Journal of the American Scientific Affiliation 32.1 (March 1980) 5-13.

               [American Scientific Affiliation, Copyright © 1980;  cited with permission]

 

             Philosophical and Scientific Pointers

                     to Creatio ex Nihilo

 

                                    William Lane Craig

                         Trinity Evangelical Divinity School

                                     Deerfield, IL 60015

 

     To answer Leibniz's question of why something exists rather than

nothing, we must posit three alternatives:  the universe either had a

beginning or had no beginning; if it had a beginning, this was either

caused or uncaused; if caused, the cause was either personal or not

personal.  Four lines of evidence, two philosophical and two

scientific, point to a beginning of the universe.  If the universe had a

beginning, it is inconceivable that it could have sprung uncaused out

of absolute nothingness.  Finally, the cause of the universe must be

personal in order to have a temporal effect produced by an eternal

cause.  This confirms the biblical doctrine of creatio ex nihilo.

 

     ". . . The first question which should rightly be asked,"

Wrote Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, is "Why is there some-

thing rather than nothing?"1  I want you to think about

that for a moment.  Why does anything exist at all, rather

than nothing?  Why does the universe, or matter, or any-

thing at all exist, instead of just nothing, instead of just

empty space?

     Many great minds have been puzzled by this problem.

For example, in his biography of the renowned philoso-

pher Ludwig Wittgenstein, Norman Malcolm reports,

 

     . . . he said that he sometimes had a certain experience which could

best be described by saying that 'when I have it, I wonder at the

existence of the world.  I am then inclined to use such phrases as

"How extraordinary that anything "should exist!" or "How ex-

traordinary that the world should exist!"'2

                                      5a



CREATIO  EX  NIHILO                    5b

 

Similarly, the English philosopher J. J. C. Smart has said,

". . . my mind often seems to reel under the immense

significance this question has for me.  That anything exists

at all does seem to me a matter for the deepest awe."3

     Why does something exist instead of nothing?  Unless

We are prepared to believe that the universe simply

popped into existence uncaused out of nothing, then the

answer must be:  something exists because there is an

eternal, uncaused being for which no further explanation

is possible.  But who or what is this eternal, uncaused

being?  Leibniz identified it with God.  But many modern

philosophers have identified it with the universe itself.

Now this is exactly the position of the atheist:  the universe

itself is uncaused and eternal; as Russell remarks, ". . . the

universe is just there, and that's all."4  But this means, of

course, that all we are left with is futility and despair,

for man's life would then be without ultimate significance,

value, or purpose.  Indeed, Russell himself acknowledges

that it is only upon the "firm foundation of unyielding

despair" that life can be faced.5  But are there reasons to

think that the universe is not eternal and uncaused, that

there is something more?  I think that there are.  For we

can consider the universe by means of a series of logical

alternatives:

Universe

 

 

beginning               no beginning

 

 


caused                  not caused

 

 


     personal           not personal

 

 



WILLIAM  LANE  CRAIG                6a

 

By proceeding through these alternatives, I think we can

demonstrate that it is reasonable to believe that the uni-

verse is not eternal, but that it had a beginning and was

caused by a personal being, and that therefore a personal

Creator of the universe exists.

 

Did the Universe Begin?

     The first and most crucial step to be considered in this

argument is the first:  that the universe began to exist.

There are four reasons why I think it is more reasonable

to believe that the universe had a beginning.  First, I shall

expound two philosophical arguments and, second, two

scientific confirmations.

 

The first philosophical argument:

1. An actual infinite cannot exist.

2. A beginningless series of events in time is an actual infinite.

3. Therefore, a beginningless series of events in time cannot exist.

 

    A collection of things is said to be actually infinite only

if a part of it is equal to the whole of it.  For example, which

is greater?  1, 2, 3, . . . or 0, 1, 2, 3, . . .  According to prevailing

mathematical thought, the answer is that they are equiva-

lent because they are both actually infinite.  This seems

strange because there is an extra number in one series

that cannot be found in the other.  But this only goes to

show that in an actually infinite collection, a part of the

collection is equal to the whole of the collection.  For the

same reason, mathematicians state that the series of even

numbers is the same size as the series of all natural num-

bers, even though the series of all natural numbers con-

tains all the even numbers plus an infinite number of odd

numbers as well.  So a collection is actually infinite if a part

of it is equal to the whole of it.

     Now the concept of an actual infinite needs to be

sharply distinguished from the concept of a potential

infinite.  A potential infinite is a collection that is increasing



WILLIAM  LANE  CRAIG                6b

 

without limit but is at all times finite.  The concept of

potential infinity usually comes into play when we add

to or subtract from something without stopping.  Thus,

a finite distance may be said to contain a potentially in-

finite number of smaller finite distances.  This does not

mean that there actually are an infinite number of parts

in a finite distance, but rather it means that one can keep

on dividing endlessly.  But one will never reach an "infi-

nitieth" division.  Infinity merely serves as the limit to

which the process approaches.  Thus, a potential infinite

is not truly infinite--it is simply indefinite.  It is at all points

finite but always increasing.

     To sharpen the distinction between an actual and a

potential infinite, we can draw some comparisons be-

tween them.  The concept of actual infinity is used in set

theory to designate a set which has an actually infinite

number of members in it.  But the concept of potential

infinity finds no place in set theory.  This is because the

members of a set must be definite, whereas a potential

infinite is indefinite--it acquires new members as it grows.

Thus, set theory has only either finite or actually infinite

sets.  The proper place for the concept of the potential

infinite is found in mathematical analysis, as in infini-

tesimal calculus.  There a process may be said to increase

or diminish to infinity, in the sense that the process can be

continued endlessly with infinity as its terminus.6  The

concept of actual infinity does not pertain in these opera-

tions because an infinite number of operations is never

actually made.  According to the great German mathe-

matician David Hilbert, the chief difference between

an actual and a potential infinite is that a potential infinite

is always something growing toward a limit of infinity,

while an actual infinite is a completed totality with an

actually infinite number of things.7  A good example con-

trasting these two types of infinity is the series of past,

present, and future events.  For if the universe is eternal,

as the atheist claims, then there have occurred in the past



WILLIAM  LANE  CRAIG                6c

 

an actually infinite number of events.  But from any point

in the series of events, the number of future events is

potentially infinite.  Thus, if we pick 1845, the birthyear

of Georg Cantor, who discovered infinite sets, as our point

of departure, we can see that past events constitute an

actual infinity while future events constitute a potential

infinity.  This is because the past is realized and complete,

whereas the future is never fully actualized, but is always

finite and always increasing.  In the following discussion,

it is exceedingly important to keep the concepts of actual

infinity and potential infinity distinct and not to confuse

them.

     A second clarification that I must make concerns the

word "exist."  When I say that an actual infinite cannot

exist, I mean "exist in the real world" or "exist outside

the mind."  I am not in any way questioning the legitimacy

of using the concept of actual infinity in the realm of

mathematics, for this is a realm of thought only.  What I

am arguing is that an actual infinite cannot exist in the

real world of stars and planets and rocks and men.  What

I will argue in no way threatens the use of the actual in-

finite as a concept in mathematics.  But I do think it is

absurd that an actual infinite could exist in the real world.

     I think that probably the best way to show this is to use

examples to illustrate the absurdities that would result

if an actual infinite could exist in reality.  For suppose we

have a library that has an actually infinite number of books,

on its shelves. Imagine furthermore that there are only

two colors, black and red, and these are placed on the

shelves alternately: black, red, black, red, and so forth.

Now if somebody told us that the number of black books

and the number of red books is the same, we would prob-

ably not be too surprised.  But would we believe someone

who told us that the number of black books is the same

as the number of black books plus red books?  For in this

latter collection there are all the black books plus an in-

finite number of red books as well.  Or imagine there are



WILLIAM  LANE  CRAIG                6d

 

three colors of books or four or five or a hundred.  Would

you believe someone if he told you that there are as many

books in a single color as there are in the whole collection?

Or imagine that there are an infinite number of colors

of books.  I'll bet you would think that there would be

one book per color in the infinite collection.  You would

be wrong.  If the collection is actually infinite then ac-

cording to mathematicians, there could be for each of

the infinite colors an infinite number of books.  So you

would have an infinity of infinities. And yet it would still

be true that if you took all the books of all the colors and

 

 



CREATIO  EX  NIHILO                    7a

 

added them together, you wouldn't have any more books

than if you had taken just the books of a single color.

     Suppose each book had a number printed on its spine.

Because the collection is actually infinite, that means

that every possible number is printed on some book.

Now this means that we could not add another book to

the library.  For what number would we give to it?  All

the numbers have been used up!  Thus, the new book

could not have a number.  But this is absurd, since objects

in reality can be numbered.  So if an infinite library could

exist, it would be impossible to add another book to it.

But this conclusion is obviously false, for all we have to

do is tear out a page from each of the first hundred books,

add a title page, stick them together, and put this new

book on the shelf.  It would be easy to add to the library.

So the only answer must be that an actually infinite library

could not exist.

     But suppose we could add to the library.  Suppose I

put a book on the shelf.  According to the mathematicians,

the number of books in the whole collection is the same

as before.  But how can this be?  If I put the book on the

shelf, there is one more book in the collection.  If I take

it off the shelf, there is one less book.  I can see myself

add and remove the book.  Am I really to believe that

when I add the book there are no more books in the col-

lection and when I remove it there are no less books?

Suppose I add an infinity of books to the collection.  Am I

seriously to believe there are no more books in the col-

lection than before?  Suppose I add an infinity of infinities

of books to the collection.  Is there not now one single book

more in the collection than before?  I find this hard to

believe.

     But now let's reverse the process.  Suppose we decide

to loan out some of the books.  Suppose we loan out book

number 1.  Isn't there now one less book in the collection?

Suppose we loan out all the odd-numbered books.  We

have loaned out an infinite number of books, and yet



CREATIO  EX  NIHILO                    7b

 

mathematicians would say there are no less books in the

collection.  Now when we loaned out all these books, that

left an awful lot of gaps on the shelves.  Suppose we push

all the books together again and close the gaps.  All these

gaps added together would add up to an infinite distance.

But, according to mathematicians, after you pushed the

books together, the shelves will still be full, the same as

before you loaned any out!  Now suppose once more we

loaned out every other book.  There would still be no less

books in the collection than before. And if we pushed all

the books together again, the shelves would still be full.

In fact, we could do this an infinite number of times,

and there would never be one less book in the collection

and the shelves would always remain full.  But suppose we

loaned out book numbers 4, 5, 6, . . . out to infinity.  At

a single stroke, the collection would be virtually wiped

out, the shelves emptied, and the infinite library reduced

to finitude.  And yet, we have removed exactly the same

number of books this time as when we first loaned out all

the odd numbered books!  Can anybody believe such

a library could exist in reality?

     These examples serve to illustrate that an actual infi-

nate cannot exist in the real world.  Again I want to under-

line the fact that what I have argued in no way attempts

to undermine the theoretical system bequeathed by Can-

tor to modern mathematics.  Indeed, some of the most

eager enthusiasts of trans-finite mathematics, such as

David Hilbert, are only too ready to agree that the concept

of actual infinite is an idea only and has no relation to the

real world.  So we can conclude the first step: an actual

infinite cannot exist.

     The second step is: a beginningless series of events in

time is an actual infinite.  By "event" I mean something

that happens.  Thus, this step is concerned with change,

and it holds that if the series of past events or changes just

goes back and back and never had a beginning, then, con-

sidered all together, these events constitute an actually



CREATIO  EX  NIHILO                    7c

 

infinite collection.  Let me provide an example.  Suppose

we ask someone where a certain star came from.  He re-

plies that it came from an explosion in a star that existed

before it.  Suppose we ask again, where did that star come

from?  Well, it came from another star before it.  And

where did that star come from?--from another star before

it; and so on and so on.  This series of stars would be an ex-

ample of a beginningless series of events in time.  Now if

the universe has existed forever, then the series of all past

events taken together constitutes an actual infinite.  This is

because for every event in the past, there was an event

before it.  Thus, the series of past events would be infinite.

Nor could it be potentially infinite only, for we have seen

that the past is completed and actual; only the future can

be described as a potential infinite.  Therefore, it seems

pretty obvious that a beginningless series of events in time

is an actual infinite.

    But that leads us to our conclusion: therefore, a begin-

ningless series of events in time cannot exist.  We have seen

that an actual infinite cannot exist in reality.  Since a be-

ginningless series of events in time is an actual infinite,

such a series cannot exist.  That means the series of all past

events must be finite and have a beginning.  But because

the universe is the series of all events, this means that the

universe must have had a beginning.

     Let me give a few examples to make the point clear.  We

have seen that if an actual infinite could exist in reality, it

would be impossible to add to it.  But the series of events in

time is being added to every day.  Or at least so it appears.

If the series were actually infinite, then the number of

events that have occurred up to the present moment is no

greater than the number of events up to, say, 1789.  In fact,

you can pick any point in the past.  The number of events

that have occurred up to the present moment would be no

greater than the number of events up to that point, no

matter how long ago it might be.

    Or take another example.  Suppose Earth and Jupiter



CREATIO  EX  NIHILO                    7d

 

have been orbiting the sun from eternity.  Suppose that it

takes the Earth one year to complete one orbit, and that it

takes Jupiter three years to complete one orbit.  Thus for

every one orbit Jupiter completes, Earth completes three.

Now here is the question:  if they have been orbiting from

eternity, which has completed more orbits?  The answer is:

they are equal.  But this seems absurd, since the longer they

went, the farther and farther Jupiter got behind, since every

time Jupiter went around the sun once, Earth went around

three times.  How then could they possibly be equal?



WILLIAM  LANE  CRAIG                8a

 

     Or, finally, suppose we meet a man who claims to have

been counting from eternity, and now he is finishing: -5, -4,

-3, -2, -1, 0.  Now this is impossible.  For, we may ask, why

didn't he finish counting yesterday or the day before or the

year before?  By then an infinity of time had already

elapsed, so that he should have finished.  The fact is we

could never find anyone completing such a task because at

any previous point he would have already finished.  But

what this means is that there could never be a point in the

past at which he finished counting.  In fact we could never

find him counting at all.  For he would have already fin-

ished.  But if no matter how far back in time we go, we

never find him counting, then it cannot be true that he has

been counting from eternity.  This shows once more that

the series of past events cannot be beginningless.  For if

you could not count numbers from eternity, neither could

you have events from eternity.

    These examples underline the absurdity of a beginning-

less series of events in time.  Because such a series is an

actual infinite, and an actual infinite cannot exist, a begin-

ningless series of events in time cannot exist.  This means

that the universe began to exist, which is the point that we

set out to prove.

     

The second philosophical argument:

1. The series of events in time is a collection formed by adding one

member after another.

2. A collection formed by adding one member after another can-

not be actually infinite.

3. Therefore, the series of events in time cannot be actually in-

finite.

 

This argument does not argue that an actual infinite cannot

exist.  But it does argue that an actual infinite cannot come

to exist by the members of a collection being added one

after the other.

     The series of events in time is a collection formed by



WILLIAM  LANE  CRAIG                8b

 

adding one member after another.  This point is pretty

obvious.  When we consider the collection of all past

events, it is obvious that those events did not exist simul-

taneously--all at once--but they existed one after another

in time:  we have one event, then another after that, then

another, then another, and so on.  So when we talk about

the collection of "all past events," we are talking about a

collection that has been formed by adding one member

after another.

      The second step is the crucial one: a collection formed

by adding one member after another cannot be actually

infinite.  Why?--because no matter how many members a

person added to the collection, he could always add one

more.  Therefore, he would never arrive at infinity.  Some-

times this is called the impossibility of counting to infinity.

For no matter how many numbers you had counted, you

could always count one more.  You would never arrive at

infinity.  Or sometimes this is called the impossibility of

traversing the infinite.  For you could never cross an infin-

ite distance.  Imagine a man running up a flight of stairs.

Suppose every time his foot strikes the top step, another

step appears above it.  It is clear that the man could run for-

ever, but he would never cross all the steps because you

could always add one more step.

     Now notice that this impossibility has nothing to do with

the amount of time available.  It is of the very nature of the

infinite that it cannot be formed by adding one member

after another, regardless of the amount of time available.

Thus, the only way an infinite collection could come to

exist in the real world would be by having all the members

created simultaneously.  For example, if our library of in-

finite books were to exist in the real world, it would have

to be created instantaneously by God.  God would say:

"Let there be. . . !" and the library would come into exis-

tence all at once.  But it would be impossible to form the

library by adding one book at a time, for you would never

arrive at infinity.



WILLIAM  LANE  CRAIG                8c

 

     Therefore, our conclusion must be:  the series of events

in time cannot be actually infinite.  Suppose there were, for

example, an infinite number of days prior to today.  Then

today would never arrive.  For it is impossible to cross an

infinite number of days to reach today.  But obviously,

today has arrived. Therefore, we know that prior to today

there cannot have been an infinite number of days.  That

means that the number of days is finite and therefore the

universe had a beginning.  Contemporary philosophers

have shown themselves to be impotent to refute this

reasoning.9  Thus, one of them asks,

 

     If an infinite series of events has preceded the present moment,

     how did we get to the present moment?  How could we get to the

     present moment--where we obviously are now--if the present

     moment was preceded by an infinite series of events?10

 

     Concluding that this difficulty has not been overcome and

that the issue is still in dispute, Hospers passes on to an-

other subject, leaving the argument unrefuted.  Similarly

another philosopher comments rather weakly, "It is dif-

ficult to show exactly what is wrong with this argument,"

and with that remark moves on without further ado.11

     Therefore, since the series of events in time is a collec-

tion formed by adding one member after another, and

since such a collection cannot be actually infinite, the

series of events in time cannot be actually infinite.  And

once more, since the universe is nothing else than the series

of events, the universe must have had a beginning, which

is precisely the point we wanted to prove.

      The first scientific confirmation:  the evidence from the

expansion of the universe.  Prior to the 1920's, scientists

assumed that the universe as a whole was a stationary ob-

ject--it was not going anywhere.  But in 1929 an astrono-

mer named Edwin Hubble contended that this was not

true.  Hubble observed that the light from distant galaxies

appeared to be redder than it should be.  He explained this



WILLIAM  LANE  CRAIG                8d

 

by proposing that the universe is expanding.  Therefore,

the light from the stars is affected since they are moving

away from us.  But this is the interesting part:  Hubble not

only showed that the universe is expanding, but that it is

expanding the same in all directions.  To get a picture of

this, imagine a balloon with dots painted on it.  As you

blow up the balloon, the dots get further and further apart.

Now those dots are just like the galaxies in space.  Every-

thing in the universe is expanding outward.  Thus, the rela-

tions in the universe do not change, only the distances.

     Now the staggering implication of this is that this means