, ye are not under the law. See also Matt. 4:3;
Luke 16:11; Acts 5:39;
B. Supposition Contrary to Fact. The
protasis states a supposi-
tion which refers to the present or past,
implying that it is not or
was
not fulfilled.
The protasis is expressed by ei] with a past tense of
the
Indicative; the apodosis by a past tense
of the Indicative with an.
John 11:21; Ku<rie,
ei] h#j w$de ou]k a@n a]pe<qanen o[ a]delfo<j mou, Lord, if
thou
hadst been here, my brother would not have died.
Gal. 1:10;
ei] e@ti a]nqrw<poij h@reskon, Xristou? dou?loj ou]k a@n
h@mhn, if I
were still pleasing men, I should not be a servant of
Christ.
See also John 14:28; Acts 18:14; Heb. 4:8; 11:15.
1 Charles Thwing, "
Dictionary of American
Biography,
ed. by Allen Johnson and Dumas Malone
(New
York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1958), pp. 341-342.
2 Ernest DeWitt
Greek (Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1897), p. 101.
43
C. Future Supposition with More
Probability. The protasis
states a supposition which refers to the
future, suggesting some
probability of its fulfillment.
The protasis is usually expressed by
e]a<n (or a@n) with the
Subjunctive; the apodosis by the Future
Indicative or by some other
form referring to future time.
Matt. 9:21; e]a<n
mo<non a!ywmai tou? i[mati<ou a]tou? swqh<somai, if I shall
but touch his garments, I shall be made whole.
John 12:26; e]a<n
tij e]moi> diakonh? timh<sei au]to>n o[ path<r, if any man
serve me, him will the Father honor.
John 14:15; e[a<n
a]gapa?te< me, ta>j e]ntola>j
ta>j e]ma>j thrh<sete, if ye
love me, ye will keep my commandments. See also Matt. 5:20;
I Cor. 4:19; Gal. 5:2; Jas. 2:15,16.
D. Future Supposition with Less
Probability. The protasis
states a supposition which refers to the
future, suggesting less
probability of its fulfillment than is suggested
by e]a<n with the
Subjunctive. There is no perfect example
of this form in the New
Testament.
The protasis is expressed by ei] with the Optative; the
apodosis by
the Optative with a@n.
I
Pet. 3:17; krei?tton ga>r a]gaqopoiou?ntaj, ei] qe<loi to>
qe<lhma tou?
qeou?,
pa<sxein h@ kakopoiou?ntaj, for it is better, if
the will of
God should so will, that ye suffer for well doing than
for evil
doing. See
also I Cor. 14:10; 15:37; I Pet. 3:14.
E. Present General Supposition. The
supposition refers to any
occurrence of an act of a certain class in
the (general) present,
and the apodosis states what is wont to
take place in any instance
of an act of the class referred to in the
protasis.
The protasis is expressed by e]a<n with the Subjunctive,
the
apodosis by the Present Indicative.
John 11:9; ea]<n tij
peripath? e]n t^? h[me<r%, ou] prosko<ptei, if
a man
walk in the day, he stumbleth not.
2 Tim. 2:5; e]a<n de> kai< a]qlh? tij, ou] stefanou?tai
e]a<n mh> nomi<mwj
a]qlh<sh, and if also a man contend in the games, he is not
crowned, unless he contend lawfully. See also Mark 3:24;
John
7:51; 12:24; I Cor. 7:39, 40.
F. Past General Supposition. The
supposition refers to any
past occurrence of an act of a certain
class, and the apodosis
states what was wont to take place in any
instance of an act of the
class referred to in the protasis.
The protasis is expressed by ei] with the Optative, the
apodosis
by the Imperfect Indicative.
44
There is apparently no instance of
this form in the New Testa-
ment.1
In addition to these general classifications,
interesting observations
regarding the specific classes. He notes that
in the first type
. . . the Future Indicative may stand in
the protasis of a conditional
sentence of the first class when reference
is had to a present
necessity or intention, or when the writer
desires to state not what
will take place on the fulfillment of a
future possibility, but merely
to affirm a necessary logical consequence
of a future event.2
This differs from Goodwin's
position that the future indicative and the
subjunctive may have the same
significance in conditional sentences.
The third class of conditional sentences may also have
these
constructions in the protasis:
(a) ei] with the Subjunctive, (b) ei] or
e]a<n with
the Future Indicative, and (c) ei] with
the Present Indicative.3
Conditions of this last form
are apparently first class conditions, but
"are distinguished by
evident reference of the protasis to the future."4
Concerning the fifth class, the Present General
Supposition, he
notes that some conditions
using ei] with the indicative
"apparently
express a present general supposition,"
which does not fit his rule that
such conditions use e]a<n with the subjunctive.5 He explains that it is
1 Burton, Syntax, pp. 102-106.
2
Ibid., p. 103.
3 Ibid., pp. 104-105.
4 Ibid., p. 105.
5 Ibid.,
p. 107.
45
difficult to distinguish
between this form of a present general condition
and that of a simple condition:
Yet in most New Testament passages of
this kind, it is possible that
a particular imagined instance in the
present or future is before the
mind
as an illustration of the general class of cases . . . . It is
scarcely possible to decide in each case
whether the supposition was
conceived of as general or particular
Luke 14:26; ei@
tij e@rxetai pro<j me kai> ou] misei? . . . th>n yuxh>n
e[autou?,
ou] du<natai ei#nai< mou maqhth<j, if any
man cometh unto
me,
and hateth not . . . his own life, he cannot be my disciple.
Cf. John 1:51; 12:26; where in
protases of apparently similar
force e]a<n with the Subjunctive
occurs, and the apodosis refers to
the future.
Rom. 8:25; ei] de> o! ou] ble<pomen e]lpi<zomen, di ]
u[pomonh?j a]pekdexo<meqa,
but if we hope for that which we see not, then do we with
patience wait for it. See
also Jas. 1:26.1
According to form, such
conditions are simple conditions, but according
to interpretation, they may be
considered a variety of present general
conditions. The distinction, it
must be stressed, is one of interpreta-
tion, not form. Classification
should be on an objective basis, such
as form, not upon a subjective
one, such as interpretation.
Summary of His Position
In addition to these details,
peculiarities of conditional
sentences. He lists nine of these, including
(1) mixed forms, (2) multiple
protases, each with its unique emphasis,
(3) the use of a participle, an
imperative or other form of expression
"suggesting a
supposition" to supply the protasis, and (4) the observation
that sometimes either the
protasis or the apodosis may be omitted.2
1 Burton, Syntax, pp. 107-108.
2 Ibid., pp. 109-112.
46
One final comment:
of "reality" or
"unreality" in these conditions as that of the speaker or
his hearers, not in the
external situation:
It should be observed that the
titles of the several classes
of conditional sentences describe the
supposition not from the
point of view of fact, but from that of
the representation of the
case to the speaker's own mind or to that
of his hearers.1
Conditional sentences do speak
of many things that are objectively true,
but the demonstration of their
factuality lies in the external world,
not in the internal world of
the conditional statement.
James Hope Moulton
The Prolegomena
to James Hope Moulton's A Grammar of the
New
Testament was
the first major grammar to utilize the newly discovered
evidence from the papyri.2
This work was followed by his Introduction to
the
Study of New Testament Greek, a formal grammar.3
Moulton had
originally conceived of his
major work, A Grammar of the New
Testament,
in terms of three volumes. He
published Volume I: Prolegomena in
1906,
and it quickly went through
three editions in two years. He produced
the rough draft for parts I and
II of the second volume, but was not
permitted to finish it. While
at sea he died "in the
1
2 James Hope Moulton, A Grammar of New Testament Greek. Volume I:
Prolegomena, third edition
(Edinburgh: T. S T. Clark, 1908), p. 4.
3 James Hope Moulton, An Introduction to the Study of New Testa-
ment
Greek (
47
in April, 1917, a victim of the
ruthless submarine campaign."1 Nigel Turner
continues the interesting
story:
His pupil, Dr. W. F. Howard, saw that
volume through the press in
parts, from 1919 to 1929, but before he
had opportunity to lay many
plans for Volume III he himself died in
1952; and then, on condition
that he had the assistance of someone who
would collect the necessary
material, Dr. H. G. Meecham assumed
responsibility for the syntax.
It was on Dr. G. D. Kilpatrick's
suggestion that I was permitted to
help at this point, and we had done no
more than compile a provisional
bibliography when Dr. Meecham died in
1955. By the kind invitation of
the publishers I then worked alone and
broke the spell by living to
complete Volume III.2
Since he was anticipating two more volumes, Dr. Moulton
did little
more than mention a few aspects
of conditional sentences in the Prolegomena.
Fortunately, his Introduction to the Study of New Testament
Greek gives
a relatively complete
presentation of his views on the classification of
these clauses.
Statement of His Position
First, the general comments from his Prolegomena will be
presented. To begin with, he
notes that the distinction between ei] and e]a<n
. . . has been considerably lessened in
Hellenistic as compared with
earlier Greek. We have seen that e]a<n can take the
indicative; while
(as rarely in classical Greek) ei] can be found with the subjunctive.3
Regarding
the constructional distinctions of conditional sentences,
Moulton makes the following
observations:
1 James Hope Moulton and
W. F. Howard, A Grammar of New Testament
Greek. Volume II:
Accidence and Word Formation (
1929),
p. v.
2 Nigel Turner, A Grammar of New Testament Greek. Volume
III:
Syntax
(Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1963), p. v.
3 Moulton, Prolegomena,
p. 187.
48
The differentation of construction remains
at present stereotyped:
ei] goes with indicative,
is used exclusively when past tenses come
in (e.g. Mk 326), and uses ou] as its negative; while e]a<n, retaining
mh< exclusively, takes the
subjunctive almost invariably, unless the
practically synonymous future indicative
is used. Ea@n and ei] are both
used, however, to express future
conditions . . . The immense
majority of conditional sentences in the NT
belong to these heads.1
Moulton opts for Blass's principle as opposed to
Goodwin's to
explain the use of the optative
mood in these sentences:
Meanwhile we may observe that
Blass's dictum (p. 213) that
ei] c. opt. form is used
"if I wish to represent anything as generally
possible, without regard to the general
or actual situation at the
moment," suits the NT exx. well; and
it seems to fit the general
facts better than Goodwin's doctrine of a
"less vivid future"
condition (Goodwin, Greek Grammar, 301).2
He specifically identifies Acts
8:31 as an example of a conditional
sentence employing a@n with the optative to which Goodwin's "less
vivid"
form does not apply. 3
However, he does follow Goodwin's general system for the
overall
classification of conditional
sentences. Three general classes are
recognized:
Simple Conditions in present or past
time.
Protasis,
ei] with
indicative; Apodosis, generally
indicative, always
without a]n.
These sentences merely join
together a condition and a result without
any indication as to the
probability or improbability of the condition.
1 Moulton, Prolegomena, p. 187.
2 Ibid., p. 196, note.
3 Ibid., pp. 198-199.
4 Ibid.,
p. 199.
49
Unfulfilled Conditions in present and
past time.
Protasis,
ei]
with indicative, imperfect for present time, aorist for
past.
Apodosis,
indicative with a@n, imperfect for present
time, aorist for
past.
Future Conditions.
Protasis,
e]a<n with subjunctive (rarely indicative, or ei] with subjunc-
tive).
Apodosis,
future indicative, sometimes the imperative.1
He classifies the optative condition, Robertson's Fourth
Class
Condition, as a special form of
the Future Condition, noting that its
full expression has vanished in
the Koine and only parts of such conditions
appear in the New Testament.
Modern
Grammarians
Archibald Thomas Robertson
Of all modern Koine grammarians, none has exerted the
influence or
achieved the status of
Archibald Thomas Robertson. As professor of New
Testament at the Southern
Baptist Theological Seminary from 1890 to
1934 he helped form modern
opinion about Koine Greek. With few exceptions
contemporary grammarians have
adopted his terminology and viewpoint,
especially on conditional
sentences. Thus his position requires detailed
study in order to fully
comprehend the current majority view of
conditional sentences in the
New Testament.
Statement of His Position
His system of analysis basically follows that of
Gildersleeve
in Classical Greek by
identifying four types of conditions, each
1 Moulton, Introduction
to New Testament Greek, pp. 210-213.
50
determined by the mood of the
protasis.
His summary.--Robertson first summarizes the
importance of mood
in conditions:
The indicative mode in the condition
always makes a clear-cut
assertion one way or the other
[fulfilled or unfulfilled]. If the
subjunctive or the optative is used in the
condition (protasis) a
doubtful statement is made whatever may be
the actual fact or truth
in
the case. By these modes of doubtful statement the condition
puts it as doubtful or undetermined (not put in a clear--cut way).
If the subjunctive is used, there is less
doubt than if the optative
is used, precisely the difference between
these two modes of doubtful
statement.1
This distinction in mood (indicative = fulfilled or
unfulfilled,
subjunctive = doubt, optative =
more doubt) leads to the natural
conclusion that there are four
types of conditional sentences:
(a) First Class: Determined as Fulfilled
(ei],
sometimes e]a<n,
with any tense of the indicative in
condition. Any tense of the
indicative in the conclusion).
(b) Second Class: Determined as Unfulfilled
(ei]
and only past
tenses of the indicative in condition.
Only past tenses in the
conclusion, usually with a@n to make clear the kind
of condition
used).
(c) Third Class: Undetermined with Prospect
of Determination
(e]a<n or ei] with the subjunctive in
the condition, usually future
or present indicative or imperative in
the conclusion, much variety
in the form of the conclusion).
(d) Fourth Class: Undetermined with
Remote Prospect
Determination (ei]
with the
optative in the condition, a@n and the
optative in the conclusion).2
1 A. T. Robertson and W.
Hersey Davis, A New Short Grammar of
the Greek Testament (New York: Harper &
Brothers, 1933), p. 349.
2 Ibid.,
pp. 349-350.
51
His Defence.--In defending this analysis,
Robertson speaks
against the popular forms of
classification, especially that of Goodwin.
First he rejects the concept of
particular and general as a basic
principle of classification.
Actually the concept of time was the key
principle of Goodwin, but the
particular-general division was important.
In any event, Robertson points
to the work of Gildersleeve and says of
Goodwin's distinction:
"This is a false step in itself."1 He accepts
Gildersleeve's position that
any condition may be particular or general,
depending upon the type of verb
used in the protasis.
Robertson then raises his next and most serious objection
to
Goodwin and those following
him: they refuse to recognize the basic
significance of the mood in
conditions. Goodwin's first class of
conditions utilizes the
indicative mood and, he says, "simply states a
present or past particular
supposition, implying nothing as to the
fulfillment of the condition .
. . .2 Robertson strongly
objects to
this interpretation, claiming
that "This condition pointedly
implies the
fulfillment of the
condition."3 Robertson
hinges his argument on the
basic significance of the
indicative mood which, he claims, has its usual
meaning in conditions as well
as normal clauses. This is, as he says,
"the crux of the whole
matter."4 Goodwin's classification seems to
1 Robertson, Grammar, p. 1005.
2 Goodwin, Moods and Tenses, p. 145.
3 Robertson, Grammar, p. 1006.
4 Ibid.,
p. 1006.
51
place emphasis on things other
than mood, relegating it to a position
of lesser importance. For
Robertson, mood is all-important. He
pursues his analysis on this
assumption.
One specific detail of his system needs further comment:
the
first class condition labeled
as "Determined as Fulfilled."
Robertson
quotes Gildersleeve as
identifying this condition as "the favorite
condition," though he is
talking about classical poets, especially
Pindar.1 The question already raised by Robertson
relates to the
degree of determination implied
by the condition. Is the speaker
presenting the condition as
something that is objectively true
(ei@
tij qe<lei o]pi<sw mou e@rxesqai, a]rnhsa<sqw e[auto<n - Since
someone
does wish to come after me, let
him deny himself. Luke 9:23)? Or is the
speaker assuming the truth of
the condition without committing himself
to a position one way or the
other, such as might be done "for the
sake of the argument" (ei] de> a]na<stasij nekrw?n ou]k e@stin, ou]de> Xristo>j
e]gh>gertai
-
But if there is no resurrection of the dead, then Christ
is not raised. I Cor. 15:13)?
This point will receive a more detailed
treatment later, but it is
important to note that some commentators
have understood Robertson to
say that the first class condition actually
affirms the objective reality
of the condition. Perhaps his statements
could have been more precise,
but common sense will suffice to show
that this cannot be the case in
all situations. If it were, then
Christ would have been
operating in the power of the Devil (Matt. 12:27)
1 Robertson, Grammar, p. 1007.
53
and would not be resurrected (I
Cor. 15:13). Yet writers continue to
to read objective reality into
the first class condition. An extreme
example is the statement of
Jerome Moore:
The first class condition implies
truth or reality. If . . .
and it is true. Colossians 1:23 . . . is
an example of this. The
idea there is, "If ye continue in
the faith grounded and settled,
and
ye shall!" There is no doubt
implied here. This is a condition
of reality. No need to doubt