OTHER CONDITIONAL ELEMENTS IN NEW TESTAMENT GREEK

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To conclude the series of studies on conditional sentences, some conditional elements which do not constitute complete conditional sentences or which present some irregularity or peculiarity of form or meaning are considered.

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MIXED CONDITIONS

There is nothing inherently surprising or improper that in actual usage the recognized patterns for conditional sentences should sometimes become mixed. There are few of these, perhaps only three or four; each of these is doubtful to some degree.

Luke 17:6 shows the first-class pattern in the protasis, εἰ with the present indicative. The apodosis is usually identified as a second-class pattern, αν with a secondary indicative, perhaps indicating that Jesus courteously avoided using the full second-class condition, which would have stated very harshly "If you had faith, which you haven't . . .," then continued with the contrary-to-fact result. Although this is plausible and possible explanation, the present writer prefers to consider this a simple first-class condition, stating a logical connection between the protasis and apodosis without any indication of censure or praise. The imperfect indicative with αν then is understood as a potential indicative which states the result which might be expected to follow: "If you have faith you can expect impossible things."

John 8:39 is another example in which a first-class protasis, indicative, is mixed with a second-class apodosis using a secondary indicative. The early textual tradition is somewhat confused, part

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2 See my discussion of this verse in "Second Class Conditions," 86-87.
of it supporting a first-class apodosis. If the imperfect εποίειτε is accepted, with or without the particle αν, it clearly is a second-class apodosis. In this instance the explanations suggested for the previous example will hardly work; a courteous softening of the rebuke can hardly be applicable in the light of the following verses, and the apodosis is not easily understood as a potential indicative. Rather, it seems better to understand that when Jesus said, "If you are Abraham's seed" (first-class), he was not rendering or implying a judgment of their spiritual relationship, but he was letting that judgment proceed from their own conscience when they compared their actions to those of their father.

Acts 8:31 has εάν with the future indicative in the protasis, which may be taken as a first-class condition since the mood is indicative, or as a third-class since the particle is εάν and since future indicatives frequently function as subjunctives in NT Greek. On the other hand, the apodosis shows an optative verb with αν, which on the surface suggests a fourth-class condition. However, on second look the apodosis can also be a rhetorical question involving a potential optative ("How could I, if someone doesn't teach me?"--the obvious answer is "Of course I can't. . ."). Thus it is a proper construction for a first-class condition. In view of the virtual non-existence of fourth-class conditions in NT Greek, the latter option is preferable.

Acts 24:19 is a fourth-class protasis, ει with the optative, and possibly a second-class apodosis, a secondary indicative verb. The situation is complicated by the formal court setting (perhaps explaining the rare use of the optative) and the emotionally charged atmosphere (evidenced by the broken construction), as well as by the structure which makes the apodosis a subordinate clause of the sentence. This last factor makes the identification of the apodosis as contrary to fact uncertain; it could be the normal tense structure of the relative clause.

Not to be cited as examples of mixed conditions are Acts 11:17 and I Cor 7:28. Acts 11:17 is clearly a first-class condition with an apodosis in the form of a rhetorical question using a potential imperfect indicative. I Cor 7:28 (two examples) shows a future or third-class condition. The aorist in the apodosis is not improper, since it expresses the situation at that future time: "You will be in a position at that time of 'not having sinned.'"


4 Cf. Boyer, "Third (and Fourth) Class Conditions."
Also not to be considered as mixed conditions are those instances of two protases with one apodosis. Whether they are of the same (e.g., 1 Cor 9:11) or of different (e.g., John 13:17) classes, each part retains its own force.

**IRREGULARITIES IN THE CONDITIONAL PARTICLES**

The almost universal pattern shows *ei* with an indicative verb and *eá* with a subjunctive verb, but there are rare exceptions. UBS\(^3\) shows four examples of *ei* with the subjunctives and four examples of *eá* with the indicative.\(^6\) Several factors may contribute to this situation or help to understand it.

1. Historical evidence shows a changing idiom in the use of these particles. "The difference between *ei* and *eá* is considerably lessened in the *koinh* though it must be remembered that *eá* was never confined to the subj. nor *ei* to the ind. and opt."\(^7\)

2. In almost every instance there is evidence of textual variations. This is not surprising in the light of the changing patterns of usage during the period of manuscript production.

3. Many places where this confusion occurs, including two where the UBS text shows *eá* with the indicative, involve the future tense. Since the future indicative often functions as the equivalent of an aorist subjunctive (see n. 3) and at times is indistinguishable from it even in form, these examples should probably be classed as simple third-class conditions with *eá* and [the equivalent of] the subjunctive.

4. In two of the examples of *ei* with the subjunctive the particle is not the simple *ei* (1 Cor 14:5 *ekt o> ei> mh <l Thess 5:10 *ei> e . . . *ei> e) and to have used *eá* might have been awkward; neither *ekt o> eá* nor *eá nte* ever occurs elsewhere in the NT.

5. The difference between the classes is determined, as Robertson has pointed out, "by the mode, not by *ei* or *eá*.\(^8\)"

\(^5\) 1 Cor 14:5, Phil 3:12, 1 Thess 5:10, Rev 11:5. In addition there are at least two other passages (Luke 11:18, 1 Cor 9:11) where textual variants show the subjunctive after *ei* Luke 9:13 probably is not an example, since the subjunctive seems to reflect a deliberative question in the compressed structure. There are examples where the form could be either indicative or subjunctive; in these the use of *ei* would presume the indicative identification.

\(^6\) Luke 19:40, Acts 8:31, 1 Thess 3:8, 1 John 5:15. In addition there are another eight passages where textual variants show the indicative after *eá* (Matt 18:19, Mark 11:13, Luke 6:34, Rom 14:8, 1 Cor 4:15, Gal 1:8, Rev 2:5, 22). In those instances where the form is ambiguous, the use of *eá* would presume the subjunctive identification.


\(^8\) Ibid., 1007.
ELLIPtical CONDITIONAL SENTENCES

Protasis Unexpressed

Strictly speaking there are no "missing protases," since without a protasis a sentence simply is not a conditional sentence. Sentences in which a participle or an imperative or other structure functions semantically as a conditional element is discussed below under "Implied Protases." The special case of implied protases of fourth-class conditions is also discussed there.

Apodosis Unexpressed

There is nothing irregular or unusual in those many instances where the connective verb (eînîs, giômaí) is not expressed. In conditional sentences this occurs about 33 times in the protasis and about 48 times in the apodosis, including about 12 examples where it is missing in both. Neither does this section of our study include the approximately 22 instances where the verb to be supplied is the same verb already occurring or implied in the context (e.g., I Cor 9:17, "For if I do this willingly I have a reward; if [I do it] unwillingly, I have been entrusted with a stewardship"). Such abbreviated expressions are common in all types of sentences.

However, there are about 12 instances in which the entire apodosis is omitted, or in which there is a protasis without an apodosis. Whether for deliberate dramatic effect or by an in-course change of sentence structure, the original construction is left uncompleted. Examples are: Luke 13:9, "and if it bears fruit ["that will be well; we've accomplished our purpose; let it grow"], but if not. . ."; Luke 19:42, "If only you had known. . . [things might have been different]"; Acts 23:9, "We find nothing evil in this man; but if a spirit has spoken to him, or an angel, [we had better not take any chances!]"; and Rom 2:17-21, "If you call yourself a Jew. . . having the form of knowledge and truth in the law, you who teach another, don't you teach yourself?"

In others, the unexpressed apodosis can be supplied by the context. In John 6:61, 62 Jesus says, "Does this offend you? [Would you not be offended even more] if you should see. . .?" In Eph 4:29, Paul admonishes, "Let no evil word go forth out of your mouth; but if there is any good word [let it be spoken], in order that. . ." In 2 Thess 2:3 Paul warns, "Let no one deceive you in any way; because [that situation (namely, that the Day of the Lord be present) cannot be true] if the apostasy does not come first. . ."

Another type of ellipsis is found in a group of passages where the Hebrew idiom used an abbreviated form of the oath formula which
only suggested the penalty involved. Thayer says, "Contrary to Greek usage, in imitation of the Hebrew ḍēr, e[ with the Indic. is so used in oaths and asseverations that by aposiopesis the formula of imprecation [constituting the apodosis] is suppressed."\(^9\) The NT passages involved are Mark 8:12, Heb 3:11, 4:4, 5 and possibly Heb 6:14.\(^10\) The unabbreviated form of the oath would be something like "may the Lord do . . . [something terrible] . . . , if . . .," or "may I no longer be Jehovah, if . . ." Thus, the conditional clause becomes a strong, oath-supported assertion or denial.

In some instances the conditional clause fits into a subordinate clause of a sentence in such a way that the full apodosis cannot be expressed (except perhaps by a parenthesis), but is implied in another part of the sentence. Two examples of a protasis without an explicit apodosis show the e[ mh clause functioning as a dissimilar element in a series, as a paraphrastic descriptive identification of an additional item in the series. Thus they are practically the equivalent of a relative clause. The conditional element is there, but it identifies some hypothetical example of the class. In I Tim 1: 10 Paul lists a long series of things for which the law is intended, and concludes the list, "and if there is anything else contrary to sound teaching [it is for them too]," or practically, "anything else which is contrary. . . ." Similarly in Rev 14:11 those who have no rest day and night are identified as "those who worship the beast. . . and anyone who (literally, 'and if anyone') receives the mark. . . ."

Two more examples express what seems to be an assumed situation. Perhaps a free paraphrase will help to bring out the sense of 2 Cor 5:2-3: "In the body we groan, looking forward to the heavenly dwelling with which we shall be clothed, if indeed, as I assume to be the case, when we put off this dwelling we shall be found not to be naked." Similarly in Eph 3:2, as Paul starts speaking of the mystery revealed to him, he assumes that his readers have already heard about it. In both these instances he uses the particle ge with e[ expressing confidence that the assumed situation is true. Note that this certainty is conveyed by the particle ge and by the context, not by his use of the first-class form of condition.

\(^10\) Three of these, Heb 3:11, 4:4, 5, are a direct quote from Ps 95:11 (Ps 94 LXX). Other OT examples of the abbreviated form are Gen 14:23, Num 14:30, I Sam 3:17, Jer 29:22.

Mark 8:12 is precisely the same idiom, but does not involve an OT quotation. Heb 6:14 involves a textual variant in both the NT quote and in the source passage in the LXX, Gen 22:17. If the reading adopted by the UBS(\(^3\)) text is used, it is simply another example of this idiom. If the alternate reading is followed, the h mh k is a particle of confirmation or assertion common in Greek from earliest times.
A special class of elliptical conditional clauses which occurs frequently and needs particular consideration involves the use of *ei]* mh <* in the sense of 'except.' It was common also in classical Greek and probably arose as an unconscious abbreviation of the conditional clause because its verb was the same as the main verb. It belongs to the first class or simple conditions. Its stereotyped form, in which *ei]* mh <* becomes almost one word, accounts for the use of mh <* as the negative particle, thus preserving the classical pattern where all protases used mh <* as the negative, even though in Hellenistic Greek ou] has become the negative for first-class conditions. The idiom expresses "... not a condition of fulfillment of which the apodosis is true or its action takes place, but a limitation of the principal statement."

The idiom shows three characteristic features. First, there is an ellipsis of the verb in the protasis which is supplied from the principal clause, often the same verb. Second, there is a negative comparison between the two clauses. And third, the protasis always follows the apodosis.

The idiom appears in three forms or patterns, differing in the way the negative comparison is expressed.

1. Ou]dei<j . . . *ei]* mh < . . . The most characteristic form of the idiom, about 31 instances, uses the negative pronominal adjective ou]dei<j or mhdei<j (in the case appropriate to its function) in the apodosis, followed by a protasis introduced by *ei]* mh <*> and names the exception (also in its appropriate grammatical form) with no verb stated. An illustration is Matt 17:8, . . . ou]de<na *ei#don* *ei]* mh < au]to>n ]h s ouh momon, "they saw no one except Jesus himself alone"; or in unabbreviated form, "they saw no one if [they did] not [see] Jesus." Both ou]de<na and ]h s ouh are objects of the verb *ei#don* (expressed in

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12 Ibid., 111.
13 There are a couple of apparent exceptions, but fuller consideration shows that they are not the same semantically. Several are negative second-class conditions (Matt 24:22, Mark 13:20, John 9:33, 15:22, 24, 18:30, Rom 9:29) and thus not true examples of *ei]* mh <* = 'except' (see below). Several are cases of *ei]* de> mh <* where the negative contrast has already been mentioned in the preceding context; the apodosis is actually missing. One (1 Cor 7:17) may be an instance where *ei]* mh <*> functions as an adversative conjunction (see below). The only instance which might be a valid exception is Mark 8:14, but even here the lack of bread had been mentioned in the preceding clause.
the apodosis, omitted in the protasis) and are in the accusative case. The parallelism may be in sense rather than in form, as in Matt 5:13: "salt that has lost its saltiness...\textit{EIj ou\^len i\^j x\u03b1\v{e}i e\^j ei}\^j mh\|^\small{>bl h\v{q}en e\|^\small{>w k\v{a}t a p\v{a}tei\^j qai} . . . it is sufficient (fit for) nothing except [it is fit] to be trampled...\textit{EIj ou\^len} is parallel with the infinitive \textit{k\v{a}t a p\v{a}tei\^j qai}. The dissimilarity in form sometimes makes it appear that there is no ellipsis of the verb. In Mark 6:5 (\textit{ou\^k e\|^\small{>umato e\^jkei? p\v{o}i\^j\i\v{a} ou\^jle\v{m}i\v{a}n d\v{u}m\v{a} min, ei\|^\small{jmh\|^\small{>oligoi a\|^\small{>r\v{w} stoij e\|^\j\v{q}eij\|^\small{>t\|^\small{aq x\v{e}i\|^\j\v{a}j e\|^\j\v{h}e\|^\j\v{r}a\|^\j\v{p}e\|^\j\v{u}se\|^\j\v{u}se\|^\j\v{u}n}, e\|^\j\v{h}e\|^\j\v{r}a\|^\j\v{p}e\|^\j\v{u}se\|^\j\v{u}n} is not the verb of a clause introduced by ei\|^\j\v{mh}\|^\j\v{<}rather it is a clausal parallel to ou\^jle\v{m}i\v{a}n d\v{u}m\v{a} min. The sense is "he was not able there to perform a single miracle except [the miracles in which] he healed a few."

\textit{Ou\|^\j\v{<}(or ou\^jle\|^\j\v{<}... ei\|^\j\v{mh}<. . . This pattern closely resembles the first and is almost as frequent, about 30 instances.\textsuperscript{15} The specific ou\|^\j\v{le\|^\j\v{<} is represented by a simple negative particle;\textsuperscript{16} the rest of the construction is the same. This pattern permits even more flexibility of expression. For example, in Mark 6:4 Jesus says, "a prophet is not without honor [anywhere] if [he is] not [without honor] in his own country."

\textit{Ti\|^\j\v{<}... ei\|^\j\v{mh}<... A third variation of this pattern, about 10 examples,\textsuperscript{17} uses interrogative ti\|^\j\v{<} to introduce the apodosis as a rhetorical question, the obvious answer to which is "no one." Thus the expression is fully equivalent to the others. For illustration, in Mark 2:7 the scribes ask, "Who is able to forgive sins except [literally, 'if not'] one, namely God?" Again dissimilarity in structural form of the items compared may seem to obscure the ellipsis of the verb. In 2 Cor 12:13 the parallel to ti\|^\j\v{<}n the apodosis is the \textit{ot\|^\j\v{<}... k\v{a}t\v{e}n\v{a}kkhsa} clause in the protasis: "In what respect were you treated worse than other churches, except [you were treated worse in respect] that (ot\|^\j\v{<}) I did not burden you?" So also Eph 4:9 in expanded form becomes, "What is the meaning of the expression 'he ascended' except [its meaning is] that he descended. . . ?"

\textit{EI\|^\j\v{mh}<} 'instead, only'

Included in the preceding category are a few examples which are not strictly exceptive. The ei\|^\j\v{mh}<protasis does not name the only


\textsuperscript{16} Usually ou\|^\j\v{<}or its strengthened form ou\^jle\|^\j\v{<}Where the grammatical structure of the apodosis calls for a subjunctive verb, the negative may be mh\|^\j\v{<} or mh\|^\j\v{<}de\|^\j\v{<}

\textsuperscript{17} Mark 2:1, Luke 5:21, Rom 11:15, I Cor 2:11 (first occurrence), 2 Cor 2:2, 12:13, Eph 4:9, Heb 3:18, I John 2:22, 5:5.
exception to the negation of the apodosis, but rather it names the only alternative to the apodosis. For example, in Rev 9:4 \(\text{ei} \ \text{mh} \ \text{tou} \ \alpha \varkappa \rho \omega \rho \nu \iota \eta\) does not name the exceptions among \(\text{ton} \ \xi \rho \zeta \tau \omega \kappa \tau \eta \) who were not hurt, but rather states another class who, in contrast, were to be hurt. Rev 21:27 tells who will not enter the holy city, then after \(\text{ei} \ \text{mh} \ \alpha\) describes a different group who will enter. So also probably Matt 12:4, unless we make the unlikely assumption that the priests mentioned were those who were present in David's company. There is no difference in the idiom used, and the difference in sense is so obvious\(^{18}\) that it is almost unnoticed.

\[\text{Ei} \ \text{mh} \ \Leftrightarrow \text{adversative conjunction 'but'}\]

It is readily admitted that \(\text{ei} \ \text{mh}\) may often be translated 'but' or 'but only' in English, particularly in those instances belonging to the last-mentioned category.\(^{19}\) However, there is another group of examples in which there seems to be no ellipsis of the verb and \(\text{ei} \ \text{mh}\) introduces a clause with its own verb, where the sense seems to call for an adversative conjunction, 'but.' Grammarians have debated whether \(\text{ei} \ \text{mh}\) is ever the equivalent of \(\text{a} \ \text{ll} \ \alpha\).\(^{20}\) Whether the claim is evaluated in the following examples.

Rom 14:14: \(\text{o} \ \text{i} \ \text{da} \ldots \text{ot} \ \text{i} \ \text{ou} \ \text{de} \ldots \text{e} \ \text{de} \ \text{ou} \ \text{de} \ \text{di} \ \text{e} \ \text{autou}\)?: \(\text{ei} \ \text{mh} \ \text{t} \ ? \) \(\text{logizomen} \& \ \text{ti} \ \text{koinon} \ \text{e} \ \text{i} \ \text{ai}, \ \text{e} \ \text{kei} \ \text{e} \ \text{koinon}. \) "I know... that nothing is unclean by itself; but to the one who considers anything to be unclean, to that one it is unclean." This manner of punctuating the verse makes good sense using the \(\text{ei} \ \text{mh}\) as an adversative conjunction introducing another clause, but it ignores the obvious similarity to the simple exceptive formulas (\(\text{ou} \ \text{de} \ldots \text{ei} \ \text{mh}\)) which is common elsewhere. If we follow the lead of the idiom, the sense becomes, "I know that nothing is unclean except to the one who thinks it is. To him it is unclean." The sense is good, and any tautology involved in the last clause is not uncommon.

I Cor 7:17: \(\text{Ei} \ \text{mh} \ \text{ekas} \ \text{t} \& \ \text{w} \ \text{e} \ \text{he} \ \text{ris} \ \text{en} \ \text{o} \ \text{kurioj}, \ \text{ekas} \ \text{ton} \ \text{w} \ \text{kekl} \ \text{hken} \ \text{o} \ \text{qeo} \ \text{j}, \ \text{out} \ \text{w} \ \text{peri} \ \text{patei} \ \text{w}. \) "But let each one walk in such manner as the Lord has apportioned to each, as God has called

\(^{18}\) Gal 1:19 is a passage where the difference is of considerable importance, but the issue must be settled on other considerations than the meaning of \(\text{ei} \ \text{mh}\).

\(^{19}\) For example, the NASB in all but three of this last group, translates by 'but.' Even in the first group 'but' is sometimes used, e.g., Matt 24:36.

each." The \textit{ei\textbackslash mh} \textless\textgreater stands at the beginning of a sentence and at the beginning of a paragraph. The adversative conjunction makes tolerable sense, and there is no apodosis with a negative comparison. The meaning 'except' seems totally out of the question. Conceivably we might take it as a case of extreme ellipsis of a negative first-class condition: "If (this does not happen [cf. v 16]) then let each walk..."

\textit{Gal 1:6-7: ei\textbackslash j eteron eu\textbackslash agge\textless\textgreater; ou\textbackslash k e\textbackslash tin a\textbackslash; o: ei\textbackslash mh tinej e\textbackslash j in o\textbackslash i[tarassontej u\textbackslash ma]?..."another gospel, which is not another; but there are some who are troubling you..."} Again the meaning 'except' is difficult and the adversative 'but' makes good sense. However, it is again possible to see here another case of extreme ellipsis of a negative first-class condition: ". . . not another [and I would not speak of it as such] if (it were not for the fact that) some are troubling you..."

If such explanations seem extreme, they must be weighed against the fact that the adversative 'but' is otherwise unsupported for \textit{ei\textbackslash mh} \textless\textgreater. Perhaps the stereotyped formula has evolved from 'except,' to 'but only,' then to 'but' as a full-fledged conjunction governing its own verb, but in the NT there are only these rare examples to support it.\textsuperscript{21}

\textit{E i\textbackslash j mh} \textless\textgreater negative second-class conditions

Not all occurrences of \textit{ei\textbackslash j mh} \textless\textgreater are exceptive; they may also be simply 'if not,' negative second-class condition.\textsuperscript{22} Of the 13 instances of \textit{ei\textbackslash j mh} \textless\textgreater which could be negative second-class protases\textsuperscript{23} only one, Rom 7:7 (first occurrence), shows the three characteristic features of the \textit{ei\textbackslash j mh} \textless\textgreater 'except' idiom, and the sense is agreeable: "I would not have known sin except [I had known it] through law." Even here the negative sense 'if not' is appropriate. All the other instances are not elliptical and are not involved in this study.

\textit{E a\textbackslash k mh} \textless\textgreater 'except'(?)

The vast majority, if not all, of the occurrences of \textit{e\textbackslash a\textbackslash k mh} \textless\textgreater are simply negative protases in third-class conditions and hence are not a part of this study. \textit{M\textbackslash h} \textless\textgreater is the normal negative, both from the historical pattern which used \textit{mh} \textless\textgreater as the negative in all protases, and from the appropriateness of its contingent character to the subjunctive mood.

\textsuperscript{21} For a similar problem with \textit{e\textbackslash a\textbackslash k mh} \textless\textgreater see below.

\textsuperscript{22} Negative first-class conditions in NT Greek use the negative particle \textit{ou} except in the stereotyped formula \textit{ei\textbackslash j mh} \textless\textgreater under consideration. For negative third-class conditions, see below. There are not negative fourth-class protases.

The question here raised is whether εἰκάν mh< is ever used in a third-class version of the idiom ei jm mh<='except.' The question is not whether εἰκάν mh< can be translated 'except.' It can, and is frequently translated this way in English version, for in English 'except' can mean simply 'if not.' But, does εἰκάν mh< ever occur in the exceptive sense of ei jm mh<?

One of the characteristics of the exceptive idiom was seen to be the ellipsis of the verb in the protasis. This almost never happens with εἰκάν mh<. One apparent exception is John 5:19 where ouj de> e]<a>n mh< ti looks much like "nothing except something. . .," but that would require a relative in place of, or in addition to, τι. It should rather be read, "the Son cannot do anything himself if he does not see the Father doing something," with no ellipsis of the verb.

Mark 4:22 expresses either the intended purpose or the necessary outcome of hiding something. The form is in part like the ei jm mh< construction, but the sense is not. Perhaps it is a case where εἰκάν mh< like ei] mh< can be considered an adversative conjunction (note the parallel a ll ] in the next clause) but that gives a different sense. It seems easier to consider it a simple negative second-class condition: "There is no such thing as a hidden thing if it is not destined to be revealed."

Mark 10:30 is another strange example of εἰκάν mh<. It is the opposite of 'except,' and states that it is always true without exception: "There is no one who forsakes. . ., if he does not also receive. . . ."

A theologically important passage involving εἰκάν mh< is Gal 2:16:

δικαιούται ανέργῳ εἰκάν mh< δια πίστευς Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ. It follows the exceptive pattern completely, yet it clearly is not the exceptive sense: "the only one who is justified by works is the one who is justified by faith." Rather it is the alternative sense: "no one is justified by works, but [the only one justified at all is justified] only by faith."

εἰ] de> mh<,  εἰ] de> mh<ge

The idiom εἰ] de> mh< occurs 6 times and the strengthened form εἰ] de> mh<ge 8 times. In each case it is a compressed negative conditional clause; the verb of the protasis is left unexpressed but may be supplied from the preceding context. It is used to express an opposite alternative to the one in the preceding clause: "If you don't do that . . ." or "If that is not the case. . . ." 'Otherwise' is a good English rendering.

24 Mark 2:21, 22; John 14:2, 11; Rev 2:5, 16.
25 Matt 6:1, 9:17; Luke 5:36, 37; 10:6; 13:9, 14:32; 2 Cor 11:16. The editions vary between mh ge (e.g., UBS13) and mh ge (e.g., UB25).
It may seem strange, but the idiom is unchanged whether the preceding alternative is stated positively (8 times in the NT) or negatively (6 times). As an example of the positive, Rev 2:5 has “Remember . . . and repent. . . . eι]de> mh< . . . . but if [you do not do so I will come. . . .” An example of the negative alternative preceding is Matt 9:17: "They do not put new wine in old bottles. . . . eι]de> mh ge . . . . but if [they do not follow that course (of not putting)], the bottles are bursted," where we would have said, "But if they do. . . .” The translation 'otherwise' will fit either situation.

Eι]mhtι
This occurs 3 times in the NT. Its sense seems to be 'unless indeed' or 'unless perhaps.' M hτι by itself occurs 14 times and is a negative interrogative particle used with questions expecting a negative or doubtful answer. In Luke 9:13 the interrogative idea gives good sense to the eι]mhtι construction and explains the use of a subjunctive verb. Taking it as a doubtfully stated deliberative question, the meaning is "We have no more than five loaves and two fishes, unless [eι]mhtι]--shall we go and buy. . . ?" The interrogative idea is not so easily applied to the other two examples except in the sense that there is an affinity between "doubtful" and "questionable.

Ει]to>j eι]mhtι
Eι]to>j occurs once as a simple adverb, 4 times as an improper preposition governing the genitive case, and 3 times it is combined with eι]mhtι apparently as a post-classical strengthening of the eι]mhtι = 'except' idiom. Its root meaning fits this sense well; 'outside of,' or beside suggests an alternative or an exception.

INDEFINITE RELATIVE AND TEMPORAL CLAUSES
This term is applied to those clauses which are expressed in English by adding 'ever' to the relative word: 'whoever,' 'whatever,' 'whenever,' 'wherever.' The Greek idiom uses with the relative word the indefinite particle a @ or ει]a<n and the subjunctive mood of the verb. They are common in the Greek NT--about 320 examples.

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26 Luke 9:13. I Cor 7:5; 2 Cor 13:5. In I Cor 7:5 it is augmented by adding the particle a @.  
27 1 Cor 14:5 with subjunctive verb following; 15:2 with indicative verb following; 1 Tim 5:19 with verb to be supplied.  
28 The indefinite particle a @ is by far most frequent, about 238 times. Ει]a<n, which is combination of the conditional eι] with a @, is used about 63 times. There are about 19 where the subjunctive verb is used in such clauses without either of these particles. In Hellenistic Greek ει]a<n and a @ even h @, where sometimes interchanged, so that either form could function for either the conditional or the indefinite sense. See n.7 above.
The propriety of including these constructions under a discussion of "other conditional elements" is suggested in two ways. First, there is the fact that they use the same basic formula as third-class conditional protases (εις κ ὅν or ἀμα with the subjunctive) which suggests a relationship between indefiniteness and supposition or condition. Second, there is the almost unanimous judgment of grammarians²⁹ that such is the situation. There is not much difference in actual sense between οὗ ἀμα, 'whoever,' and εις κ τί, 'if anyone.' But this word of caution from A. T. Robertson is needed to avoid over-zealous application: "But after all, it is not a conditional sentence any more than the so-called causal, final consecutive relative clauses are really so. It is only by the context that one inferentially gets any of these ideas out of the relative."³⁰

**IMPLIED CONDITIONS**

This category should not be confused with that discussed above under "elliptical conditions." By "elliptical" we refer to conditional sentences which have some part unexpressed but the conditional form of the sentence remains intact. By "implied conditions" we refer to sentences or elements which are not in form or fact conditional, but which are judged from context to imply a conditional sense.

These are hard to deal with specifically. One cannot go through and count, for example, all the conditional participles in the NT; one must first study every participle in the NT, then decide which are adverbial, that is, are modifying the verb of the sentence in some way, then decide in what way it is affecting the verb (conditional is only one of many possibilities, and the decision is purely an interpretive one). Only then can one study conditional participles. The same is true of the other types to be mentioned in this section. Our present purpose will be served by illustrating from examples.


Conditional Participles

That participles do sometimes bear a conditional relationship to the governing verb is undoubted. In Matt 16:26 the conditional clause εἷς τόν κόσμον ὅλων κερδήσ^ is paralleled in Luke 9:25 by the participial phrase κερδῆσαι τόν κόσμον ὅλων. Heb 2:3 literally says, "How shall we escape, having neglected. . ." The participle αμέλης could possibly mean "since we have neglected," but that does not fit the sense as well as "if we neglect." It is not necessary to multiply examples, but compare also Acts 15:29 (διαθροῦντες), I Cor 11:29 (διακρίνων), Gal 6:9 (ἐκλουμένων), I Tim 4:4 (λαμβανονειν).

Conditional Imperatives

This is more rare and less obvious, but a few cases seem clear. In John 2:19 Jesus said to the unbelieving Jews who were challenging him, Λυσάτε τόν ναόν τούτον καὶ εἴσερχεται ημῶν τρία δισεβήματα; "Destroy this temple and in three days I will raise it." He was not commanding or requesting that they kill him, or even that they tear down the building. Rather, he was challenging them: "You do that and I'll do this!" or "If you. . . , I will. . . ." So in Eph 4:26 it is difficult to understand "Be angry and sin not" as a command or even a permission, especially in light of the context (see v 31). It is much easier to take it as a condition, "If you are angry, do not sin." Perhaps also this may apply to passages like Matt 7:7, Mark 1:17, 11:24, James 4:7, although the ordinary imperative sense makes good sense. Even less likely is its use in Matt 19:21, Luke 7:7, John 14:16.

Conditional Questions

A couple of passages have been used to show that an independent interrogative sentence may function as the protasis of an implied condition. I Cor 7:21: "Were you called as a slave? Let it not be a concern to you" is understood to say, "If you were. . . let it not. . . ." James 5:13: "Is there anyone sick among you? Let him pray" becomes "If anyone is sick. . . ." Such an expression is possible and permissible; whether it was actually so intended by the author is a matter of interpretive judgment or stylistic preference on the part of the reader, not a matter of grammar.

Other grammatical structures may also be treated in this manner. Mark 4:9 for example, the relative clause "He who has ears to hear, let him hear" may be called an implied conditional clause, since may be understood as equivalent to "If anyone has ears. . . ." particularly in the light of the parallel in v 23. Here also may be placed the so-called "conditional participle" in Heb 6:6. Since
parapes omtej is one of a series of 5 participles governed by the article touk, it is adjectival and not circumstantial. Therefore, it is not an example of what is usually called a conditional participle.\footnote{J. A. Sproule, "parapes omtej in Hebrews 6:6," GTJ 2 (1981) 327-32.} As adjectival all 5 are most readily translated by a relative clause which itself may be conditional in character if the context suggests it: "It is impossible to renew to repentance those who do these five things."

The statement seems to be speaking of a hypothetical situation rather than an actual instance. The sharp contrast with the four preceding descriptions (which are all favorable) with the last (which is drastically unfavorable), serves to heighten the hypothetical nature of the whole.

Implied Protases of Fourth-Class Conditions

A few of the optative verbs in the NT are called by some grammarians "potential optatives," and as such are sometimes described as apodoses of fourth-class conditional sentences with implied protases. Chamberlain lists 5 of these constructions: "These are the potential optative, practically the apodosis of an unexpressed protasis."\footnote{W. D. Chamberlain, An Exegetical Grammar of the Greek New Testament (Grand Rapids: Baker, 1941) 85.} Such terminology comes from grammarians of classical Greek, such as Goodwin,\footnote{Goodwin, Grammar, 281.} who says, "The optative with a@ expresses a future action as dependent on circumstances or conditions," and This optative is usually called potential, and corresponds generally to the English potential forms with may, can, might, could, would, etc. . . . The limiting condition is generally too indefinite to be distinctly present to the mind, and can be expressed only by words like perhaps, possibly, or probably, or by such vague forms as "if he pleased, if he should try, if he could, if there should be an opportunity," etc.

In view of this admission that the implied condition is "generally too indefinite to be distinctly present to the mind" of the speaker, it seems better to recognize that the potential optative is a construction which stands alone without an implied protasis. All the NT examples are questions, either direct or indirect, except one.\footnote{Acts 26:29. See Robertson, Grammar, 938, where he speaks of the construction as a "softened assertion."} In none of them is there a clearly implied protasis.

CONCESSIVE SENTENCES

A special category of conditional sentences is marked by an adverbial use of kai\i\n association with the conditional conjunction,
ei] or e[ η. These are called concessive. They are in no way distinguished in form from other conditional sentences and are best thought of as a variety of them rather than as a separate classification.\(^{35}\) They have been included, though not called attention to, in the previous treatment of conditional sentences.

When the ka i q precedes the conditional conjunction (ka i q ei] or ka i q e[ η) the sense is climactic, 'even if.' "The supposition is considered improbable. ..the truth of the principal sentence is stoutly affirmed in the face of this one exception. It is rhetorically an extreme case."\(^{36}\) The idea is "... improbable in itself, or especially unfavorable to the fulfillment of the apodosis."\(^{37}\) An example is Gal 1:8, "But even if (ka i q η) we or an angel from heaven should preach a gospel other than what we preached, let him be anathema."\(^{38}\)

When ka i q follows the conditional conjunction (ei] ka i q or e[ η ka i q) the sense is 'if also,' 'although,' 'even though.' "Here the protasis is treated as a matter of indifference. . . sometimes a note of contempt is in ei] ka i q."\(^{39}\) The protasis is "... conceived of as actually fulfilled or likely to be fulfilled",\(^{40}\) "... fulfilled in spite of the fulfillment of the protasis."\(^{41}\) An example is Col 2:5: "For although (ei] ka i q I am absent in flesh, yet I am with you in spirit." This type is more common in the NT than the other.\(^{42}\)

Conditional sentences may be concessive even without the ka i q. For example, Matt 26:33 uses simply ei] where the parallel passage in Mark 14:29 has ei] ka i q. Also in Mark 14:31, e[ η is used where the parallel Matt 26:35 has ka η (= ka i q η). Other passages where the sense seems to be concessive without ka i are Rom 3:3, 9:27, 1 Cor 4:15, 9:2.

On the other hand, ka i q in conjunction with ei] or e[ η most frequently\(^{43}\) does not involve the concessive idea at all. It may simply be a connective conjunction, 'and if,' as in the series of conditional sentences in 1 Cor 13:1-3: F a n . . . ka i ƞ n . . . ka ƞ n . . . ka ƞ.

\(^{35}\) Burton, Moods and Tenses, 112, attempts to make a strong differentiation between the two, but then admits that sometimes "to make distinction between them is difficult."

\(^{36}\) Robertson, Grammar, 1026.

\(^{37}\) Burton, Moods and Tenses, 113.

\(^{38}\) The passages so identified in this study are (1) first-class with ka i q (2 occurrences): I Cor 8:5, I Pet 3:1; (2) third-class, with ka i q η or ka η (6 occurrences): Matt 26:35, Mark 16:18, John 8:14, 10:38, 11:25, Gal 1:8.

\(^{39}\) Robertson, Grammar, 1026.

\(^{40}\) Burton, Moods and Tenses, 113.

\(^{41}\) Ibid., 112.

\(^{42}\) The passages so identified are (1) first-class with ei] ka i q (16 occurrences): Mark 14:29, Luke 11:8, 18:4, I Cor 7:21, 2 Cor 4:3, 16, 5:16, 7:8 (three times), 12, 11:6, 12:11, Phil 2: 17, Col 2:5, Heb 6:9; (2) third-class with e[ η ka i q (3 occurrences): I Cor 7:11, 28, 66 times, as compared with 29 where ka i q is concessive.
[= ka î x̌a n̂ x̌]. Or the ka î n̂ may go with some specific word or part of the sentence, not with the protasis as a whole, as in 2 Cor 11:15 where ka î goes with oi[dia kono i a û ʃou]̂ and means 'also.'

Concessive conditions are usually of the first class (21 times), also frequently of the third class (14 times). Ka î ϵι]̂ appears three times with second-class conditions, only one of which could be concessive.44 The one possible example of a fourth-class condition, 1 Pet 3:14, has ei]ka î and is concessive in sense.

44 Heb 11:15. In the other two (Matt 24:22 and its parallel in Mark 13:20) the ka î must be taken as a simple continuative conjunction; the concessive 'even if' cannot be the sense of the statement.