THE LEVIRATE AND GOEL

            INSTITUTIONS IN THE

                 OLD TESTAMENT

                        With Special Attention to

                                the Book of Ruth

 

 

 

 

 

                                             DONALD A. LEGGETT

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

                                                             1974

                                       MACK PUBLISHING COMPANY

                                                Cherry Hill, New Jersey

 

 

 

            Digitized with permission by Ted Hildebrandt, Gordon College, 2006.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

                                         TO LINDA

 

                                   hvhy rxry twx

 

                                     Proverbs 31:30b

 


 

 

 

             Acknowledgments

 

IT is with deep gratitude that I take this opportunity to

publicly acknowledge many who have played a key role

in the completion of my work.

            It was through training received at Reformed Episcopal

Seminary, Philadelphia, and Westminster Seminary, Phila-

delphia, that I was first introduced to the Free University. A

scholarship received from the University was an impetus to-

ward taking the step of coming to Europe and tackling an

unfamiliar language. I am grateful for the happy years which

I was able to spend in Amsterdam and Dordrecht, from

1960-1964, while pursuing my studies. I would like to single

out Rev. and Mrs. Jacob Vos, fellow-students at the Free

University in those early years, who were tremendously help-

ful to my wife and me and who remain to this day our closest

friends. In Dordrecht, mention should be made of the De

Leng family who extended many kindnesses to us. Drs. Van-

noy and his family graciously allowed me to share their home

in the closing phases of my work.

            Research for my thesis was carried on in numerous librar-

ies. Special mention should be made of the libraries of the

Free University and Municipal University of Amsterdam,

Westminster Theological Seminary, Philadelphia, Pittsburgh

Theological Seminary, and McMaster University, Hamilton,

Ontario. My sabbatical year was spent in Belfast, N. Ireland,

and I am grateful to Queen's University, Belfast, for the gen-

erous use of their facilities. It was my pleasure to make two

extended visits to the Tyndale House, Cambridge, England,

and to be able to take advantage of their research facilities.

Lastly, I would not wish to omit mention of the extensive

help which I have received from the library personnel at the

Ontario Bible College.

 

                                          v
vi                       Acknowledgments

 

            This thesis would never have been completed without the

generous grant of a sabbatical year by Ontario Bible College.

I am also grateful for the stimulation received in my part-

time involvement at the Irish Baptist College during that

year. How can I ever thank those students of mine and their

wives who gave me substantial support during that year and

who have been a constant encouragement to me! To the

Postma, Males, Pointner, Barber, Smith, Stoute, McPhee,

Henkelman, and Taylor families, I am deeply grateful. Simi-

larly, to Dr. and Mrs. C. Wellum and Dr. and Mrs. E. Higbee,

and the congregation of Grace Baptist Church, Carlisle, Penn-

sylvania, for their kind expressions of Christian love.

            To Professor Dr. N. H. Ridderbos, I wish to express my

thanks for his wise counsel and competent criticism of my

work. For the considerable time which he has given in its

supervision and for the high standard of biblical scholarship

which he has exemplified, I remain in his debt.

            Finally, I wish to thank my wife and children for their

part in my thesis. Through the loving encouragement of my

wife, I was enabled to persevere in my work. She willingly

assumed the added responsibilities of typing and proofread-

ing to her already busy life. The children too have known

what it is to sacrifice vacation time and other things in the

interest of "the thesis." As a family we are thankful to God,

who has enabled us to finish this work. To Him be glory

forever.

 


 

 

 

 

 

 

                                    TABLE OF CONTENTS

 

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS                                                                             v

INTRODUCTION                                                                                         1

 

                                                Part One

THE LEVIRATE AND GOEL INSTITUTIONS IN THE OLD

       TESTAMENT (EXCLUSIVE OF THE BOOK OF RUTH)

 

1. THE LEVIRATE IN THE ANCIENT NEAR EAST                     9

            Babylonia                                                                                           10

            Assyria                                                                                               12

            Hittites                                                                                               21

            Nuzi                                                                                                    24

            Ugarit                                                                                                 25

 

2. THE LEVIRATE IN ISRAEL                                                                    29

            The Levirate Incident, Gen. 38                                                         29

            The Levirate Law, Deut. 25:5-10                                                     49

            The Persons Involved, Deut. 25:5                                                    42

            The Purpose of the Levirate, Deut. 25:6                                        48

            The Ceremony of Refusal, Deut. 25:7-10                         55

 

3. THE GOEL IN THE ANCIENT NEAR EAST                             63

            Parallels to the Goel-Redemption of Property                              63

            Parallels to the Goel-Redemption of Person                                 68

            Parallels to the God-Redemption of Blood                                    71

 

4. THE GOEL IN ISRAEL                                                                83

            Goel-Redemption of Property, Lev. 25:23-28                              83

            Goel-Redemption of Person, Lev. 25:47-55                                 98

            God-Redemption of Blood, Num. 35; Deut. 19:

                        1-13; Josh. 20:1-9                                                                107

            Restitution to the Goel, Num. 5:8                                                   138

 

                                             vii


viii                                  Contents

 

                                        Part Two

           THE LEVIRATE AND GOEL INSTITUTIONS IN

                              THE BOOK OF RUTH

 

5. THE DATE AND PURPOSE OF THE BOOK OF

            RUTH                                                                                                 143

            The Date of the Book of Ruth                                                          143

            Arguments for a Pre-Exilic Date                                                     143

            Arguments for a Post-Exilic Date                                                   146

            Argument from Purpose                                                                   147

            Argument from the Place of the Book in

                        the Canon                                                                               152

            Argument from Language                                                                 154

            Argument from the Social and Legal

                        Customs                                                                                 157

            The Purpose of the Book of Ruth                                                    163

            The Interesting-Story Purpose                                                         164

            The Exemplary Purpose                                                                    165

            The Theological Purpose                                                                  166

            The Davidic-Ancestry Purpose                                                        168

            The Legal Purpose                                                                            170

 

6. NAOMI AND THE LEVIRATE                                                   173

 

7. NAOMI AND THE GOEL                                                                        181

            The Discovery of a Goel, Ruth 2:20                                               181

            The Approach to Boaz, Ruth 3:1-9                                     188

            Preparations for the Visit, Ruth 3:1-4                                            188

            The Appeal of Ruth, Ruth 3:7-9                                                       192

            The Response of Boaz, Ruth 3:10-15                                             201

    EXCURSUS: THE INITIATIVE OF NAOMI     

 

8. BOAZ AND THE GOEL

            The Administration of Law at the Gate, Ruth

                        4:1, 2                                                                                      209

            The Sale of the Property, Ruth 4:3                                      211

            The Double Responsibility, Ruth 4:5, 10                                       222    

            The Refusal of the Goel and the Ceremony of

                        the Shoe, Ruth 4:6-8                                                             249

 


                                            Contents                                                    ix

 

9. OBED                                                                                                         255

            Naomi's Goel, Ruth 4:14                                                                  255

            Naomi's Son, Ruth 4:16, 17                                                             260

            Boaz' Son, Ruth 4:21                                                                        265

 

                                        Part Three

                        GENERAL CONCLUSIONS

 

10. SUMMARIZING CONSIDERATIONS ON THE

            LEVIRATE INSTITUTION IN ISRAEL                               271

                        Representative Views                                                           271

                        Recapitulation and Conclusion                                            287

 

11. SUMMARIZING CONSIDERATIONS ON THE

            GOEL INSTITUTION IN ISRAEL AND ON THE

            SIGNIFICANCE OF THE BOOK OF RUTH                                  292

 

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL ABBREVIATIONS                                     299

BIBLIOGRAPHY                                                                                         303

 

 


 

 

               Introduction

 

IN recent years attention from different quarters has been

devoted to the subject of the goel.1 in Israel. Several

important publications can be named. In 1940 Stamm

published his work Erlösen und Vergeben im Alten Testa-

ment, which established that the verb lxg was a term taken

from the sphere of family law, as over against hdp which

belonged to the domain of commercial law.2 In 1947 the

stimulating work of Daube, Studies in Biblical Law, was pub-

lished, in which considerable attention was devoted to the

study of the goel concept and to the verb lxg. Daube made

additional contributions to these topics in his later writings;

in particular in his 1956 work, The New Testament and Rab-

binic Judaism, and in the work published in 1963, The Exo-

dus Pattern in the Bible. He presented very penetrating

studies of the goel and opened serious discussion on the sub-

ject of Yahweh as the Divine Goel. He suggested that the

specific functions of the human goel in Israel were applied in

some instances to Yahweh, although he acknowledged that

there were many general references to Yahweh as Goel where

specific nuances could not be inferred. By studying the spe-

cific functions of the goel, Daubecame to the conclusion

that "lxg primarily suggests the return of men or things into

their own legitimate place. . . The word simply denotes the

 

            1. Throughout the course of this study the active participle of the verb lxg,

"redeem," will be transliterated simply with the word goel and the noun hlxg,

"redemption" with the word geullah.

            2. J. J. Stamm (p. 45) concludes: "hdp ist ein Terminus des Handelsrechtes,

welcher einfach den Loskauf durch Stellung eines Gegenwertes ausdrückt. lxg ist

ein familienrechtlicher Begriff, der stets eine vor dem einzelnen Rechtsgeschäft

zwischen dem Loskaufenden und dem Losgekauften bestehende, durch die Zuge-

hörigkeit zu einer Sippe gegebene, Beziehung voraussetzt." Stamm dealt with

Jahweh as Goel in pp. 31-44 and made one passing remark on the goel in Ruth

(cf. p. 28).

 

                                                             1
2                                 Introduction

 

rightful getting back of a person or object that had once

belonged to one or one's family but had been lost."3 Daube

proposed therefore that lxg means "to recover."

            Jepsen concurred in the main with Daube in his article

written in 1957. He wrote: "Go'el war der, der Besitz,

Freiheit und Leben der Sippe und ihrer Glieder wiederherste

len sollte. . . . Ga'al bedeutet danach: das, was eine Sippe an

Leben, Freiheit und Besitz verloren hat, wiederherstellen.. . .

Die Mittel der Wiederherstellung, der ge'ullah, sind verschie-

den: Blutrache, Heirat, Rückkauf . . . immer aber ist das eine

Ziel, die verlorene Lebenskraft der Sippe wiederzugewinnen."4

            An opinion in general agreement with that of both Daube

and Jepsen was Snaith's, who in 1961 argued that "primarily

the root [lxg] is used with reference to the enforcement, the

restoration of a right or claim that has lapsed. . . . Generally,

 whenever person or property is freed by purchase, the verb is

G'L if it is reverting to the original owner. . . . The idea of

reversion is essential to the root.”5 The goel is the agent

involved in securing this reversion to the original owner.

            An article evoking wide interest on this subject was that

of Johnson, who in 1953 advanced the idea that the basic

idea underlying the varying activities of the goel was that of

protection. "When a kinsman is slain or dies childless, or

when he is forced to sell himself into servitude or to part

with his property, there is a breach of continuity, and the

normal life of both individual and society is upset. Disorder

has been introduced into the life of each, and in the case of

the corporate unit as in that of the ordinary individual, any

weakness or disorder, whether brought about by actual physi-

cal death or not, involves a certain loss of vitality and it is the

function of the lxeGo to "protect" the life or vitality of both

the individual and the kin-group and thus preserve their

 

            3. D. Daube, Studies in Biblical Law, 1947, pp. 3940.

            4. A. Jepsen, "Die Begriffe des Erlösens im Alten Testament," Solange es

"Heute" heisst, Festgabe fur R. Hermann, 1957, p. 159.

            5 N. H. Snaith, "The Hebrew Root G'L (1)," ALUOS, 3, 1961-62, pp. 60,

61.

 


                                 Introduction                                           3

 

standing in society by keeping intact their essential unity or

integrity."6

            Johnson pointed out that lxg in several places means

"defile," and argued that the verb lxg, "to defile" may not

be divorced, as is commonly done, from lxg, "to redeem, to

lay claim to." In both cases the basic idea is that of "covering

up" an object. He seeks support for his opinion from Job

3:5, which he translates: "Let darkness, let utter blackness

cover it; Let a cloud settle upon it; Let the o'er-shadowings

of day bring terror to it." By a process of semantic polariza-

tion the original thought of covering was employed both in

the sense of protection from degradation as well as in the

sense of causing degradation or defilement.7 Johnson's opin-

ion on the root meaning of the verb did not receive wide-

spread support8 although the article as a whole was a worth-

while contribution to the growing material on the goel in

Israel.

            Within more recent years, Holmgren,9 Baltzer,10 Stamm

(for the second time),11 Ringgren,12 Stuhlmueller,13 and

 

            6., A. R. Johnson, "The Primary Meaning of lxg," SVT, 1, 1953, pp. 71, 72.

            7. A. R. Johnson, op. cit., pp. 72-74. RSV translates the verb vhlxgy in Job

3:5 with "claim" as does the NV, "beslag op hem leggen"; KJV translates with

"stain" and the NEB with "sully."

            8. Johnson's argument has been accepted for example, by A. Guillaume,

"Unity of the Book of Job," ALUOS, 4, 1962-63, pp. 26-46, and R. de Vaux,

Ancient Israel, 1961, p. 21, who comments that the root "means 'to buy back, or

to redeem,' ‘to lay claim to,’ but fundamentally its meaning is 'to protect.' " It is

disputed, in my opinion correctly, by J. Blau, "Uber Homonyme und angeblich

Homonyme Wurzeln," VT, 6, 1956, p. 243. Blau argues that the verb vhlxgy in

Job 3:5 is parallel with the verb vhwrdy in Job 3:4 in an abc bca parallelism, in

which case the thought is, God need not claim the day, for the darkness shall

claim it for its own. wrd is used in a sense similar to lxg in Genesis 42:22 and

Psalm 9:13 (12) which supports Blau's argument. Cf. also K. Koch "Der Spruch,

‘Sein Blut bleibe auf seinern Haupt,' und die israelitische Auffassung vom vergos-

senen Blut," VT, 12, 1962, p. 410 n.l.

            9. F. Holmgren, The Concept of Yahweh as Go'el in Second Isaiah, unpub-

lished Ph.D. dissertation, Union Theological Seminary, New York, 1963.

            10. D. Baltzer, Ezechiel und Deuterojesaja (BZAW, 121), 1971, pp. 84-99.

            11. J. J. Stamm, "lxg," THAT, 1, pp. 383-397.

            12. H. Ringgren, "lxg," TWAT, 1, pp. 884-895.

            13. C. Stuhlmueller, Creative Redemption in Deutero-Isaiah, 1970, pp. 97-

131.

 


4                                 Introduction

 

Sklba14 have published materials relevant to the topic of the

goel in Israel. In these newer studies the question of a basic

root meaning for the verb has receded somewhat into the

background and more emphasis has been given to an exami-

nation of the usage of the terms.

            It was my intention initially to seek to handle the topic

of the goel in Israel in its broadest sense, including the topic

of Yahweh as Divine God. It soon became apparent that such

a task was precluded by the sheer quantity of materials in-

volved.

            It also turned out that in the literature cited above rela-

tively little was being said about the goel in the book of

Ruth. Yet of the forty-four usages of the substantive goel,

nine occur in Ruth; and of the fifty-one occurrences of the

verb lxg in the qal form, twelve are found in Ruth.15 In the

face of these statistics and the paucity of material to be

found in the general works cited above dealing with the goel

in Ruth, it seemed that a study which specialized in the role

of the goel in Ruth was needed. Further research into the

literature brought to light a considerable number of articles

and other small works which discuss the specialized questions

arising from the book of Ruth. These individual questions all

have a bearing on the basic problem of how the marriage of

Boaz as goel to Ruth is to be related to the levirate16 law of

Deuteronomy 25:5-10, which requires only the marriage of

"brothers dwelling together." It is necessary, therefore, as

well as, we trust, useful to devote considerable space to pre-

senting this literature and to sketching the views taken by

various authors.17 In addition, a thorough study of the levirate

 

            14. R. Sklba, "The Redeemer of Israel," CBQ, 34, 1972, pp. 10-18.

            15. Cf. G. Lisowsky, Konkordanz zum Hebräischen Alten Testament, pp.

299, 300 and J. J. Stamm, "lxg," THAT, 1, p. 383.

            16. The term "levirate" is derived from the Latinword levir meaning "a

husband's brother."

            17. The commentary of W. Rudolph, Das Buch Ruth, Das Hohe Lied, Die

Klagelieder, KAT, 17, 1962, provides considerable literature as does especially the

article by H. H. Rowley, "The Marriage of Ruth," in The Servant of the Lord,

 


                                      Introduction                                      5

 

institution in Israel is indispensable to the topic of the goel in

Ruth. Some authors write that the book of Ruth has essential-

ly nothing to do with levirate marriage,18 some find it neces-

sary to coin the special term "ge'ullah marriage"19 to define

the marriage of Boaz and Ruth, and others are convinced that

this marriage is to be properly reckoned as a levirate mar-

riage.20  The strong majority of scholars seek to fit the data of

the book of Ruth concerning the levirate-type marriage into a

particular phase of the levirate development within Israel. It

seems, therefore, that the book of Ruth is crucial to the

understanding of the levirate and goel institutions in Israel.

Tentatively, two conclusions affecting methodology were

reached. In the first place, the commonly accepted methodol-

ogy of tracing the historical development of the levirate by

dating Ruth either before or after Deuteronomy was con-

cluded to be faulty. In the second place, it was decided that

the narrative sections of the Old Testament which tell of a

levitate situation (Gen. 38; Ruth) should be given as serious

consideration and weight in the study of the levirate

tion as the levirate law of Deuteronomy 25.

            In addition to studying the levirate institution as the

background for the goel activity in Ruth it was deemed

imperative to examine the sections of the Old Testament law

where the duties of the goel are prescribed, to see if any

correlation might exist between these duties and the levirate

type-marriage undertaken by the goel, which was not pre-

scribed in the Old Testament laws.

            In the examination of the goel and levirate institutions in

Israel a study of possible parallels to these institutions in the

ancient Near East was felt to be of interest and importance.

 

19652, but many significant articles appeared in more recent times. See chapter 1

nn. 2, 4.

            18. Cf. for instance, K. Dronkert, Het Huwelijk in het Oude Testament,

1957, pp. 68, 69.

            19. L. Epstein, Marriage Laws in the Bible and the Talmud, 1942, pp. 86,

140.

            20. Cf. the definition of the levirate given by J. Mittelmann in chap. 2, n. 1.

 


6                                      Introduction

 

Finally, because the book of Ruth occupies the central part

of this study, it is necessary to give special attention to the

question of the date (in spite of the first of the above-named

conclusions affecting methodology) and the purpose of the

book of Ruth.

            Part One discusses the levirate and goel institutions in the

Old Testament (excluding Ruth) with their Near Eastern

counterparts. Part Two, after dealing with the date and the

purpose of the book of Ruth, focuses the reader's attention

upon the light this book sheds on these important institu-

tions within Israel. Chapter 6 discusses Naomi's reference to

the levirate in Ruth 1:11-13. Chapter 7 is a study of the data

in Ruth 3 which centers on Ruth's night-time encounter with

Boaz. An excursus tackles the question, Why did Naomi take

the initiative and send the widow, Ruth, to Boaz instructing

her to request marriage from him on the basis of his being a

goel? Chapter 8 directs attention to Ruth 4: 1-8, the account

of the completion of Ruth's request by Boaz in his meeting

with the nearer kinsman and the subsequent shoe transaction

ceremony. Chapter 9 centers on Obed, who is called Naomi's

goel in Ruth 4:14, Naomi's son in Ruth 4:16, 17 and Boaz'

son in Ruth 4:21. Part Three is given over to our conclusions

on the levirate and god institutions, which have been drawn

through integrating the results of the general study in Part

One with those of the specific study of the book of Ruth in

Part Two.

 


 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

                                       PART ONE

 

 

 

                              THE LEVIRATE AND

 

                             GOEL INSTITUTIONS

 

                          IN THE OLD TESTAMENT

 

              (EXCLUSIVE OF THE BOOK OF RUTH)

 


 

 

 

                         1

           The Levirate In the

            Ancient Near East

 

IN 1947, H. H. Rowley wrote, "The simple story of Ruth

abounds in problems for which no final solution can ever

be found, since the materials for this solution are denied

us."1 Anyone who seeks to penetrate beneath the surface of

the book recognizes the validity of this remark. We may be

grateful, however, that Rowley's essay has gone considerable

lengths toward clarifying the issues, if not in providing a

"final solution." Since the publication of his article a signifi-

cant number of attempts have been made to solve the legal

complexities of the book.2 Burrows has well summarized the

problem in the book of Ruth by saying, "We have in Ruth a

combination of three institutions which are not elsewhere

 

            1. H. H. Rowley, "The Marriage of Ruth," HTR, 40, 1947, p. 77 = The

Servant of the Lord, 1965, p. 171. All references to Rowley's article will come

from the latter.

            2. Since the appearance in 1947 of Rowley's comprehensive discussion of

the marriage of Ruth, the following articles more directly connected with the

legal problems in the book have appeared: S. Belkin, "Levirate and Agnate Mar-

riage," JQR, 6, 1969-70, pp. 284-287; J. R. Porter, "Legal Aspects of Corporate

Personality," VT, 15, 1965, pp. 375-377; D. R. Ap-Thomas, "Book of Ruth,"

ExpT, 79, 1968, pp. 369-373; D. R. G. Beattie, "Kethibh and Qere in Ruth 4:5,"

VT, 21, 1971, pp. 490-494; H. A. Brongers, "Enkele Opmerkingen over het

Verband tussen Lossing en Leviraat," NedThT, 2, 1947, pp. 1-7; W. McKane,

"Ruth and Boaz," GUOST, 19, 1961-62, pp. 29-40; E. Robertson, "The Plot of

the Book of Ruth," BJRL, 32, 1950, pp. 207-228; Th. and D. Thompson, "Some

Legal Problems in the Book of Ruth," VT, 18, 1968, pp. 79-99: Th.C. Vriezen,

"Two Old Cruces," 0TS, V, 1948, pp. 80-91; D. Weiss, "The use of hnq in

connection with Marriage," HTR, 57, 1964, pp. 244-248; B. M. Wambacq, "Le

Mariage de Ruth," Melanges Eugene Tisserant, I, 1964, pp. 449-459. See also J.

Schoneveld, De Betekenis van de Lossing in het Boek Ruth, 1956.

 

                                                      9

 


10           The Levirate In the Ancient Near East

 

found together. Levirate marriage, redemption, and inheri-

tance are all familiar to the reader of the OT, but only here

do we encounter a transaction which involves all three of"

them."3 The background for our study of the activity of the

goel in the book of Ruth must be the Old Testament institu-

tion of levirate marriage.4 Since the law of the levirate was

not an uncommon feature of ancient Semitic jurisprudence, a

summary of levirate marriage in the ancient Near East will be

in order.5

 

                                    Babylonia

 

            There is general agreement6 that the CH contains nothing

comparable to levirate marriage, though Neufeld suggests that

 

            3. M. Burrows, "The Marriage of Boaz and Ruth," JBL, 59, 1940, p. 445.

For a detailed list of the legal difficulties encountered in the book, cf. W.

McKane, op. cit., pp. 31-32.

            4. Th. and D. Thompson, op. cit., p. 79, remark, "The interpretation of

Ruth depends on the understanding one has of the levirate." For an extremely

comprehensive list of literature discussing levirate marriage in Israel, cf. W.

Rudolph, Das Buch Ruth, Das Hohe Lied, Die Klagelieder, KAT, 17, 1962, pp.

60-61. In addition to the works cited therein, cf. J. R. Porter, op. cit., pp.

375-377; S. Belkin, op. cit., pp. 275-329; 1. Mattuck, "Levirate Marriage in Jewish

Law," Studies in Jewish Literature in Honor of Kaufmann Kohler, 1913, pp.

210-222; 0. Baab, "Marriage," IDB, 1962; D. Jacobson, The Social Background

of the Old Testament, 1942, pp. 290-300; Morgenstern, "The Book of the

Covenant, Part II," HUCA, 7, 1930, pp. 159-185; I. Mendelsohn, "The Family in

the Ancient Near East," BA, 11, 1948, pp. 30-31; G. R. Driver and J. C. Miles,

The Assyrian. Laws, 1935, pp. 240-249; R. de Vaux, Ancient Israel, 1961, pp.

37-38; H. Schaeffer, Social Legislation of Primitive Semites, 1915, pp. 57-65.

            5. E. A. Speiser, "The Biblical Idea of History in its Common Near East

Setting," Oriental and Biblical Studies, ed. J. J. Finkelstein and M. Greenberg,

1967, p. 188, correctly writes, "The Bible is first and foremost a unique distilla-

tion of history. Now no process of this kind and magnitude can unfold in a

vacuum. The people of the Bible, who were to make history in more ways than

one, were neither politically nor culturally isolated from other soci-

eties.... Hence the ultimate achievement that is the Bible cannot be properly

understood, still less appreciated, except in terms of the setting in which this

work originated, and of the initial values which it went on to transfigure and

transcend." Some indication of the pervasiveness of this custom may be gleaned

by consulting, E. Westermarck, History of Human Marriage, 3, 1925, p. 208 and

J. Scheftclowitz, "Die Leviratsehe," ARW 18, 1915, 250 ff.

            6. R. de Vaux, op. cit., p. 38; E. M. MacDonald, The Position of Woman as

reflected in Semitic Codes, 1931, p. 23; M. Burrows, "Ancient Oriental Back-

ground of Hebrew Levirate Marriage," BASOR, 77, 1940, p. 7 (hereafter cited as

"Background"); G. R. Driver and J. C. Miles, op. cit., p. 246. Generally this


                    The Levirate In the Ancient Near East               11

 

the institution may have been outgrown in Hammurabi's

days, or even before his time. He affirms that such a wide-

spread custom could not have been unknown to the Baby-

lonians although he acknowledges the conjectural nature of

his conclusion.7 MacDonald concludes that "the Babylonian

woman gained by its abandonment, both in personal freedom

and economic relief, for her support was definitely arranged

for in giving her the usufruct of her husband's property dur-

ing her lifetime, and she was not forced to be dependent

upon the precarious existence of her husband's male relatives,

or, failing them, upon the charity of her own kin or the

 

absence of reference to levirate marriage is attributed to the practice of adoption

in Babylon (CH §185-193) or to the practice of legitimation of issue by slave

girls. Cf. M. Burrows, "Background," p. 5; D. Mace, Hebrew Marriage, 1953, pp.

116, 117; S. Belkin, op. cit., p. 276. E. Speiser, "People and Nation of Israel,"

JBL, 79, 1960, p. 161, writes, "There is not a single attested case of adoption in

the whole of the Hebrew Bible, in marked contrast to Mesopotamia. On the other

hand, the levirate, much though its hold may have been loosed through progres-

sive urbanization, is never completely eliminated." This difference, he attributes

to a differing role of the family in relation to the state. In Mesopotamia, "the

family played a part, inevitably, but its autonomy was severely restricted by

political and economic considerations. Though blood was thicker than water,

bread and taxes rated still higher. That is why adoption, which tends to loosen

blood ties, became such a prominent factor in Mesopotamian society; contrari-

wise, the institution of the levirate, which stands guard over blood relationship,

never took hold in Mesopotamia proper." Cf. W. Albright's remarks on Speiser's

position in Yahweh and the Gods of Canaan, 1968, p. 58 n. 31. For a contrary

view on adoption within Israel, see S. Feigin, "Some Cases of Adoption in Israel,"

JBL, 30, 1931, pp. 186-200. A. Phillips, "Some Aspects of Family Law in Pre-

Exilic Israel," VT, 23, 1973, pp. 359, 360, maintains, in the light of the wide-

spread practice of adoption throughout the ancient Near East, that it was also

undertaken in Israel. It was a part of family law which "took place in the home

and was a unilateral act of the adopter. It would also explain why no mention of

adoption occurs in the legal sections of the Old Testament, for as a part of family

law it did not concern the community at large, and therefore no resort was made

to the courts." R. de Vaux, op. cit., p. 52, writes, "We may conclude that the

notion of adoption, in the juridical sense, was known in Old Testament times, but

had little influence on daily life; it was unknown in later Jewish law."

            7. E. Neufeld, Ancient Hebrew Marriage Laws, 1944, p. 49 (hereafter cited

as AHML). Cf. also H. D. Bracker, Das Gesetz Israels, 1962, p. 36.

 


12          The Levirate In the Ancient Near East

 

community at large."8 Despite occasional9 attempts at identi-

fying comparable laws, the consensus of scholarly opinion is

that no such institution as the levirate existed in Babylon. It

would seem to be the case that the misfortune of having no

son was solved through adoption customs.10

 

                                     Assyria

            A far better case can be made for the presence of the

levirate custom in Assyria though even here there is room for

dispute. The generally accepted date for the MAL, which are

closely related to the CH, is from 1500 to 1100 B.C.11 MAL

§30, 33, and 43 from Tablet A have the most direct bearing

on the question of the levirate. Meek cites MAL §30 as a law

which the Assyrian code held in common with the levirate

law in Israe1.12 It reads: "If a father has conveyed (or)

brought the betrothal-gift to the house of his son's (prospec-

tive) father-in-law, with the woman not yet married to his

son and another son of his, whose wife is living in her father's

house, died, he shall give his dead son's wife in marriage to

his other son to whose father-in-law's house he brought (the

 

            8. E. M. Macdonald, op. cit., p. 12. C. Lattey, The Book of Ruth, 1935, pp.

XXII, XXIII, writes, "In the ancient Babylonian code of Hammurabi a widow is

allowed under certain conditions to keep or inherit property from her husband

(nos. 150, 171); this fact and the absence of any mention of the Goel appear to

indicate a more developed social system than that of the Pentateuch or of the

Book of Ruth."

            9. Friedrich Delitzsch, Babel und Babel, 1902, pp. 14, 92. P. Koschaker,

Eheformen bei den Indogermanen, 1937, p. 101, made reference to an unpub-

lished Sumerian inscription, which he believes may contain a reference to the

levirate. E. Neufeld, AHML, p. 50, remarks, "If so thorough an expert on Baby-

lonian law as Koschaker knows of no further proof for the existence of levirate

marriage than this doubtful inference no more reliable evidence is available at the

moment."

            10. M. Burrows, "Background," p. 5; G. R. Driver and J. C. Miles, op. cit.,

p. 249.

            11. T. Meek, "The Middle Assyrian Laws," ANET, 19693, p. 180, dates the

tablets at the time of Tiglathpileser I in the 12th century though he states that the

laws themselves may well go back to the 15th century. G. R. Driver, and J. C.

Miles, op. cit., p. 12, place the laws between 1450-1250. Cf. also E. F. Weidner,

"Das Alter der mittel-assyrischen Gesetzestexte," Archiv für Orientforschung, 12,

1937, p. 50.

            12. T. Meek, Hebrew Origins, 19602, p. 63.


                   The Levirate In the Ancient Near East                         13

 

gift). . ."13 On this law he comments, "The Levirate was to

be enforced even though other marriage plans had been made

for the deceased man's brother."14 Driver and Miles however,

do not regard this as a case comparable to the Hebrew levi-

rate, since the girl is not a widow in the strict sense. The

marriage transaction has been legally completed but the bride

has not yet been given to her husband. She is the "assatu" of

her dead bridegroom, living with her father. "This, however,

does not seem to be a case of the levirate, as there is nothing

showing a legal duty on the second son to marry her apart

from the duty to fulfill his father's wish.”15

            Burrows and Neufeld dispute the conclusion of Driver

and Miles and contend that the law does constitute a genuine

case of levirate marriage. The point under dispute between

them is the fact that the widow is living in her father's house,

while under the authority of her father-in-law. Two possibili-

ties present themselves. One would be to explain the presence

of the woman in her father's house as an "errebu" marriage,

whereby the husband enters his wife's father's family, receiv-

ing only partial powers of a husband over her.16 While this

 

            13. T. Meek, ANET, p. 182.

            14. T. Meek, Hebrew Origins, p. 64. E. Neufeld, AHML, p. 51, agrees re-

marking, "It seems to follow from §30 of M.A.L. that a father-in-law can give his

son's widowed bride—she is a bride although the text speaks of an Assatu—to

another of his sons for whom he had already acquired a bride before the death of

his previous son. In these circumstances the bride of the second son might become

a second wife to her original bridegroom who has in the meantime married his

widowed sister-in-law, or perhaps she could be given to another son by her pro-

spective father-in-law." Cf. also, M. Burrows, "Background," p. 12.

            15. G. R. Driver and J. C. Miles, op. cit., p. 247. They further add (p. 173):

"Here there is nothing to show whether the marriage of this girl who is described

as the assatu of the dead son was a completed marriage, but it is almost incon-

ceivable that it was so. For as she is still in her father's house, she is presumably of

tender age, and moreover it would be expected that, if the marriage had been

completed, she would have had issue, as no one would marry or at any rate keep a

barren wife; but no issue is mentioned in the text."

            16. M. Burrows, "Background," pp. 3, 5, 11-12. Cf. also M. Burrows, "The

Complaint of Laban's Daughter," JAOS, 57, 1937, pp. 259-2761M. David, Vorm

en Wezen van de Huwelijkssluiting naar de Oud Oostersche Rechtsopvatting,

1934, pp. 4 f., 19 (hereafter cited as Vorm en Wezen); T. Meek, Hebrew Origins,

p. 65; E. Neufeld, "Errebu Marriage amongst the Semites and amongst the Hit-

tites," ArOr, 18, 1950, pp. 124-130.

 


14          The Levirate In the Ancient Near East

 

would explain her presence in her own family, it does not

seem likely under such circumstances that her father-in-law

would have any control over her or responsibility toward

her.17 It is more likely that the law is concerned with widows

who have returned to their father's homes before or after the

death of their husbands and the design of such a law is to

establish the right of the father-in-law even where the widow

is seeking to get out from under his control.18 There is, in

any event, no mention of sons or of lack of sons in the law.

Because of this Neufeld, who sees levirate marriage in this

law, acknowledges that some sections of the MAL refer to

the levirate custom in a rather confused manner.19

            MAL § 33 has a bearing as well on a possible levirate

custom in Assyria. There we read: "(If), while a woman is

still living in her father's house, her husband died and she has

sons, (she shall live where she chooses in)20 a house of theirs.

(If) she has no (son, her father-in-law shall marry her to the

son)21 of his choice ... or if he wishes, he may give her in

marriage to her father-in-law. If her husband and her father-

in-law are both dead and she has no son, she becomes a

widow; she may go where she wishes."22

            Four cases seem to be in view.23 The first is that of a

widow with at least one son. In such a situation she is to live

with her son(s). The second is where there are no sons, but

 

            17. M. Burrows, "Background," p. 12.

            18. Ibid. Cf. E. Neufeld, AHML, pp. 51, 52.

            19. E. Neufeld, AHML, p. 51.

            20. G. R. Driver and J. C. Miles, op. cit., p. 228, restore the missing words in

the same fashion as Meek, "It seems then that 11.58-9 contained words to the

effect that the woman may live with her sons and, of course, be supported by

them."

            21. G. R. Driver and J. C. Miles, op. cit., p. 228, restore the text again in the

same fashion as Meek, reasoning that the case here in view is where the woman

"has no sons or only infant eons. For the statement in the last paragraph setting

out what happens if she has neither sons nor father-in-law, coupled with that in

11.65-66 to the effect that under certain circumstances she is given in marriage to

her father-in-law, makes it practically certain that the mutilated lines dealt some-

where with the case in which she had no sons but had only a father-in-law."

            22. T. Meek, ANET, p. 182.

            23. M. Burrows, "Background," p. 13.

 


                   The Levirate In the Ancient Near East                      15

 

the dead husband is survived by brothers as well as his father.

Here the law states that the father-in-law of the widow may

give the widow to his son, as we saw in MAL §30. The third

case is where there are no sons or brothers, but where the

father-in-law is living. Because of the brokenness of the text

there is some question of interpretation. Driver and Miles

comment, "The lines preceding the statement that she may

be given to her father-in-law are missing, so that it is impossi-

ble to be certain that they did not deal with the case in which

she had no sons or with that in which she was inchoately

married."24 How then are we to understand the statement "if

he wishes, he may give her in marriage to her father-in-law"?

In other words, Who gives the woman to her father-in-law?

We have seen that MAL § 33 is one of the laws regulating the

situation where the woman is living in her father's house.

Driver and Miles infer from MAL §43, "that if there are no

brothers of a deceased husband of an age to marry his wife,

she reverts into the power of her own father.”25 Burrows

agrees that the subject of the clause "if he wishes, he may

give" is the woman's father. He is of the opinion, however,

that "there must be some significance in the fact that the

clause allowing the woman's father to give her to her father-

in-law is preceded by the condition, 'or if he pleases.' This

suggests that the missing portion of the text just preceding it

allowed the father the option of retaining his daughter in his

own household if he so desired. In other words, the wife's.

father even in an errebu-marriage had no responsibility for

her support when her husband died, leaving no sons, but

might either keep her at home or give her to her father-in-

 

            24. G. R. Driver and J. C. Miles, op. cit., p. 247. They use the phrase

"inchoately married" to describe the situation in which the marriage transaction

has been completed, but the bride has not actually gone over to the husband. "In

the Assyrian laws there appear to be three classes of widows; the first is the

completely married wife who has sons, the second is the almattu, who has neither

grown-up sons nor father-in-law, and the third is the inchoately married bride who

has lost her husband and of course has no sons"; op. cit., p. 246.

            25. G. R Driver and J. C. Miles, op. cit., p. 229.

 


16          The Levirate In the Ancient Near East

 

law. In that case, the permission granted to the father-in-law

to give the widow to one of his other sons in the second set

of circumstances, may have been similarly conditioned upon

her father's consent."26

            The fourth situation mentioned in,. MAL §33 regulates

the case where there are neither sons nor father-in-law. In this

case "she may go where she wishes." She is free to dispose of

herself as she sees fit, particularly now in her right to remarry

whom she will.27

            From MAL §33 Neufeld affirms that "one may deduce

with caution that in Assyria the levirate duty existed irrespec-

tive of the existence of children of the widow, who can be

married by her own father-in-law where, for example, her

husband has left no brothers. Whether the father-in-law mar-

ried his daughter-in-law if there was issue remains an open

question."28

            Another law possibly touching on the levirate in Assyria

is MAL §43. It reads: "If the seignior either poured oil on

(her) head or brought betrothal-presents (and) the son to

whom he assigned the wife either died or fled, he may give

(her) to whichever he wishes of his remaining sons from the

oldest son to the youngest son who is at least ten years old. If

the father died and the son to whom he assigned the wife also

died, but the dead son has a son who is at least ten years old,

he shall marry (her), but if the grandsons are younger than

ten years, the girl's father, if he wishes, may give his daughter

(to one of them), or if he wishes, he may make an equitable

return (of the gifts)."29 Here we see the case where a daugh-

ter has been conveyed from her father's house and has come

 

            26. M. Burrows, "Background," p. 13.

            27. G. R. Driver and J. C. Miles, op. cit., pp. 224, 225: "This phrase obvi-

ously permits her to remarry but probably connotes something more than

this.... She is free from both paternal and marital control, and this freedom

includes the right to marry whom she will."

            28. E. Neufeld, AHML, p. 52. T. Meek, Hebrew Origins, p. 64, comments on

MAL §33, "In the light of this law we can see the justification for Tamar's

trickery whereby she was enabled to marry her father-in-law, Judah."

            29. T. Meek, ANET, p. 184.

 


                     The Levirate In the Ancient Near East                  17

 

under the authority of a man who is to give her to one of his

sons. The son to whom she has been given disappears or dies

before the consummation of the marriage. The father may

then give her to another of his sons. If the bridegroom's

father is dead, a son of the bridegroom not younger than ten

years of age shall take the bride. If there are no such sons the

girl's father may either give her to any sons of the bride-

groom younger than ten, for whom she shall have to wait, or

return the gifts he received.

            Does this law, in any sense, reflect the Hebrew levirate?

Once again there is a divergence of opinion among scholars.

The negative position is taken by Driver and Miles, who main-

tain that there is no right or duty placed upon the brother of

the deceased comparable to the Hebrew duty of the levirate.

Furthermore, they note that this law clearly reflects a case of

an inchoately married bride, which would set it apart from

the Hebrew levirate, which governs the widow without chil-

dren.30 Neufeld, on the other hand, rather confidently af-

firms from this law that the Assyrian levirate was extended

under certain circumstances beyond the brothers and father

of the deceased, and contends that though it deals with a

bride, it must also apply to a wife.31

            The difficulty of evaluating the evidence for the levirate

custom in Assyria may be seen in the conflicting opinions of

scholars. The positions taken hinge upon how much impor-

tance is attached to the differences.32 Driver and Miles feel

that "these laws then contain no certain instance in which

the girl who is given to her brother-in-law had actually been

the full wife of the dead man. The evidence then in favour of

the existence of the Hebrew type of levirate is very slight, for

 

            30. G. R. Driver and J. C. Miles, op. cit., p. 247. See n. 24,

            31. E. Neufeild. AHML. p. 52 n. 1. “This law also deals a bride; how

much more must it apply to a wife?" M. David. Vorm en Wezen. p. 25 n. 14, also

argues that this law is a true reflection of the levirate marriage institution.

            32. For an enumeration of the differences, see E. Ring, Israel's Rechtsleben

zm Lichte der neuentdeckten assyrischen und hethitischen Gesetzesurkunden,

1926, pp. 43-49.

 


18             The Levirate In the Ancient Near East

 

the case where any inchoately married man or woman has

died and another brother or sister takes their respective

places is certainly not what is generally understood as the

Hebrew levirate."33 The laws which would seem to point to

the existence of the levirate are explainable in terms of the

Assyrian practice of buying a girl ana kallatuti, "for bride-

ship."34 Burrows, Neufeld, David, and Meek all speak of vari-

ous Assyrian laws as exemplifying real cases of levirate mar-

riage.35 To a certain extent—as we have seen, only to a cer-

tain extent—the differences between scholars are semantic,

since one may talk about "a real case of levirate marriage" as

Burrows and Neufeld do, and yet go on to carefully distin-

guish between the purpose of the levirate law in Assyria as

compared with the purpose in Israel.36 One of the laws cited

 

            33. G. R. Driver and J. C. Miles, op. cit., pp. 247, 248. Their argument is

also based on several laws (§25, 33, 36, 45, 46), which "inferentially are opposed

to the existence of the levirate"; op. cit., p. 248. H. Bracker, op. cit., p. 36, states,

"Also von einer Leviratsehe der Witwen war in Assyrien keine Rede."

            34. G. R. Driver and J. C. Miles, op. cit., pp. 163, 174, 248. Commenting on

MAL § 30 they write, "The transaction then must resemble that in which a father

acquires another man's daughter 'for the purpose of a daughter-in-law (Bab. ana

kalluttim or kallatuti) in order to marry her to a specified son or, if that son dies,

to another of his sons"; op. cit., p. 175. H. Bracker, op. cit., p. 35, writes, "Die

Braut war eben nicht nur für ein spezielles Glied der Familie, sondern für die

ganze Familie zum Heiraten gekauft oder `adoptiert.' " For a similar custom at Nuzi

and Ugarit, cf. C. Gordon, "The Status of Women Reflected in the Nuzi Tablets,"

ZA, 43, 1936, pp. 152, 153 (hereafter cited as "Status") and A. F. Rainey,

"Family Relationships in Ugarit," Or, 34, 1965, p. 17.

            35. M. Burrows, "Background," p. 12; E. Neufeld, AHML. p. 52, writes:

"The Assyrian levirate law can thus be summarized as follows: (a) It applied

whether the widow had sons or not; (b) it was in force even if there were no

marriage but only an engagement; (c) all brothers of the deceased husband arc

subject to the obligation; (d) failing brothers, the deceased's father marries the

widow; (e) failing brothers and father of the deceased, the levirate duty extended

to the grandchildren horn by another wife, and most probably also to children

thus begotten." For reference to Meek and David, see nn. 28 and 31.

            36. M. Burrows, "Background," p. 12, as against G. R. Driver and J. C.

Miles, refers to MAI, §30 as a real case of the levirate practice. Yet when he

summarizes, in terms of how this institution functioned in Assyria and Israel, he

writes, "Except among the Hebrews and perhaps the Canaanites, levirate marriage

was not in the ancient Near East a means of securing a son for the dead. It was

rather a part of the whole system of family relationships, authority, and inheri-

tance"; op. cit., p. 15. This can also be observed as well in E. Neufeld, op. cit., p.

54, who writes, "1,o:irate marriage was a common feature in Western Asia, but the


                    The Levirate In the Ancient Near East                     19

 

by Driver and Miles as inferentially opposed to the levirate in

Assyria is MAL §33. As previously noted, the concluding

section of MAL §33 concerns the widow living in her father's

house who has no son and whose father-in-law is dead. The

widow is free to go where she wishes; that is, to marry whom

she will. For Driver and Miles, this law is the opposite of the

Hebrew levirate, which would not allow the widow a similar

freedom of choice if any male kinsman of her husband were

living.37 This objection presupposes that the marriage of

Ruth to the goel was a levirate marriage. At this point this

question can be set aside. Suffice it to say, that others might

not see MAL §33 as inferentially opposed to a levirate cus-

tom, since they would not speak of the marriage of a Hebrew

widow to a more distant relative as a levirate marriage.

            More important than the inquiry into whether one should

or should not speak of a levirate custom in Assyria is the

consideration of the purpose of the levirate in Assyria and in

Israel. On this point, there is little disagreement,38 for it is

quite evident that the laws functioned dissimilarly in the two

places.  In the Hebrew levirate, the emphasis is on the child-

less widow and the need for male progeny for the deceased.

A connection between the much desired male issue and the

succession to the family estate must be noted. So also the

levirate in Assyria was intimately tied in with the family and

inheritance.39 Yet as Ring has noted, "Der Unterschied aber

ist, dass in CA die Rücksicht auf den Toten and die berech-

tigte Forderung darauf, dass sein Name nicht aussterben

 

ancient Hebrew has stamped the custom in Israel with its own individual charac-

ter. There are many points of difference between the Hebrew levirate and the

Assyrian-Hittite levirate which are much more striking than their points of resem-

blance."

            37. G. R. Driver and J. C. Miles, op. cit., p. 248, maintain that "a childless

widow could not do this by Hebrew law if she had either a brother-in-law or a

male kinsman of her husband."

            38. G. Morgenstern, op. cit., p. 161, talks of the levirate in Israel as having

"an altogether new motif ... entirely without parallel in Semitic practice." Cf. n.

36.

            39. M. Burrows, "Background," p. 15.

 


20               The Levirate In the Ancient Near East

 

möge, gar keinen Platz findet. Es handelt sich blos um das

Recht der ihn Überlebenden ihn zu beerben. Das assyriche

Levirat hat daher sicherlich bezweckt das Eigentum innerhalb

eines Geschlechtes zusammen zu halten, aber die Bestimmun-

gen über dasselbe haben nicht, wie es in Israel der Fall war, es

gleichzeitig und vor allem darauf abgesehen, dass der von

Anfang an mit dem Eigentume verbundene Name auch fer-

nerhin an dasselbe gebunden bleiben und auf diese Weise fort-

leben möge. In CA sind es nur die Interessen der Hinter-

bliebenen und deren erbrechtliche Forderungen gewesen,

denen bei der Leviratsehe Beachtung geschenkt worden

ist."40 One can conclude, then, that while there are formal

points of contact between the two practices, such as the role

of the father-in-law and the brothers of the deceased, there

are some rather basic differences. At least many of the cases

adduced from the Assyrian laws have reference to the incho-

ate bride and not to the widow. It is unclear in others wheth-

er children are present or not. Ring is correct in calling atten-

tion to the fact that in Israel the law was primarily directed

toward the dead, to continue his name, whereas in Assyria

the exclusive focal point is the rights obtained by the family,

in the marriage contract, which brings the bride into her

husband's family. It is therefore understandable when Brack-

er concludes, "Kommt man vom ausserisraelitischen Levirat

 

            40. E. Ring, op. cit., p. 49. H. Bracker, op. cit., p. 36, writes, "In Israel war

die Leviratsehe etwas sehr viel anderes. In Israel handelte es sich nicht um die

Versorgung oder Festhaltung der Witwe als eines gekauften Eigentums der Fam-

ilie, sondern darum, dass dem ohne Sohn verstorbenen Ehemann für dessen Land-

besitz, der in seinem Geschlecht forterben sollte, ein Erbe verschafft wurde....

Die Witwe ging in diesem Falle nicht wie eine Ware aus einer Hand in die andere,

sondern sie handelte selbstandig zu Ehren ihres verstorbenen Mannes und seines

Geschlechtes." I. Price "The so-called Levirate marriage in Hittite and Assyrian

Laws," Oriental Studies Dedicated to Paul Haupt, ed. C. Adler and A. Embler,

1926, p. 271: states, "The Assyrian laws uphold the sanctity of a betrothal on the

part of the parents of both parties with all the detail that a complicated society

would seem to require. If these features may be classed as a kind of levirate-

marriage, they omit those phases of the question, viz: posterity, property and

inheritance, that stand out so prominently in Hebrew legislation."

 


                   The Levirate In the Ancient Near East                       21

 

zum israelitischen, ist es, als ob man in eine ganz andere Welt

tritt."41

 

                                         Hittites

            The Hittite law code42 contains one law, HC § 193, which

resembles the levirate law in Israel. It reads, "If a man has a

wife, and the man dies, his brother shall take his wife, then

his father shall take her. If also his father dies, his brother

shall take his wife (and also) the son of his brother shall (take

her). (There shall be) no punishment."43

            There are variations in translation arising from an imper-

fect text,44 which affect the order of responsibility in the

levirate marriage situation. There is agreement among schol-

ars that the first and second responsibility falls upon the

brother of the deceased and the father of the deceased. Opin-

ion is divided over the question of who assumes the responsi-

bility for marrying the widow if the father of the deceased

dies as well. Stated in another way, How are we to under-

 

            41. H. Bracker, op. cit., p. 37. This conclusion is also arrived at by P.

Cruveilhier, "Le lévirat chez les Hébreux et chez les Assyriens," RB, 34, 1925, p.

542, "Si nous comparons entre eux le droit de Lévirat des Hébreux et celui des

Assyriens, nous constatons que leur ressemblance est plus apparente que

réelle.... En spécifiant que c'est uniquement, quand it n'y a pas de fils, que le

droit de lévirat doit s'exercer, le Deutéronome marque clairement que le but de

cette institution est d'assurer la perpétuité du nom et de l'héritage du défunt. En

négligeant au contraire la question de l'existence d' enfants, le Recueil de lois

assyriennes nous manifeste qu'un tel but n'a nullement préoccupé l'auteur de son

droit de lévirate." E. M. MacDonald, op. cit., p. 72, writes, "In Israel there was a

religious motive behind Levirate marriage, in Assyria an economic motive...."

            42. In connection with the dating of these laws A. Goetze, "State and

Society of the Hittites," in Neuere Hethiterforschung, ed. G. Walser, 1964, p. 27,

comments, "It is quite clear that they go back to the Old Kingdom.... A recent

refinement of palaeography allows the statement that some of the law tablets that

have come down to us in Fact were inscribed during this early period (1800

B.C.)."

            43. E. Neufeld, The Hittite Laws, 1951, p. 55.

            44. I. Price, op. cit., p. 269, translates, "If the second (husband) or his

father die, then his first brother, although married, may take her; there is no

penalty." J. Friedrich, Die Hethitischen Gesetze, 1959, p. 85, translates, "Wenn

ein Mann eine Frau hat und der Man stirbt, nimmt seine Gattin sein Bruder; dann

nimmt sie sein Vater. Wenn zweitens auch sein Vater stirbt und die Frau die er

hatte sein Bruder nimmt, ist kein Anstoss."

 


22           The Levirate In the Ancient Near East

 

stand the reference to "his brother" who takes the woman

after the decease of the father? Does the phrase, "his broth-

er," refer to the brother of the originally deceased man or to

the father who has died?45 Price46 Ledersen,47 and Ring48

assert that a married brother of the deceased is the third in

order of responsibility. The distinction between married and

unmarried is inferred from the conclusion where it is express-

ly stated that in the instance of the latter assuming the obli-

gation of the levirate "There shall be no punishment."49

            On the other hand, Koschaker50 Nöetscher,51 Burrows,52

and Neufeld53 understand the sequence as involving the

brother of the deceased, the father of the deceased, and the

 

            45. The translation of A. Walther in J. M. P. Smith, The Origin and History

of Hebrew Law, 1931, p. 272, circumvents this problem by translating the dis-

puted lines, "If again also his father die and one brother of his take the woman."

This translation presupposes that the "his brother" has reference to the father's

brother.

            46. I. Price, op. cit., p. 270.

            47. J. Pedersen, Israel, its Life and Culture, I-II, 1926, p. 547, translates law

§ 193, "If a man marries a woman and then dies, then his brother may (or must)

marry her; secondarily, his father. When the father dies, a brother may (or must)

marry her, whatever his marital relations." He remarks (p. 548) on the concluding

section of the law, "The latter remark might point in the direction that the

first-mentioned brother is at any rate not under obligation to take over the

widow, if already married."

            48. E. Ring, op. cit., pp. 137, 138, writes, "Eine besondere Eigentümlich-

keit ist die ausdrtickliche Vorschrift, dass ein verheirateter Bruder, wenn so erfor-

derlich, die Leviratspflicht erfüllen kann. Er kommt dadurch in die Lage in Biga-

mie zu leben, and vermutlich hat man bigamische Verbindungen innerhalb des

hethitschen Rechtsgebietes als nicht erlaubt angesehen, da besonders angegeben

wird, dass er nicht hestraft werden soil. Seine neue Verbindung wird nämlich als

eine durch besondere Verhaltnisse veranlasste ausserordentliche Massnahme

betrachtet, eine reine Ausnahme, welche das Gesetz, deshalb dulden kann."

            49. I. Price, op. cit., p. 270, remarks, "The levirate-marriage requirement

should be carried out even if it involved polygamy of a brother of the deceased.

This proceeding was an emergency case and was not punishable under a law which

impliedly was in vogue at that time."

            50. P. Koschaker, "Zum Levirat nach hethitischen Recht," RHA, 10, 1933,

p. 77.

            51. F. Nötscher, Biblische Altertumskunde, 1940, p. 88 n. 2, comments,

"Der hethitische Levirat ist fakultativ, greift aber viel weiter als der israelitische.

Levir ist der Reihe nach der Bruder, der Schwiegervater and sogar der Bruder des

Schwiegervaters des Verstorbenen."

            52. M. Burrows, "Background," p. 14.

            53. E. Neufeld, The Hittite Laws, 1951, pp. 191, 192.


                   The Levirate In the Ancient Near East                    23

 

paternal uncle of the deceased. Meeks54 and Gurney55 believe

the third party to he the nephew of the deceased.

            It is not expressly stated whether this law is in operation

only if the widow is childless. Koschaker believes it is highly

probable that such was the case.56 On the other hand, Price is

of the opinion that the law "aims to provide a home for the

bereaved widow among the kinsman of her late husband or

husbands, and thus promotes humanitarianism in a wide

sense."57 Neufeld,58 Pedersen,59 Ring,60 Brongers,61 and

 

            54. T. Meek, Hebrew Origins, 1960, p. 63 n. 32. Cf. A. Goetze, ANET, p.

196, "If in turn also his father dies, one of his brother's sons shall take the wife

whom he had. There shall be no punishment."

            55. 0. R. Gurney, The Hittites, 1954', p. 101.

            56. P. Koschaker, "Zum Levirat nach hethitischen Recht," p. 80, remarks,

"Sie ist noch-einleuchtender, wenn der Levir auch die Aufgabe hat, für die Fort-

setzung der Familie und des Namens seines verstorbenen Bruders zu sorgen. § 193

gedenkt indessen dieser Voraussetzung nicht. Dass aber auch in diesem Punkte das

hethitische Recht der allgemeinen Regel folgte, lässt sich meines Erachtens in

hohem Grade wahrscheinlich machen." J. Morgenstern, op. cit., p. 163, draws the

parallel between Genesis 38 and this law and implies a similar purpose. 0. R.

Gurney, op. cit., pp. 101, 102, maintains that the law is "remarkably similar to

the Hebrew law of levirate rnarriage"; he argues that § 193 is not a full statement

of the levirate.                           57. I. Price, op. cit., p. 271.

            58. E. Neufeld, The Hittite Laws, p. 192, writes, "The Law makes no refer-

ence to the question of issue of the original marriage of the deceased. It seems

certain, however, that this question does not affect the obligation of the persons

involved in the levirate duty. As long as the widow's age permitted her to give

birth to children, all the above persons were under an obligation to marry her."

            59. J. Pedersen, op. cit., p. 548, comments, "From the Hittite and Assyrian

Laws it appears that the Levirate marriage was a common feature in Western Asia,

but the Israelites stamped this custom with quite a different character."

            60. E. Ring, op. cit., pp. 138, 139, discusses the similarities and distinctions

between Hittite levirate law and the levirate in Deut. 25. Mention is made of three

similarities which take in the following points: both involve a moralistic responsi-

ilit make reference to the performance of the levirate by a brother of the

deceased; both, in contrast with the Assyrian legal system, know nothing of the

counterpart of the levirate in cases where the woman has died. The differences are

noticeable, including the absence of any mention of the dead person dying with-

out male issue and the prescribed sequence. The purpose of the institution is

dissimilar: "Darum ist es vermutlich nicht, so wie im israelitischen Recht, in erster

Linie die Sorge für das Fortleben des Namens des Toten gewesen.... Wahrschein-

lich ist die in Frage kommende Einrichtung bei den Hethitern mit dem ganz

allgemeinen Zwecke begründet gewesen, dass durch sie, ebenso wie im assyrischen

Rechte, gewisse Garantieen dafur gegeben werden sollten, dass das Eigentum

fortdauernd in der Familie als deren Besitz erhalten bliebe and nicht nötig hätte

in fremde Hände überzugehen."

            61. H. Brongers, Oud-Oosters en Bijbels Recht, 1960, p. 129, remarks on


24              The Levirate In the Ancient Near East

 

Meek62 draw a clear distinction between the practice of the

levirate among the Hittites and in Israel.

 

                                            Nuzi

            One brief mention is made in the Nuzi texts of something

similar to the levirate. A brother giving his sister in marriage

for a purchase price agrees that if Hanaya, the husband, dies,

Ithipsharru, the husband's father, who purchased her, shall

give her to his other son.63 Gordon refers to this as "levirate

marriage in the crudest form."64 The purchase of a bride with

the attendant right of transfer to another son in case of de-

cease is similar to what we saw in MAI. §43. There is also the

case where, in a husband's will, provision was made to pre-

vent the wife from remarrying. The children were to strip her

and she was to go out naked. This has, ill any case, nothing in

common with the Israelite levirate, since the marriage in view

had already resulted in children.65

 

HL § 193, "We ontmoeten hier het instituut van het leviraat, dat ons ook uit het

bijbels recht bekend is (Deut. 25:5 vv.). Er is echter enige nuancering. Zo wordt

bier de kwestie of het huwelijk kinderloos was gebleven, niet aan de orde gesteld,

terwijl dit voor de bijbelse wet op het leviraat een conditie sine qua non is.

Bovendien schijnt de nadrukkelijke constatering dat een leviraatshuwelijk niet

strafbaar is, crop to wijzen dat het niet wcttelijk verplicht was."

            62. T. Meek, Hebrew Origins, p. 63 n. 32, denies, as Brongers, cf. our

preceding note, that the levirate was required among the Hittites. He bases this

conclusion on the final word in the law, "There shall be no punishment," and

remarks, "It is clear from this that the Levirate with the Hittites had become

quite obsolete; so obsolete and out of favor that a law had to be formulated to

make it legal if someone did follow it." For a different interpretation of the

statement "There shall be no punishment," cf. nn. 48, 49.

            63. Text 441 in E. Chiera, Mixed Texts, Publications of the Baghdad

School, V, 1934. Cf. C. Gordon, "Status," p. 163.

            64. C. Gordon, "Fratriarchy in the Old Testament," JBL, 54, 1935, p.

230. He feels that "in the Old Testament, a secondary, sentimental and purely

fictitious phase of levirate marriage, to wit, that of supplying the deceased with an

heir, has evolved into its 'raison d'etre.' The whole institution, which was original-

ly the right of the levir, has developed into the widow's privilege."

            65. E. Neufeld, AHML, p. 54; C. Gordon, "Status," p. 163.

 


                     The Levirate In the Ancient Near East                   25

 

                                           Ugarit

            The evidence from Ugarit is very scant, although several

scholars are of the opinion that the levirate was known.66

One text possibly bearing on the levirate is an Akkadian doc-

ument uncovered at the excavation of the royal palace of

Ugarit in 1952:

            “To be effective immediately! Thus says Arihalbu, King of Ugarit:

            “Whoever, after my death, takes (in marriage) my wife, Kubaba,

            daughter of Takan (?) from my brother—

            May Baal crush him,

            May he not make great (his) throne,

            May he not dwell in a (royal) house,

            May Baal of Mt. Casius crush him!'”67

 

            Due to its conciseness, there has been some difference of

interpretation,68 but a number of scholars arc convinced that

we have in this political testament of the Ugaritic King Ari-

halbu a reference to the levirate. According to M. Tsevat,

Arihalbu "drew up the document when he felt his end near

and he was not blessed with a son, for no man would provide

for the levirate of his widow as long as he might hope for a

male heir."69

            This text then is a political testament with the unusual

added weight of the curse. Apparently, Arihalbu is anticipat-

ing a possible violation of the intended marriage of his broth-

er to his wife by some would-be aspirant to the throne. The

imprecations in the text are designed to thwart any attempt

 

            66. R. de Vaux, op. cit., p. 38; L. M. Muntingh, "The Social and Legal

Status of a Free Ugaritic Female," JNES, 26, 1967, pp. 108, 111; M. Tsevat,

"Marriage and Monarchical Legitimacy in Ugarit and Israel," JSS, 3, 1958, pp.

237-243; A. van Selms, Marriage and Family Life in Ugaritic Literature, 1954, p.

36.

            67. M. Tsevat, op. cit., p. 237. His translation is from R. S. 16.144. J.

Nougayrol, Le palais royal d' Ugarit, III, 1955, p. 76, offers a similar translation

except in line eleven. Nougayrol renders: "(Sa) maison ne florira pas!" Tsevat:

"May he not dwell in a (royal) house."

            68. Cf. M. Tsevat, op. cit., p. 239, for the particular views.

            69. M. Tsevat, op. cit., p. 240. Also, L. M. Muntingh, op. cit., p. 108 and G.

Boyer, "La place des textes d'Ugarit dans l'histoire de l'ancien droit oriental," in

Le palais royal d'Ugarit, III, 1955, p. 300.

 


26                The Levirate In the Ancient Near East

 

to overthrow his purpose to secure the continuance of his

line in the kingship of Ugarit.70

            Van Selms calls attention to two instances in the Ugaritic

texts where the daughter-in-law is mentioned as present in

the household of the master of the house (329:2, 3; 11, 12).

He feels that these are best explained by the supposition that

the daughter-in-law remained with the dead husband's family,

in which case it is probable that "we have here something we

could compare with the idea underlying the Levirate mar-

riage: once married into her husbancf's family, the wife is

regarded as belonging to that family, and on her husband's

death she remains in the care of her father-in-law. Perhaps he

detained her till the moment a younger son could marry

her.”71

            It would appear then that the levirate did operate in some

form in ancient Ugarit although again this conclusion is based

more on inference than on direct statement.72 Summing up

Ugaritic matrimonial law, Muntingh, who concurs with the

opinion that R. S. text 16.144 is a political testament of King

Arihalhu presupposing a levirate custom that there is

tdo little material to come to definite conclusions.73

 

            70. M. Tsevat, op. cit., p. 241, points out that the concern of the king was

"a dynastic one: to retain kingship in his family, ideally to secure the uninter-

rupted hereditary line.... The brothers, far from entertaining suspicion of each

other, acted in the fullest accord. The document is written to guard the interests

of either brother as well as those of the dynasty." Ile then draws an interesting

parallel with David (II Sam. 12:8), Ahithophel (II Sam. 16:21), and Adonijah

(I Kings 2:13-25); in these texts the appropriation of the king's wives is connected

with taking over his office.

            71. A. van Selms, op. cit., pp. 35, 36.

            72. A. van Selms, op. cit., p. 36.

            73. L. M. Muntingh, op. cit., p. 111. G. Boyer, op. cit., pp. 300, 301,

concludes, "mail sur la foi de ce seul texte nous ne pouvons affirmer que le lévirat

était de regle pour l'ensemble de la population. La famille royale a pu etre

soumise en matiere matrimoniale a des usages differents de ceux appliques au

reste de la population. Si on peut raisonner par analogic avec les institutions

hébraiques, le manage de la veuve de l'ancien souverain a pu jouer un role dans la

dévolution de la couronne." R. de Vaux, op. cit., p. 38, tersely states that there is

evidence for the levirate in Ugarit. M. Tsevat, op. cit., p. 240, writes, "The

institution of the levirate is attested in the ancient Near East for Israel, the

Hittites, Assur, and Nuzi. In Biblical law, the condition for the levirate is that the


              The Levirate In the Ancient Near East                   27

 

            We have now finished our survey of the levirate in the

ancient Near East. With the exception of the one text which

contained the political testament of the Ugaritic King Ari-

halbu, the evidence suggests that the levirate was basically a

matter of inheritance, a means whereby a piece of property,

acquired through an act of purchase, is kept within the fam-

ily because of the value for the family This fact, in itself,

must set it apart from the levirate in Israel, since it is not

possible to regard the operation of the levirate in Israel in

similar terms.74 Moreover, as has been pointed out, the em-

phasis in the surrounding nations is on the rights of the living

whereas in Israel the goal of the levirate is that the "name of

the dead may not be blotted out" (Deut. 25:6). Other pur-

poses may have been incorporated in the course of the his-

tory of this institution in Israel, but the emphasis remains

throughout on the need for a male descendant, and it is this

emphasis which we cannot find in the surrounding cultures.

In commenting on Hebrew law and its relation to other an-

cient Semitic law codes, Meek concludes, " . . .What they did

borrow, they made their own. It was no slavish imitation of an

uncreative people, but an imitation that improved what it took,

and in the end what it did take became definitely Hebrew and

did not remain Babylonian or Hurrian or Canaanite."75

 

husband has died without leaving a son; according to Koschaker it is likely that

this applies to Hittite law as well. We may assume identical conditions for Ugarit,

sandwiched as it was between Palestine and Hatti." J. Gray, The Legacy of

Canaan, (SVT, 5), 1965', p. 251, makes the following comment on the political

testament of king Arihalbu: "On this evidence alone it is not possible to argue for

the regular practice of levirate marriage as in Hebrew society. The fact that

marriage of a widow with any but her brother-in-law is here expressly forbidden

by special deed suggests that even if levirate marriage was regular in Ugaritic

society it was certainly not compulsory. Indeed, since this is a royal disposition

where the marriage of the king's widow might have possible political conse-

quences, to say nothing of the infringement of the 'divinity that doth hedge a

king,' it may well be that levirate marriage in Ugarit was exceptional."

            74. See chap. 8, nn. 59, 104.

            75. T. Meek, Hebrew Origins, p. 81. D. Mace, Hebrew Marriage, 1953, p.

113, remarks: "Though it has parallels with the customs as it obtains in other

lands, the Hebrew levirate is essentially an inherent product of the culture to

which it belongs, and its antiquity marks it as having grown out of that soil." See

also nn. 36, 40, 59-61.


 

 

 

 

 

                           2

 

           The Levirate In Israel

 

MATERIALS for the study of the levirate custom1

in the Old Testament are somewhat meagre, con-

sisting of three main passages: the story of Judah

and Tamar in Genesis law given in Deuteronomy

25:5-10, and the book of Ruth. In this chapter consideration

is given to the first two passages.

 

                    The Levirate Incident, Genesis 38

 

            In Genesis 382 we are told of Judah's marriage to Shua

and the birth of three sons, Er, Onan and Shelah.3 The ac-

 

            1. For our purposes we shall operate with the definition of levirate given by

J. Mittelmann, Der altisraelitsche Levirat, 1934, p. 1, who says, "Die moderne

Rechtswissenschaft verwendet jedoch den Ausdruck Levirat für alle Falle, in

denen die Witwe einem Verwandten des Mannes zufällt, mag dies nun der Bruder

oder irgendein anderer Verwandter des Verstorbenen sein." We recognize that

some will strongly object to calling the marriage of Boaz and Ruth a levirate

marriage. Cf. S. R. Driver, Deuteronomy, ICC, 19023, p. 285. K. Dronkert, Het

Huwelijk in het Oude Testament, 1957, pp. 67, 68, writes, "Strikt genomen

komen wij het leviraatshuwelijk in de practijk alleen tegen in Gen. 38 en als

wettelijke bepaling in Dent. 25:5-10. In het boek Ruth hebben wij niet te doen

met een leviraatshuwelijk.... Het geval Ruth heeft met het leviraatshuwelijk in

wezen niet veel te maken." L. Epstein, Marriage Laws in the Bible and the Tal-

mud, 1942, pp. 86, 140, prefers to use the term "geullah marriage" when refer-

ring to the marriage of Boaz and Ruth. While there may be some merit in using

different terms for the purpose of more precisely defining the distinctions within

the levirate development, most scholars would nevertheless employ the termi-

nology "levirate marriage" when referring to the marriage of Boaz and Ruth.

            2. D. Redford, A Study of the Biblical Story of Joseph, Gen. 37-50 (SVT,

20), 1970, p. 18, states, "As for the insertion of 38 at exactly this point in the

story ... , one can only protest (a) between chapters 37 and 39 there is a natural

pause in the action, and (b) certain coincidental features of chapter 38 bind it to

chapters 37 and 39. Among the latter one may note the similarity between Judah

in 38 and Jacob in 37: both are patriarchs; both are deceived, both are obliged to

give legal recognition to a piece of evidence."

            3. S.R. Driver, Genesis, 192612, p. 326, finds two purposes in this narrative.

 

                                                   29


30                         The Levirate In Israel

 

count goes on to mention the marriage of Er, the firstborn,

to Tamar and the subsequent death of Er.4 Judah then tells

Onan to go in to Tamar, his brother's wife, and perform the

duty of a brother-in-law to her and to raise up offspring for

his brother: jyHxl frz Mqhl htx Mbyv (v. 8). Knowing that

the offspring of such a union would not be his, when he went

in to Tamar, he spilled the semen on the ground.5 For the

 

First, to explain the origin of Judah's tribal subdivisions and secondly, to stress

the duty of marriage with a deceased brother's wife. M. Burrows, "Levirate Mar-

riage in Israel," JBL, 59, 1940, p. 23, suggests that the story of Judah and Tamar

should not be used in discussions on the levirate since it is not typical. "As an

illustration of possible variations it may he relevant, but for information as to

normal procedure it has little value." So also R. K. Harrison, I0T, 1970, p. 650,

and H. Brongers, "Enkele Opmerkingen over het Verband tussen Lossing en

Leviraat in Ruth IV," NedThT, 2, 1947-48, p. 4. S. Belkin, "Levirate and Agnate

Marriage," JQR, 60, 1969-70, p. 278, writes, "This story of Tamar reveals the

ancient practice of levirate, before the Sinaitic Revelation." W. McKane, "Ruth

and Boaz," GUOST, 19, 1961-62, p. 3, and E. Neufeld, Ancient Hebrew Marriage

Laws, 1944, p. 35 (hereafter cited as AHML) oppose Burrows. Neufeld argues

that the case of Judah and Tamar represents not merely a local law as distinct

from a general law, since "on comparison with the C. Hitt. and the M.A.L., it will

be seen that the duty of levirate marriage might devolve upon a father-in-law." D.

Mace, Hebrew Marriage, 1953, p. 96, maintains that Gen. 38 "provides us with an

interesting example of the levirate custom in action." L. Epstein, op. cit., p. 80,

calls Gen. 38 "the first case of levirate." D. Daube, "Consortium in Roman and

Hebrew Law," JurR, 62, 1950, p. 72 (hereafter cited as "Consortium") remarks,

"The narrative of Judah and Tamar confirms that the original and chief function

of levirate marriage was among brothers still under the rule of their paterfami-

lias.. . . This state of affairs must unquestionably be considered typical of levirate

marri age."

            4. In contrast to the case of Onan, no particular crime is mentioned; never-

theless, Er incurred the displeasure of the Lord and the Lord slew him. C. F.

DeVine, "The Sin of Onan," CBQ, 4, 1942, p. 334, maintains, "that both Iler and

Onan committed the same sin and so were killed by God." This conclusion he

bases on the similarity of expression (hvhy ynyfb fr) in Gen. 38:7 and Gen.

38:10 and the similar fates of the two brothers. Cf. n. 5. We cannot see that

similar wording used to describe Yahweh's verdict on an action constitutes proof

that the actions themselves were similar. G. Coates, "Widows Rights: A Crux in

the structure of Genesis 38," CBQ, 34, 1972, p. 462, is probably correct when he

writes, "Neither is 'Er's character a part of the narration. The exact nature of his

violation, the act that angered Yahweh, is not set out. It is irrelevant for the

developing plot. The only purpose of this stage is to explain that Tamar became a

widow."

            5. S. R. Driver, Genesis, p. 328, believes that Onan was "hoping perhaps

selfishly to secure the rights of primogeniture in his father's family for him-

self...." D. Kidner, Genesis, TOTC, 1967, p. 188, writes, "The enormity of

Onan's sin is in its studied outrage against the family, against the brother's widow


                        The Levirate In Israel                                 31

 

second time the story relates the reason behind his practice

which was "lest he should give offspring to his brother" (v.

9). What he did was displeasing to the Lord and the Lord

slew him. At this point, Judah tells Tamar to return to her

father's house until Shelah, the younger son, grows up.6  

Judah is fearful for the life of Shelah and sends Tamar home

to her, house father's house.7

 

and against his own body." The standard English translations fail to make clear

that this was his persistent practice. The repetitiveness of Onan’s, sin is a factor in

understanding the severe punishment which was meted out to him. Mx (v. 9)

should be translated "whenever." Cf. Num. 21:9; Judg. 6:3. CF. GKC §112,gg.

The NV brings out accurately the true meaning when it translates, "zo vaak hij tot

de vrouw van zijn broeder kwam." C. F. DeVine, op. cit., pp. 337-339, argues that

the principle cause of Onan's punishment was his violation of the natural law.

Secondarily, his evasion of the levirate duty was a factor. This conclusion he seeks

to support with several arguments. Emphasizing the hWf rwx in 38:10 he writes,

"What Onan did was to waste his seed on the ground; this constituted an offence

against the natural law, and for this was Onan killed." He goes on to suggest that

"it Onan were killed by God simply because he failed in the levirate duty, we

would be forced to admit that God punished Onan with severity beyond measure,

and in fact, beyond the measure of the law which He later gave to Moses." He

further argues that "if the penalty of death were inflicted on Onan simply and

solely because of his levirate failure then we fail to see why Juda did not suffer

the same penalty." Finally, he introduces reasons based on his belief that Er and

Onan committed the same crime (cf. n. 4). If both committed the same crime and

were visited by " the same fate and no levirate failure could be attributed to Er

"this leads to the conclusion that Onan was not killed, principally because of the

levirate failure but because he, like Her, did something wicked in the eyes of God.

This something is recounted in detail of Onan and suggested as regards Her."

Several things must be said in reply to De Vine. The meaning of hWf rwx cannot

be restricted to the spilling of the seed but must include the remaining clause "lest

he should give offspring to his brother" (Gen. 38:9b).

            It is. speculative to presume that the brothers, Er and Onan, committed

similar crimes simply because in both cases it is stated they were evil in the eyes

of the Lord. Nor can an argument be based on the unusual punishment of Onan in

relation to his father, Judah, since the latter's levirate responsibility is open to

question. Cf. nn. 14-19: For these reasons we must reject DeVine's position.

            6. Cf. MAL §43. J. Morgenstern, "The Book of the Covenant, Part II,"

HUCA, 7, 1930, p. 164, writes, "A certain parallelism with the Assyrian practice

exists in that the youngest brother had to reach a certain age, no doubt the age of

puberty, before his union with his brother's widow could be effected."

            7. According to G. von Rad, Genesis, OTL, 1961, p. S53, Judah's dis-

honesty "lay in considering this solution as really final for himself but in present-

ing it to Tamar as an interim solution." Cf. also A. van Selins, Marriage and

Family Life in Ugaritic Literature, 1954, p. 36: "In sending her hack to her father

he made it clear to her—though he did not actually say so—that he no longer

wanted her  as a daughter-in-law. That looks like a legal figure for which we have

 


39                       The Levirate in Israel

 

            The second and main part of the story concerns Judah

and Tamar. Judah has become a widower and Tamar has, by

this time, become aware of his intent to be permanently rid

of her. When she sees that sufficient time had elapsed for

Shelah's maturation and yet Judah has not kept his promise

(38: 14b), she resorts to a form of trickery, waylaying him in

the disguise of a harlot.8

            When it becomes evident that Tamar is pregnant and

Judah is told, he, acting with authority as head of the family,

immediately decides that she should be burnt.9 However,

 

not a proper name; a 'divorce' by the father-in-law! Nevertheless, when Judah

hears that she is pregnant, he feels that his rights, or rather those of his son, have

been infringed (rather illogically we should think), but as he never formally in

words 'divorced' Tamar, he is still able to exert full authority over her."

            8. According to Gen. 38a15,  Judah took the woman for a harlot (hnvzl).

But when his friend goes to recover his pledge (38:21) he-asks for the cultic

prostitute (hwdqh). The mention of the veil in 38:14 seems to point in the

direction of the latter. Cf. M. Astour, "Tamar the Hierodule," JBL, 85, 1966, pp.

1921-1121 Porter, "Legal Aspects of Corporate Personality," VT, 15, 1965,

pp. 370, 371, comments, "Heb. ZANAH, frequently, and perhaps more often

than not, in the Old Testament, has the technical sense of becoming a sacred

prostitute in the service of some female deity, whose worship would he con-

sidered apostasy to Yahweh. This is clearly the case with the use of the word in

the story of Judah and Tamar, Gen. XXXVIII 24, since twice the word there used

 for prostitute is qedeshah, one devoted to a religious cult, and it is noteworthy

that the punishment for Tamar's prostitution is to be burning." See also C. Vos,

Women in Old Testament Worship, 1968, p. 97, who views the two words in

Genesis 38 as "virtua1synonyms." E. Speiser, Genesis, AB, 1964, pp. 299, 300,

suggests that Judah's friend introduced the term hwdqh "in order to place the

affair on a higher social level." E. Good, Irony in the Old Testament, 1965, p.

108, states, "Judah's readiness to go to a roadside prostitute increases the comic

irony, as does her, insistence on a pledge of payment, which prepares us for the

conclusion; we must also perceive the irony of the fact two words for 'prostitute'

are used in the story.... Certainly the alternation of terms is not accidental. Judah

is not about to inform strangers that he runs around after ordinary prostitutes

while anyone would assume perfect respectability in the search for a cultic prosti-

tute."

            9. G. von Rad, op. cit., p. 355, writes, "Judah assumes competence as judge;

he thus reckons Tarnar as part of his family, though Tamar's act proceeded from

the assumption that. Judah had released her permanently from the family...."

Cf. H. J. Boecker, Redejormen des Rechtslebens im Allen Testament, 1964, p.

147, comments, "In dem Ehebruchprozess gegen Thamar wird von Juda, dem

zustandigen Richter. caber die angeklagte Frau die Tatfolgebestimmung verhangt:

Jrwtv. S. Belkin, op. cit., pp. 279, 319, 320, feels that the story is significant in

ascertaining the legal status of the widow before the levirate is performed. From

the,mention of burning as punishment he concludes that her status was still that


                              The Levirate In Israel                                 33

 

Tamar has obtained from Judah the pledge, thereby positive-

ly identifying him as the father of her child. Accordingly, she

is vindicated by Judah, who acknowledges10 that she is more

in the right11 than he, because he has not given his son,

 

of a married woman. "Her marriage ties were not considered dissolved by the

death of her husband." S. R. Driver, Genesis, p. 330, holds that Tamar is treated

as the bethrothed of Shelah and consequently as ad adulteress. We should note that

burning is mentioned as the punishment of the priest's daughter who has com-

mitted fornication (Lev. 21:8, 9), death by stoning being the usual mode of

execution for adultery. R. de Vaux, Ancient Israel, 1961, p. 36, believes that in

very ancient times it may have been that burning was also employed as a more

common means of execution. M. Astour, op. cit., pp. 190-195, in an attempted

reconstruction of the whole chapter, views Tamar in the role of a sacred prosti-

tute of the kind allowed to marry but not to have children. The explanation of

Tamar's burning then is that "she became pregnant while being a hierodule." His

drastic reconstruction of the data, however, is not convincing. Nor can we accept

the view of A. Phillips, Ancient Israel's Criminal Law, 1970, p. 129, who believes

that "Judah's order that Tamar should be burnt ... may in fact be a priestly gloss

reflecting this Babylonian type of punishment, which had been incorporated into

the Holiness Code."

            10. According to D. Daube, Studies in Biblical Law, 1947, p. 6, the verb

rkn (cf. vv. 25, 26) sometimes has the technical meaning of the "formal finding

out of, and making a statement to the other party about, a fact of legal relevance;

be it one on which a claim might be based, or one on account of which a claim

must be abandoned, or one on account of which the other party's claim must be

admitted." In the story of Judah and Tamar there is "the submission of formal

evidence with a request to acknowledge it, and the acknowledgment." Cf. H. J.

Boecker, op. cit., pp. 126-128.

            11. A. Jepsen, "qdc und hqdc im Alten Testament," in Gottes Wort und

Gottes Land, Festschrift H. W. Hertzberg, 1965, pp. 81, 82, calls attention to the

use of this term in the historical books (Gen. 30:33; 38:26; I Sam, 24:18; II Sam.

4:11; 15:4; 19:29; I Kings 2:32 and II Kings 10:9): "Bezeichnend ist das Vor-

kommen der Wurzel in den Geschichtsbuchern, wo es uberwiegend auf das Ver-

halten der Menschen zueinander angewandt wird. Aber es sind doch nur wenige

Stellen, die von der Gottesbeziehung absehen, wo nur der Unterschied der

Menschen in bezug auf ihre hqdc festgestellt wird oder vom ‘ordentlichen’

Gericht gesprochen wird. Zu allermeist wird deutlich, das qdc etwas mit Gott zu

tun hat." E. Gerstenberger, Wesen und Herkunft des apodiktischen Rechts, 1965,

pp. 115, 116, writes: "In der Familie, Grossfamilie oder Sippe ist der Vater die

Autoritatäperson, die im Zentrum des sozialen Geftiges steht.... Das Familien-

oberhaupt ist darum als der Urheber und Garant der das Sippenleben regulierenden

Prohibitive und Gebote anzusehen. Die Einschränkung seiner Rechte ist jedoch

dadurch gegeben, dass auch er sich innerhalb der ihm übergeordneen, durch Gott

geschutzten Rechte bewegt, die sich eben in der Familienordnung ausdrücken. So

Weiss sich Juda Gen. 38, 26 durch die 'höhere Gerechtigkeit' überführt...." It is

possible that the phrase ynmm hqdc expresses a contrast rather than a comparison

in which case we should translate, "she is in the right as compared with me." Cf.

GKC § 133 n. 2. H. J. Boecker, op. cit., p. 127 remarks, "So muss er öffentlich


34                         The Levirate In Israel

 

Shelah, to her. The incident ends with the affirmation that he

did not have intercourse with her again (38:26b).

            In the levirate incident in Genesis 38, primarily three

things will he investigated: (1) the purpose of the levirate,

(2) the parties involved in its execution, and (3) the pressures

placed upon the involved participants to execute their re-

sponsibility toward the deceased. It is evident from Judah's

command to Onan to go in to his brother's wife that the levitate

duty consisted of raising up offspring for the brother (Gen.

38:84). This is reiterated in the statement that Onan knew

the offspring would not be his own (Gen 38:9a) and in the

comment that "whenever he went in to his brother's wife he

spilled the semen on the ground, lest he should give offspring

to his brother” (Gen. 38:9b). This threefold reiteration

makes it abundantly clear that the child of such a union was

reckoned as the legal offspring of the deceased, and that such

was the purpose of the levirate as recorded in this story.

Property succession is not expressly mentioned as being in-

volved, though it may be possible to infer from the continued  

adament refusal of Onan that such interests may also have

been at stake in this incident.12

 

feststellen, class Thamar im Recht hqdc er selbst aber im Unrecht (ynmm) ist." K.

Koch, Sdq im AT, Diss. Heidelberg 1953, p. 71, cited by H. J. Boccker, op. cit., p.

127, translates "Sic ist sdq-ich bin es nicht."

            12. The relation between begetting a son for the deceased, and the property

succession is one of the thorny questions of the levirate. This question. becomes

most acute in the marriage of Boaz to Ruth, where the property transaction is

suddenly introduced in Ruth 4. J. Scheftelowitz, "Die Leviratsehe," ARW, 18,

1915, p. 255, maintains that Onan, "der das Erhe des verstorbenen Bruders

dauernd im Besitze haben wollte, darauf bedacht, dass diese kinderlos bliebe."

Similarly, J. Mittelmann, op. cit., p. 13. S. Belkin, op. cit., p. 279, writes: "The

child which Onan would have raised, were he to perform the levirate, would not

have been reckoned as his. The inheritance of his deceased brother, too,—if there

had been any—would have belonged, it seems, to the new-born child. Surely, these

factors were deterrants to a willing moral performance of the levirate." Th. and D.

Thompson, "Some Legal Problems in the Book of Ruth," VT; 18, 1968 pp.93,

94, reason: "If Onan had openly refused the levirate obligation, then Tamar

would have been able to lake her own independence, as well as, we must suspect,

her dead husband's share of inheritance.... But when Onan ostensibly does ac-

cept his levirate obligation, Tamar is left without any way of proving her case.

Onan (and this is of what his sin consisted) was trying to steal his dead brother's


                                    The Levirate In Israel                               35

 

            The levirate duty first devolved on Onan, the brother of

Er, whereupon it then was passed to Shelah. It would appear

that the widow was to wait until the young brother was able

to perform the levirate duty. The suggestion has been made,

based on Ruth 1:11-14, that in ancient Israel even a later-

born brother would have been obliged, as well, to marry the

widow.13 It is more disputable how we are to understand

Judah's responsibility. Basing their conclusions on compari-

sons with HL, § 193, many scholars believe that an obligation

to marry the widow of his deceased son rested as well with

the father-in-law.14 Such an inference, however, is debatable

and there have not been lacking those who would resist draw-

ing this conclusion.15 In discussing a possible father-in-law

 

inheritance, which, upon Judah's death, Onan, as go'el for Tamar, would control

and keep in lieu of a possible future son of Tamar's." Because the right of

inheritance was intertwined with the duty of the levirate, D. Mace, op. cit., pp.

106, 108, feels there were two kinds of abuses. "First, the heir might try to take

the property without marrying the widow.. The second possible abuse of the

law was that the brother, having taken over both the property and the widow,

might try to avoid his responsibility as levir by preventing the woman from

becoming pregnant, so that he might keep the property for himself. It is possible

that attempts of this kind were quite frequent; and the story of the tragic fate of

Onan may well have been a cautionary tale to warn others who were tempted to

employ a similar device."

            13. E. Neufeld, AHML, p. 35. M. David, Het Huwelijk van Ruth, 1941, p. 4,

writes, "Dit sluit evenwel niet uit, dat ook voor eventueel later geboren zonen van

Juda de verplichting zou kunnen hebben bestaan, na den dood van de oudste

broeders Tamar te trouwen.''

            14. J. Wijngaards, Deuteronomium, BOT, 1971, p. 285, remarks, "Het is

zeer waarschijnlijk, dat de plicht om een mannelijke afstammeling te verwekken

oorspronkelijk niet alleen op de broers, maar zelfs op de schoonvader en andere

familieleden rustte." Similarly, E. Neufeld, op. cit., p. 36; D. Mace, op. cit., p.

103; C. Lattey, The Book of Ruth, 1935, p. XXVI; J. Morgerstern, op. cit., p.

163; J. Mittelmann, op. cit., p. 15; H. H. Rowley, "The Marriage of Ruth," in The

Servant of the Lord, 19652, p. 80; L. Epstein, op. cit., p. 100; G. A. Smith,

Deuteronomy, 1918, p. 287; Th. and D. Thompson, op. cit., p. 94; S. Belkin, op.

cit., p. 278. G. von Rad, op. cit., p. 354, believes that Tamar "can well have

reckoned with Judah's taking her in marriage."

            15. J. Skinner, op. cit., p. 455, warns against concluding that it was the

father-in-law's duty to marry his son's widow under all circumstances. This would

ignore the exceptional nature of the circumstances which the writer wished to

portray. Cf. W. Caspari, "Erbtochter and Ersatzehe in Ruth 4," NKZ, 19, 1908,

p. 128, and D. Jacobson, The Social Background of the Old Testament, 1942, p.

296. F. Horst, "Leviratsehe," RGG, 4, 19603, p. 338, writes, "Ob beim Ausfall


36                      The Levirate In Israel

 

obligation two points in particular should be noticed: First,

Judah's acknowledgment in verse 26 that Tamar more in

the right than he, is explained16 in the words of the final

clause "inasmuch as I did not give her to my son, Shelah."

This acknowledged delinquence seemingly has to do with his

failure to give Shelah to her upon his maturation. It is not an

acknowledgment of his own failure to act personally on her

behalf,17 but perhaps Judah's words, "She is more righteous

than I, inasmuch as I did not give her to my son, Shelah" go

beyond an admission of fault for not giving Shelah to Tamar.

He may as well be saying that since he had not given her

Shelah, "she had the right to obtain fulfillment of the duty

of the levirate by him, if his sons failed."18 Judah's words

"she is more righteous," are an acknowledgment of his delin-

quence in his responsibility toward Tamar in not giving her

his grown son, but it could be that in the light of this omis-

sion the levirate was then his duty, which of course he also

had not assumed. Through her cunning artifice she had man-

aged to take what should have been hers but what was with-

held from her. Secondly, the son born to the union is reck-

oned (Gen. 46:12)19 to be Judah's own, and not as belonging

 

von Brüdern wie im Hethitischen der Schwiegervater leviratsehepflichtig wurde,

ist aus Gen. 38 nicht sicher zu entnehmen."

            16. E. Jacob, TOT, 1958, p. 95, is far removed from the text when he

explains Judah's remark as follows: "When Judah cries that Tamar is more righ-

teous than himself he is saying that in the particular circumstances which are

being narrated she has acted according to the rules and customs of prostitution

while he himself has not respected them."

            17. W. Rudolph, Das Ruch Ruth, Das Hohe Lied, Die Klagelieder, KAT, 17,

1962, p. 63.

            18. G. R. Diiver and J. C. Miles, The Assyrian Laws, 1935, p. 242. They

refer to MAL, A, §33, in their interpretation of the responsibility of the father-

in-law. Cf. also T. Meek, Hebrew Origins, p. 64.

            19. J. Morgenstern, op. cit., pp. 182, 183, cites Gen. 46:12 as well as Ruth

4:1 1 b, 12 and 4:17b, 22 as passages which reflect a late post-exilic attitude where

the child is reckoned as belonging to the actual father and the institution is

merely regarded in terms of the inheritance of property. D. Mace, op. cit., p. 109,

argues that in both Ruth and Gen. 38, "the fundamental point of the custom

appears to have been overlooked in the telling of the story, because the children

born are described as belonging to their actual fathers and not to the deceased

husbands of their mothers." G. Coates, op. cit., p. 462, writes, "Implicit in


                            The Levirate In Israel                                    37

 

to Er as would be expected if the father-in-law were regarded

in the story as having validly performed the levirate.

            We have reason to conclude from this incident that there

was an order followed in the performance of the levirate.

Such an order went from the oldest to the youngest of the

brothers. Whether the father of the deceased was also legally

involved, in the event of the nonfulfillment of the levirate by

the brothers, is certainly debatable, though there are no in-

surmountable arguments that can be introduced against it.

            From Genesis 38 it appears that the obligation to per-

 form the levirate duty rested strongly upon the brother of

the deceased.20 The fact that Onan resorted to a secret act of

defiance suggests that no other recourse was available by

which he might have avoided his responsibility. God, himself,

 

the custom is protection for the widow's inheritance rights within the father-in-

law's family. The concern is not simply, for 'Er's future line; in, fact, the children

finally conceived within they frame of the story trace their paternity to their real

father, not to 'Er (cf. Numb. 26:19-20). The concern is for Tamar's future." This

is clearly contrary to the emphasis of Gen. 38:5, 8, 9 on giving offspring to the

deceased brother. It is not valid to give precedence to later geneological references

over the clear statements of the narrative. Because of the extreme difficulty in

interpreting the genealogies of the Bible, the inclusion of Perez and Zerah as sons

of Judah in Gen. 46:12 and Num. 26:19-20 should, not, in the absence of addi-

tional evidence, be regarded as a final evolutionary stage of the levirate. As a

possible example within a genealogy the use of both the real father as well as

the father by means of the levirate, note should be taken of Zerubbabel who is

called the son of Pedaiah (I Chron. 3:19) and the son of Shealtiel (Ezra 3:2, 8;

5:2; Neh. 12:1; Hag. 1:12, 14). W. Rudolph, Chronikbücker, HAT, 21, 1955, p.

29, writes: "Beide Angaben werden so auszugleichen sein, dass Fedaja, als Scheal-

tiel ohne Sohn starb, mit dessen Witwe eine Leviratsehe (Dt. 25:5ff) schloss, so

dass sein Erstgeborener Serubbabel physisch sein Sohn, rechtlich aber der seines

Bruders war." This is also considered to be distinctly possible by J. Myers,

I Chronicles, AB, 1965, p. 21. For an explication of some of the obscurities in

biblicalgenealogies, see A,Malamat, "King Lists of the Old Babylonian Period and

Biblical Genealogies," in Essays in Memory of E. A. Speiser, ed. W. Hallo, 1968,

pp. 163-172. See also, M. Johnson, The Purpose of the Biblical Genealogies, 1969,

pp. 77-82.

            20. I. Mendelsohn, "The Family in the Ancient Near East," BA, 11, 1948,

p. 30, maintains that this incident suggests a revolt on the part of Canaanite

society against an institution "economically and socially out of tune with the

times." In an attempt to justify compliance with the law the new interpretation

of "raising up seed" for the dead brother was advanced, but Onan refused such an

innovation, even though his evasion was punishable by death.


38                         The Levirate In Israel

 

severely punished21 this sin of "Lieblosigkeit gegen den ver-

storbenen Bruder."22 Judah's recognition of his culpableness

in withholding Shelah similarly points to the seriousness with

which such duties were regarded. While it might appear to be

possible to argue that his failure to give his son to Tamar

betrays the opposite, such reasoning would not sufficiently

take into account the exceptional nature of the recorded

incident. Furthermore, we must not overlook Tamar,23 who

 

            21. The lack of opportunity to opt out of this responsibility as well as the

severe punishment meted out by Jahweh may be evidence for the most ancient

phase of the levirate, at which time the levirate was an unavoidable obligation. We

cannot speak with "complete certainty on this point. It is instructive to note the

remarks of W. Rudolph, op. cit., p. 62, who writes, "Dass in der sehr alten

Erzahlung Gn 38 die Leviratspflicht ganz streng ist, ergiht sich daraus, dass Onan,

obwohl er möchte, sich dieser Pflicht nicht entziehen kann und dafür, dass er

geheime Sabotage treibt, von Jahwe mit dem Tode bestraft wird." Comparing the

obligation pictured here with that in the book of Ruth, he makes the following

significant statement: "Nun hängt dieser Unterschied in der Verbindlichkcit

offenbar mit dem Unterschied des Verwandtschaftsgrades zusammen: Der Bruder

musste, der entferntere Verwandte konnte; dass zwischen Gn 38 und Ru kein

Widerspruch besteht, folgt auch aus Ru I, 1 I ff., wo Noomi doch wohl als

selbstverständlich voraussetzt, dass, wenn sic Söhne hätte diese ihre Schwieger-

töchter pflichtgemäss ehelichen würden. Andererseits schliesst Gn 38 die

Anschauung vom freiwilligen ‘Levirat’ entfemterer Verwandter nicht aus, nur dass

dort kein Anlass war, davon zu reden."

            Moreover, it may be that this severe punishment of Onan should be attri-

buted to the exceptional nature of the means employed to circumvent the obliga-

tion and the deception involved in such a procedure. The repetitive nature of

Onan's sin may also have been a factor. See n. 5.

            22. H. Gunkel, Genesis, HK, 1, 19173, p. 413. He writes further, "Man

beachte die Gottesanschauung, die hier zu Grunde liegt: Jahves Augen sehen auch

das Geheimste, was kein Menschenauge schaut; und er beschutzt den, der sich

selhst nicht helfen kann: den Verstorbenen, desscn Recht man verletzt."

            23 C. F. Keil, The Pentateuch, 1, 1864, p. 343, explains Tamar's conduct as

resulting not from lust but from "the innate desire for children." G. von Rad, op

cit., p. 357, on the contrary feels that "the question of whether she was moti-

vated more by the desire for a child than by her widow's duty is not raised in the

story." While one must agree that there is no express statement on Tamar's

motivation, there is also no reason to believe it to be anything other than that

with which the entire narrative is preoccupied, which is the duty of the deceased's

family to raise up seed to the dead brother. H. H. Rowley, op. cit., p. 181, is of

the opinion that of all the duties of the next-cif-kin that of performing the levirate

was the least pressing. In support of this opinion, he cites Judah's behavior in

disregarding the levirate as well as Tamar's in resorting to trickery rather than

appealing to public opinion. It is questionable, however, whether public opinion

would have been a feasible means of counteracting the kind of subterfuge em-

ployed against Tamar. J. Pedersen, Israel, its Life and Culture, 1-11, 1926, p. 79,


                            The Levirate In Israel                                    39

 

keenly felt her obligation to her dead husband and whose

persistence led her surreptitiously to seek for a son for her

deceased husband.

            One remaining point must be mentioned regarding the

levirate in Genesis 38. This duty, as we say, consisted of

raising up offspring to the dead brother. Such a purpose,

however, did not necessarily require a levirate marriage.

Judah ordered Onan to raise up offspring (Gen. 38:8), not to

take Tamar as a wife. Furthermore, when Tamar had become

pregnant, and subsequently was exonerated by Judah, we are

told that "he did not lie with her again" (Gen. 38:26b). For

this reason Belkin remarks, "In retrospect, one realizes that

this story reveals only the duty of levirate, but not necessar-

ily levirate marriage."24 If this is the case, one can see a

 

writes, "Israelitic women have looked up to her as an example, a woman who

knew how to show endurance and cunning and set aside all other considerations

in order to attain the great victory, namely to give the husband progeny." G. von

Rad, op. cit., p. 357, remarks, "Only Tamar is unmistakably praised by the

narrator." For rabbinic comment on Tamar, cf. M. Johnson, op. cit., pp. 159-162.

We cannot accept the verdict on Tamar expressed by E. Robertson, "The Plot of

the Book of Ruth," BJRL, 32, 1950, p. 226: "That Tamar had my legal justifica-

tion for her conduct I do not for a moment believe, yet Old Testament scholars

have displayed extraordinary ingenuity in attempting to provide her with one."

We prefer the verdict of D. Redford, op. cit., p. 18, who describes Tamar as "an

honorable woman faithful to the interests of her husband." This is also the verdict

of A. van Selms, "The  Canaanites in Genesis," OTS, 12, 1958, p. 205, who

comments, "For later generations in Israel Tamar remained an admired example

of complete devotion to  first task, the procuring of offspring."

            24. S. Belkin, op. cit., p. 279; also G. R. Driver and J. C Miles, op. cit., p.

243. G. Coates, op. cit., p. 463, comments, "Not tantamount to marriage, the

duty of a brother-in-law (yabam) is only for production of a male heir. The

widow remains the wife of the dead brother (cf. vs. 8a: Go in to your brother's

wife)." Coates maintains that the goal toward which Tamar's scheme moves is the

conception of a child, not marriage. His conclusion (p. 465) is that "the widow

can look for marriage from the brother-in-law or whoever fulfills the levirate

custom. But she has the right only for conception." His reasoning concerning the

purpose of Tamar's deception may well be correct but his attempt to link Tamar

and Ruth together in similar strategies must remain unconvincing. Cf. 7 n. 31.

Cf. H. H. Rowley, op. cit., p. 186, "The woman was still considered as the wife of

the dead man, and the brother was merely a substitute for him for a single

purpose. Again, levirate marriage had reference only to a single birth. The broth-

er-in-law had completed his duty when he had provided the dead with a single

heir." He feels (p. 187 n. 2) that the case of Judah, who was married and with

children, is significant, confirming that "an institution whose only raison d'etre in

Israel was to provide an heir for the dead would hardly function beyond the range


40                      The Levirate In Israel

 

parallel to the custom of niyoga mentioned in the laws of

Manu which reads: "But when the purpose of the appoint-

ment to cohabit with the widow has been attained in accor-

dance with the law, these two shall behave towards each

other like a father and daughter-in-law."25 Yet we must also

take notice of Genesis 38:14, "For she saw that Shelah was

grown up and she had not been given to him as wife"26 (xl

hwxl vl hntn). Such terminology, however, may have been

employed to emphasize that the "obligation of the levir_does

 

of its purpose." Later, however, (p. 192) he remarks, "it neither required nor

excluded full marriage."

            25. E. Bühler, The Laws of Manu, Sacred Books of the East, 25, 1886, p.

339. Such a parallel is viewed by M. Burrows, "The Ancient Oriental Background

of Hebrew Marriage," BASOR, 77, p. 6 (hereafter cited as "Background") as

being too remote to be of any significance in interpreting the Hebrew levirate.

Similarly, J. Mittelmann, op. cit., pp. 10, 11. Th. and D. Thompson, op. cit., p.

95, mention the parallel in the laws of Manu as being far afield but valuable! They

maintain that "because of its closeness to incest, it was felt necessary to limit the

levirate relationship to what was necessary to fulfill its purpose. It was certainly

not considered equivalent to marriage.” Chamberlayne, Man in Society,

1966, p. 65, refers the laws of Manu on the basis of which he regards it as

probable that the levirate duty was finished when a single son was born.

            26. The same phraseology is to be seen in Deut. 25:5. G. R. Driver and J. C.

Miles, op. cit., p. 243, argue that marriage is not required in the Deuteronomic

law of the levirate or in the Tamar incident. J. Mittelmann, op. cit., p. 11, writes,

"Weiter finden wir im A. T. an keiner den Levirat betreffenden Stelle ein Verbot

der Fortsetzung des Geschlechtsverkehrs nach der Zeugung des Leviratssohnes."

His reasons are interesting, in that they provide an example of the circular reason-

ing which is at times involved in this issue. Considering the data from Ruth as

implying levirate marriage, he is able to argue that the levirate duty involved

marriage for at least two reasons. One would be the clear statement of Ruth 4:13.

"So Boaz took Ruth and she became his wife." The second is the goel' s reluctance

to redeem the property (for fear of impairing his own inheritance). This reluc-

tance may be reasonably explained, according to Mittelmann, on the grounds that

a number of sons will come from the union which, when combined with his own

sons, will lead to the dismemberment of his estate, ibid, p. 13. There can be little

doubt that in the book of Ruth we have a full marriage taking place between Boaz

and Ruth. For this reason, our discussion of whether the levirate duty involved

marriage or merely cohabitation for the purpose of procreation is of some rele-

vance in the analysis of the goel marriage in Ruth. If the levirate duty were merely

to produce a son, and were not a levirate marriage, this would be an addition-

al argument in favor of differentiating between the levirate duty and the goel

marriage in Ruth. Noting this, H. H. Rowley, op. cit., p. 192, remarks, "Indeed, if

in the case of a brother-in-law such marriage [full marriage] would have been

excluded, it is hard to see how Ruth's marriage could have been brought within

the framework of the levirate custom at all."

 


                                The Levirate In Israel                               41

 

not stop short at furnishing a son to perpetuate the name of

the dead, but extends to the future security and status of the

woman.

            We must accept Rowley's plea for a greater flexibility in

our approach to the details of the levirate. He writes: "The

scanty evidence we have thus suggests that we ought to recog-

nize a much greater degree of looseness than some writers

allow Levirate marriage was not in early times limited to a

brother-in-law it neither required nor excluded full marriage;

it neither required nor excluded the unmarried condition of

the levirate partner."28

            We have been discussing Genesis 38 as background mate-

rial for the goel marriage in Ruth. A comparison between the

two is drawn by the elders and people who say to Boaz,

"May your house be like the house of Perez, whom Tamar

bore to Judah, because, of the children that the Lord will give

you by this young woman" (Ruth 4:12). We shall now pro-

ceed to Deuteronomy 25 which is generally regarded as the

key passage in discussions of the Hebrew levirate.

 

 

            27. W. McKane, "Ruth and Boaz," p. 30.

            28. H. H. Rowley, op. cit., p. 192.


42                            The Levirate In Israel

 

             The Levirate Law, Deuteronomy 25:5-10

 

The Persons Involved In the Levirate, Deuteronomy 25:5, 6.

 

            The law reads: "If brothers29 dwell together,30 (vbwy yk

vdHy MyHx) and one of them dies and has no son,31 the wife of

 

            29. Many kinship terms in the Bible have both a specific and a more general

usage. See F. I. Anderson, "Israelite Kinship Terminology and Social-Structure," BT,

20; 1969, pp. 29-39. Hx accordingly, has the meaning of a blood brother of the

same parents, as well as the more general meaning of a blood brother of the 

same clan, cf. Gen. 13:8; 19:7; 29:4; Lev. 25:25; Judg. 19:23. The later usage is

at the basis of the levirate as practiced by the Samaritans and the Jewish Karaite

sect. These groups held that the duty devolved not upon the blood brother but

the intimate friend, believing that the performance by the blood brothers of the

levirate violated the Levitical prohibition in Lev. 18:16 and Lev. 20:21. Cf. L.

Epstein, op. cit., pp. 89, 92. A. van Praag, Droit matrimonial assyro-babylonien,

1945, p. 109, remarks, "Si dans Deut. XXV 5-10, ‘la loi fondamentale du levirat',

le term frère avait un sens classificatoire, la clause que les frères doivent habiter

ensemble serait plus clairement un résidu de l'epoque patriarcale où les différ-

ents fils mariés d'un patriarche continuaient d'habiter, avec leurs femmes, chez

leur père; ainsi, les fils de ces fils, en grandissant ensemble, étaient regardés

comme des frères." He goes on to appeal to Lev. 25:25 and Ruth 4 to support his

opinion that Hx should be interpreted as brother in the wider sense.

            30. Cf. J. C. De Moor, "Lexical Remarks concerning Yahad and Yahdaw,"

VT, 7, 1957, pp. 350-355. Cf. Gen. 13:6; Gen. 36:7; and Ps. 133:1 for vbwy

vdHy. J. Pederson, op. cit., p. 508, interprets the living together as meaning "in

the same town" since the matter is an affair of the city. E. Neufeld, AHML, p. 40,

writes, "The word 'together' no doubt means here living on the same family estate

at the same time." The rabbinic tradition took vdHy temporally; thus: when they

lived contemporaneously. Any later born son would be thereby excluded. A.

Ehrlich, Randglossen zur Hebraischen Bibel, 2, 1909, p. 323, writes, "bwy kann

an dieser Stelle nur heissen: da sein, lehen, und der Ausdruck den Fall ausschlics-

sen, wo der verstorbene Bruder nicht Zeitgenosse des lebenden war." He gives the

following explanation for interpreting vdHy temporally: "Der Grund dieser

Beschränkung unserer Vorschrift liegt auf der Hand. Denn im Falle der verstor-

bene Bruder starb, noch ehe der lebende zur Welt kam, ist die Witwe des erstern

im gewöhnlichen Verlauf der Dinge zur Zeit, wo letzterer die geschlechtliche

Reife erlangt hat, zu alt, um Kinder zu gebaren und so den Zweck der Leviratsehe

zu erfüllen. Dabei kann aber auch der Umstand mitwirken, dass das Verwand-

schaftsgefuhl gegen einen Bruder, den man nie gesehen und nie sehen konnte, fur

ein so grosses Opfer zu gering ist. Denn die Leviratsehe war seitens des Mannes ein

sehr grosses Opfer."

            31. Nb; LXX: spe<rma. Josephus, Antiquities, IV, 8, 23, uses the term a

childless (a@teknoj) wife; so also Luke 20:28; Matt. 22:24; and Mark 12:19. The

word used by Judah in Gen. 38:8 is frz. If the inheritance of the family property

is in some way connected with levirate, Neufeld's observation that "in interpret-

ing the word Nb in its relation to the levirate the state of the law of inheritance at

different stages in the history of Israel becomes, the decisive factor," would be

valid (AHML, p. 45).


                                 The Levirate In Israel                                  43

 

the dead shall not be married outside the family (hcvHh)32 to

a stranger; her husband's brother (hmby)33 shall go in to her,

and take her as his wife, and perform the duty of a husband's

brother to her (hmbyv). And the first son whom she bears

shall succeed to the name (Mw lf Mvqy) of his brother

who is dead, that his name may not be blotted out of Israel."

            The key phrase in our understanding of who is affected

by the law is the phrase "brothers dwelling together."34 It is

generally assumed that this law presupposes the existence of

the patriarchal family with the father as authority over his

wife and children, even over the married sons living with him

 

            32. See Judg. 12:9 for a comparable use of this word. J. Mittelmann, op.

cit., p. 30, concludes from this word "dass hier die Rede ist von einem in örtlicher

Gemeinschaft lebenden Verwandten - Verbande, dem sämtliche Bruder mit ihren

Familien angehoren und aus dem die Witwe nicht ausscheiden soil." R. Meren-

dino, Das Deuteronomische Gesetz, (Bonner Biblische Beiträge, 31), 1969, p.

319, comments on hcvH: "Das Wort setzt eine scharfe Grenze zwischen der

Familie und den nicht dazu Gehörigen."

            33. Mby, is used in Deut. 25:5, 7 to refer to the dead husband's brother:

hmby, is used in Deut. 25:7, 9 to refer to the brother's widow and further alone in

Ruth 1:15 where it refers to the widow of the brother of a wife's husband. J.

Vesco, "La Date du Livre de Ruth," RB, 1967, p. 243, cites this as a possible

linguistic argument for a late date for Ruth: "Si le livre de Ruth emploie ce nom

sans lui donner son séns précis mais en lui accordant une signification plus large,

n'est-ce pas l'indice que le livre de Ruth a été écrit, à une, époque où la législation

léviratique n'était plus d'un usage fréquent et où le vocabulaire de la parenté

devenait plus large?" See also, M. David, "The Date of the Book of Ruth," OTS,

1941-42, p. 62; C. Rodd, "The Family in the Old Testament," BT, 18, 1967, p. 20.

One need not assume imprecise usage in Ruth 1:15. For a similar usage which

parallels the twofold use of hmby, one can point to hdvd in Exod. 6:20, meaning

father's sister and in Lev. 18:14, meaning wife of father's brother. Hebrew has a

special verb for the performing of the levirate (Mby) which may be evidence of the

importance of the levirate duty; cf. S. R. Driver, Deuteronomy, pp. 282, 283. For

a discussion of the root cf. E. Neufeld, AHML, p. 231. M. Burrows, "Back-

ground," pp. 6, 7, following a suggestion of Albright's, calls attention to the

epithet "ybmt limm" for the goddess Anat in the Ras Shamra texts. W. Albright,

"Recent Progress in North Canaanite Research," BA, 70, 1938, p. 19 n. 6, sug-

gested that "ybmt limm" means "progenitress of the peoples." The word devel-

oped the meaning brother-in-law and sister-in-law because of their involvement in

the yibbum, the levirate marriage. C. Gordon, UT, 1965, p. 408, suggested that

"progenitress of heroes" may be a correct rendering of "ybmt limm." Th. and D.

Thompson, op. cit., p. 85, write, "We ought not to translate yibbum as levirate'

but as 'progenitor marriage' or the like. It is the progeny rather than any previous

relationship between the couple that is significant in this custom." Cf. J. Gray,

The Legacy of Canaan (SVT, 5), 19652, pp. 40, 271, 272.

            34. Cf. n. 30.


44                       The Levirate In Israel

 

and their wives.35 Furthermore, it is commonly asserted that

this law is operative only where brothers are dwelling to-

gether.36 Mittelmann is representative when he writes, "Da

das Gesetz die Erfüllung der Leviratspflicht nur von zusam-

menwohnenden Brüdern fordert, ist der Gegenschluss ge-

rechtfertigt, dass nach dem Willen des Gcsetzgebers der nach-

geborene Bruder nicht der Leviratspflicht unterliegen soll, da

er mit dem Verstorbenen nicht zusammengewohnt haben

kann, dass ferner Brüder, die in verschiedenen Orten, Län-

dern oder Erdteilen wohnen, nicht leviratspflichtig rein

sollen."37

            Our understanding of this phrase "dwell together" takes

on significance when the question is posed, "Is the levirate

connected with the laws of inheritance?" As we shall present-

ly see, the phrase "succeed to the name of the dead brother"

 has some connection with  the rights of inheritance.38 Should

 

            35. R. de Vaux, Ancient Israel, 1961, p. 20. He believes the proper word to

describe the Israelite family is bx tyb, "the house of one's father." T. Mitchell,

"Family," NBD, 1962, p. 415, regards Josh. 7:16-18 as instructive in understand-

ing the relation between the tribe, clan and house. "Conceptually the members of

a tribe can be pictured as a cone with the founding ancestor at the apex and the

living generation at the base." See also F. I. Anderson, op. cit., pp. 29, 30.

            36. G. von Rad, Deuteronomy, 1966, pp. 154, 155; D. Mace, op. cit., p.

110; G. R. Driver and J. C. Miles, The Assyrian Laws, 1935, p. 243; I. Mattuck,

"Levirate Marriage in Jewish Law," Studies in Jewish Literature in Honor of

Kaufman Kohler, 1913, p. 211; H. Schaeffer, Social Legislation of the Primitive

Semites, 1915, p. 59; S. R. Driver, Deuteronomy, p. 282. According to L.

Epstein, op. cit., p. 88, "Dwelling together, which alone permits the levirate

situation, presupposes a patriarchal family structure, and where there is no patri-

archal family there is no levirate." This is in accord with the very strong distinc-

tion which he draws between levirate marriage and geullah marriage. Both existed

at the same time. "Brothers dwelling together performed levirate, when not dwell-

ing together, they performed the ge'ullah courtesy." Levirate marriage was rare

and came to an end with the breakdown of the patriarchal family.

            37. J. Mittelmann, op. cit., p. 31.

            38. In later Jewish writing the meaning of "to succeed to the name" is "to

inherit the property." According to Tannaitic tradition the child of the levirate

union was the levir’s and the levir was the inheritor of the property, cf. S. Belkin,

op. cit., p. 289. Such an understanding is contrary to the literal intent of the text

"and the first son whom she bears shall succeed to the name of his brother who

is dead." I. Mattuck, op. cit., p. 217, refers to the "forced interpretation" of rvkb

which "is made to mean that the duty of the marriage devolves first upon the

oldest of the surviving brothers." He adds: "The reason for transferring the inheri-


                            The Levirate In Israel                               45

 

we then see in the phrase "brothers dwelling together" an

additional indication that inheritance is an important factor

in the levirate? Epstein answers in the negative since he be-

lieves that "the levirate situation arises while the patriarch is

still alive and heads his corporate family. It is one of the sons

who has died childless and left a widow. There is no question

of disposing of an estate, because the patriarch is still alive. It

is a matter of conserving property right in the childless

widow and perpetuating the name of the deceased.”39 This is

the complete opposite of the opinion held by Driver and

Miles, who call attention to the absence in this law of any

inclusion of a duty on the part of the father (similar to the

duty of Judah). They feel that he must be dead, in which

case the brothers are sharing the inheritance.40 They see the

situation pictured in the phrase "dwelling together" paral-

leled in the MAL by the phrase "brothers who have not

divided the inheritance"41 which would indicate their living

on a joint estate.

            Such a family pattern described in the phrase "brothers

 

tance from the son to the brother-in-law is the recognition of his right to inherit

his brother's property at the same time that he inherits the widow." S. Belkin, op.

cit., pp. 290, 291, explains the change remarking: "Our sages could not and

would not visualize that the son born from the levies seed should legally be

recognized as, the seed of the deceased.... If the levir's son exclusively inherited

the property of the deceased, the levirate union would ofttimes not be consum-

mated, due to the financial complexities inherent.... On this account the Rabbis

explained the biblical law, establishing therewith the legality of the natural father

(the levir) to be also the legal heir of the deceased's estate. Under these condi-

tions, the usual ground for objecting to the fulfilment of the levirate duty was

removed."

            39. L. Epstein, op. cit., p. 86.

            40. G. R. Driver and J. C. Miles, op. cit., p. 243. Cf. n. 18.

            41. G. R. Driver and J. C. Miles, op. cit., p. 243. See Meek's translation of

MAL, B, §2, 3 (ANET, p. 185): "If one among brothers who have not divided

(the inheritance) took a life, they shall give him up to the next-of-kin; if he

chooses, the next-of-kin may put him to death, or if he chooses, he may spare

(him) (and) take his share. If one among brothers who have not divided (the

inheritance) uttered treason or ran away, the king (shall deal) with his share as he

thinks fit." A. F. Puukko, "Die altassyrischen und hethitischen Gesetze und das

Alte Testament," StOr, 1, 1925, p. 132, comments, "Die Wendung [the brothers

of an undivided estate] ist dieselbe wie Dt 25:5 wenn Brüder beisammen (d. h. in

der ungeteilten Hinterlassenschaft) wohnen."


46                    The Levirate In Israel

 

dwelling together" is indisputably ancient.42 Neufeld re-

marks, "Although the Deuteronomic levirate law had in view

a restriction of the levirate obligation, the way in which the

law is framed leaves little doubt that it bears the traces of an

ancient custom of Hebrew family law which was no doubt

out of date in Deuteronomic times.”43 Driver and Miles re-

flect on the consortium of brothers and ask why such a word-

ing is included in the Deuteronomic law. They see the phrase

"dwelling together" as reflecting the ancient situation where

inheritances were impartible. They maintain that "when the

law which now stands in Deuteronomy was originally laid

down, brothers generally did dwell together, and the Deuter-

onomic compiler has left the phrase where it is either per

incuriam or because he wished to restrict the custom as far as

possible."44 The latter explanation seems somewhat artificial,

since it is doubtful whether the lawgiver would deliberately

legislate a situation he knew to be virtually nonexistent in

order to restrict the practice of the levirate.45

            Daube argues convincingly that in Deuteronomy 25, "the

legislation about levirate marriage, as conceived by its author,

dealt with consortium, brothers who on their father's death

remained together on the paternal estate.... In this case, if

one died without leaving children and the survivor refused to

raise seed for him in order that his place in the consortium

should be filled again, the widow could summon the traitor

before the elders.”46 As over against the situation reflected in

 

            42. Cf. Z. Falk's review of R. de Vaux's Les Institutions de l'Ancien Testa-

ment, in JJS, 9, 1958, p. 202, where he comments on the levirate law, "Our

passage, however, seems to be based on an earlier law. It was formulated when

‘brethren dwelt together,’ i.e. during the patriarchal stage."

            43. E. Neufeld, AHML, pp. 41, 42.

            44. G. R. Driver and J. C. Miles, op. cit., p. 243.

            45. Cf. A. Noordtzij, Het Boek Levitikus, KV, 1940, p. 16, who comments:

"Die onderstelde wetgevers waren toch zeker geen archeologen! Ze schreven toch

voor hun eigen tijd, wilden hun wetten toch door hun tijdgenooten gehoorzaamd

zien. En dan toch voorschriften geven, die in hun tijd ten eenenmale onuitvoer-

baar waren?!"

            46. D. Daube, "Consortium," pp. 89, 90, J. Mittelmann, op. cit., pp. 30, 31,

is of a similar opinion when he remarks that "der Gesetzgeber bei der Form-


                               The Levirate In Israel                                 47

 

Genesis 38, in which the father was alive, Daube maintains

that the Deuteronomic lawgiver refers to a situation in which

the estate had not been partitioned after a father's death but

the inheritance held in common. As evidence to support his

view that the phrase "brothers dwelling together" refers to

consortium, Daube cites Psalm 133:1. He finds references to

the consortium institution in early Hebrew law in the stories

of Abraham and Lot and Jacob and Esau (Gen. 13:1 ff., 6;

36:6, 7) where the phrase "to dwell together" is found.

Daube gives several reasons for believing that the law operates

in the situation where the father is dead. "If the lawgiver had

in mind the ordinary case where the paterfamilias is still alive,

            (1) the expression 'if brethren dwell together and one of

them die' would be strange, and one would expect something

like 'If a man take a wife for his son and this son die. . . .’

            (2) Similarly, the expression 'her husband's brother shall

go in unto her and take her to him to wife' would be strange,

and one would expect something like 'the paterfamilias shall

send her husband's brother in unto her and give her unto

him.. .’

            (3) If the paterfamilias were still alive, one would expect

him to be strong enough to force the remaining brother to

marry the widow even if he did not wish to do so. . . .

            (4) At least, one would expect the paterfamilias to play

some part in the proceedings laid down in the case of disobe-

dience on the part of the survivor."47

            Daube appears to be arguing for the original Sitz im Leben

of the levirate law and his argument is cogently presented.

The application of the levirate law to additional cases (where

the father is alive or where the father is dead and the brothers

separate, taking their own inheritance portion) is a later

 

ulierung des Gesetzes in erster Linie an Brüder gedacht haben, die als Bauern in

fortgesetzter Erbengemeinschaft auf dem vdterlichen Grund and Boden gemein-

sam Leben." Similarly, H. Brongers, Oud-Oosters en Bijbels Recht, 1960, p. 199.

            47. D. Daube, "Consortium," pp. 72, 73. Cf. also Daube's review of L.

Epstein, Marriage Laws in the Bible and the Talmud in BiOr, 3-4, 1947, pp. 32-35.


48                     The Levirate In Israel

 

development "when the primitive consortium had become

obsolete and forgotten."48

            At the beginning of our discussion of the phrase "broth-

ers dwelling together," we noted that most scholars assume

that the levirate law operates only where brothers are dwell-

ing together; that the law provides the exclusive conditions

under which the levirate duty was to be in effect, but it is

questionable whether the levirate law is to be understood in

such a fashion; that is, as prescribing exhaustively the situa-

tion in which the levirate operated. Rather, as Th. and D.

Thompson state, "When Deuteronomy speaks of brothers

dwelling together, it is not specifying the limits under which

the law is binding. It is describing the typical situation under

which the law would normally be used."49 The law is then

 legislating how the responsibility toward the deceased and

the deceased's widow customarily operated. Normally, the

brother50 of the deceased, being the nearest of kin and best

suited to act for the deceased, will be called upon to raise up

seed for the deceased. However, it should not be understood

as if the levirate was performed only under the conditions

and through the specific parties mentioned in the Deutero-

nomic law.

 

The Purpose of the Levirate, Deuteronomy 25:6.

 

            We must now enter into the very heart of the levirate

marriage institution and to the crucial question of its purpose

as construed by the Deuteronomic legislation. In particular,

we must inquire into the meaning of Deuteronomy 25:6.

There it is stated that the first-born of the levirate union

 

            48. D. Daube, "Consortium,". p. 90. H. H. Rowley, op. cit., p. 175 n. 3,

objects to Daube's position and remarks, "This would seem to distinguish the

marriage of Ruth too sharply from levirate marriage, and would make the refer-

ences to Deut. 25:5-10 and Gen. 38 in the book of Ruth hard to explain."

Rowley's objection does not sufficiently take into consideration, however, that

Daube is arguing for the primitive life setting contained in the phrase "brothers

dwelling together."

            49. Th. and D. Thompson, op. cit., p. 90.

            50. J. Pedersen, op. cit., p. 78: "When the brother is mentioned as the one

to take this obligation upon himself, it is because he is the nearest of kin to the


                            The Levirate In Israel                                49

 

"shall succeed to the name of his brother who is dead, that

his name may not be blotted out of Israel." What is the

meaning of the phrase Mw lf Mvqy?  What is meant by the

statement of purpose "that his name may not be blotted out

of Israel"? We find similar phraseology in verse 7 where the

widow's accusation against the levir is that "he refuses to

perpetuate his brother's name in Israel" (Myqhl ymby Nxm

lxrWyb Mw vyHxl). In the halisah ceremony the brother-in-

law who rejects his duty is referred to as the one who is not

willing to build up his brother's house (v. 9). We must en-

quire into these statements relating to the distinctive purpose

of the levirate in Israel. There can be little doubt that, ac-

cording to Deuteronomy, the purpose of the levirate was to

provide the dead man with a son," which in Israelite think-

 

deceased and best suited to act in his name, just as he is the man from whom it is

most fair to exact the fulfillment of this duty."

            51. It is difficult to believe that in v. 5 "son